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| THE FUTURE OF PAY EQUITY ENFORCEMENT IN CANADA BY MARY CORNISH & FAY FARADAY Cavalluzzo Hayes Shilton McIntyre & Cornish Prepared for the LEAF
National Forum on Equality Rights, |
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| As we look forward to the
twenty-first century, women must continue the fight for fair and non-discriminatory wages.
Although there are many laws across the country which are intended to eradicate wage
discrimination, many women have not yet achieved pay equity. Many women continue to work
for discriminatory pay. This paper focuses on strategies for pursuing pay equity for women across Canada. It focuses on how to use old legislation in new ways to achieve pay equity and it addresses strategies for combatting new impediments to enforcing existing pay equity entitlements. Before addressing the future of pay equity enforcement, though, it is useful to have a snap shot of where we are at right now: what laws do we have now? and what kinds of remedies are available? Part II of this paper, then, reviews of the traditional laws and enforcement procedures for seeking pay equity. Part III addresses non-traditional laws and enforcement strategies, such as grievances under collective agreement, unfair labour practice complaints before labour relations boards and Charter of Rights litigation to achieve pay equity. Finally, Part IV addresses the need to continue efforts in the political sphere to keep the issue of pay equity on the political agenda and to combat the anti-equity ideology which has risen in combination with the ideology of deficit-reduction at all costs. Although recognizing that women who work in non-unionized workplaces have particular difficulty in achieving pay equity, this paper addresses tools that can be used primarily by unions. A separate presentation in connection with this panel addresses the circumstances of women in non-unionized workplaces. |
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| This section of the paper addresses
the traditional analyses for addressing pay equity and the use of traditional forms
of adjudication to remedy pay equity. A. The Nature of the Pay Equity Problem The nature of the wage discrimination problem can be stated simply: "Women's work" is paid less than "men's work". Women are paid approximately 70 cents on the dollar compared to men's wages. But beyond this simple disparity, when considering what equity-seeking strategy to pursue, it is important to remember that
The occupational segregation of labour both at a systemic level and in an individual workplace has an enormous impact on the possible strategies for identifying wage discrimination. This segregation controls what choices women have for accessing remedial legislation and it controls what comparisons they can make to male (i.e., "equitable") wages. The enforcement strategy that one choses to pursue pay equity will clearly be driven by the composition of the workforce and the particular establishment in question. But it is useful to keep the fundamental structure of wage discrimination in mind because ultimately the legal frameworks and adjudicative bodies which are now used to achieve equal pay may not be a good match for the underlying problem. Our strategies for seeking equity should address this shortcoming. B. What is Equity? Three
Definitions of Equality A review of laws across Canada reveals that there are basically three adjudicative bodies that are specifically charged with addressing wage discrimination complaints:
When considering where to go for equity, it is necessary to be aware that each of these three bodies defines fair wages differently. Not all conceptions of "equality" are equal. The existing statutes set out three different definitions of fair wages. 1. Equal Pay for Equal Work The first definition of fair wages is equal pay for equal work. Under this definition, equal pay is achieved if men and women are paid the same and they work
This definition of fair wages is found in
2. Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value The second definition of fair wages is equal pay for work of equal value. This definition focuses on the value of the work, not on the kind of work done. It enables women to make comparisons between male- and female-dominated job classes and does not require that men and women be performing similar types of work. For example, a comparison can be made between the job classes of nurse and police officer. Equal pay for work of equal value provides broader access to equity because it addresses the reality of occupational segregation. The measure of equality is whether the value of the work men and women do is similar or comparable. If so, they should be paid the same. The equal pay for work of equal value definition is found in
Where this paper uses the term "pay equity", it refers to this definition of equal pay for work of equal value. 3. General anti-discrimination clauses The third definition is found in general statutory prohibitions against discrimination in employment. For example, s. 5(1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code states as follows:
This definition, phrased in various ways, is found in several provincial human rights statutes, specifically Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. This definition does not prescribe a specific formula for identifying wage discrimination, but clearly it contemplates that sex discrimination in pay is prohibited. As is addressed in more detail below, this may be a useful tool for those seeking pay equity either in the absence of a pay equity statute or in circumstances where other legislation is too narrow or falls short of providing full pay equity. C. Limitations of
the Existing Laws Some of the barriers to achieving equity are found directly in the legislation that is currently on the books. These limitations fall into at least three broad categories:
1. Pay Equity Statutes The major advantage of pay equity statutes is clearly that they impose a pro-active obligation upon employers to achieve pay equity. They require bargaining agents and employers to negotiate and achieve comprehensive pay equity plans and they provide access to a statutory mechanism for enforcing and monitoring pay equity. For example, in Ontario the Pay Equity Commission is entrusted with public education, investigating complaints, assisting the parties to settle disputes and to achieve pay equity plans, making orders, and referring disputes to the Tribunal for formal adjudication. Either a bargaining agent or an employer can also request a formal hearing before the Tribunal. There are, however, structural limitations to pay equity statutes: a. Scope of Coverage The most serious limitation is the scope of coverage of the existing laws. With the exception of Ontario and Quebec, pay equity statutes apply exclusively in the public sector and broader public sector. In most Canadian jurisdictions, the private sector has no pro-active obligation to achieve pay equity. Even in Ontario, where the private sector is generally covered, private sector workplaces with fewer than ten employees are excluded from the law's application. Most pay equity laws, then, leave many workers with no access to these pay equity rights and remedies. These workers are instead forced to rely on complaints-driven mechanisms for achieving equity such as those available under human rights and employment standards legislation. b. Definition of Fair Wages For workers who are covered by pay equity statutes, one major advantage is that these laws apply the highest definition of fair wages: equal pay for work of equal value. One major disadvantage, though, is that women in a large number of workplaces covered by these statutes cannot produce the appropriate male job comparators to allow them to access fair wages using this definition. Consider the following examples,
c. Difficulties with Enforcement A further structural limitation under the pay equity statutes can lie in the difficulty and complexity of their enforcement procedures. For example, in Ontario where the Pay Equity Commission is charged with investigating and assisting to settle a complaint, it can take a very long time to get any form of order and so it takes even longer to get referred to the tribunal for a final adjudication. Since it is only a Tribunal order which can be enforced as a practical matter, when faced with a reluctant employer, it becomes very difficult to enforce rights in a timely manner. The Ontario Commission has recently indicated that it intends to streamline its procedures for issuing orders to address the issue of delay but at the present time delay remains a reality of seeking enforcement. 2. Human Rights Statutes Pay equity claims can also be filed with provincial and federal human rights commissions and tribunals, although this route is rarely used. However, human rights statutes have the advantage of applying to both the public and private sector and have no exclusions for smaller workplaces. a. Difficulties with Enforcement Difficulties with human rights enforcement are well known and exist across Canada. Apart from the backlogs and lengthy delays, some commissions have authority to decline to deal with a complaint if they think it should be more appropriately dealt with under another process, such as a grievance process mandated by labour relations laws. Thus, it may not always be possible for parties to control the process. A party may try to file a complaint only to have the commission decline to address it. There is also an on-going debate in the case law about whether a union has standing to file a complaint about pay equity. The opposing views are represented by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Canada Safeway Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) (1997), 150 D.L.R. (4th) 207 and the Federal Court of Appeal in Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Bell Canada (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 432 (F.C.A.). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Canada Safeway Ltd. v. Saskatchewan in a 2-1 decision ruled that the union could neither file a pay equity complaint under the provincial human rights law in its own name nor support an individual, Barbara Hall, in her class action complaint regarding systemic pay discrimination. The Court based its decision in part on the SCC judgment in Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud (1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) which held that a union can be jointly liable for discrimination where it signed the collective agreement containing the discriminatory provisions, here the disputed wage schedule. The Federal Court Trial Division in CEP v. Bell Canada followed a similar analysis but in November 1998 the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that unions can bring pay equity complaints to the federal commission: CEP v. Bell Canada [1998] F.C.J. No. 312 (F.C.T.D.), reversed (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 432(F.C.A.). The Federal Court of Appeal found that
On 8 July 1999, Bell Canada was denied leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, the issue has not been finally resolved. The legal reasoning in the Federal Court decision is relatively narrow and is closely tied to the language in the federal statute so the issue may still arise in other jurisdictions. There are a number of reasons why trade unions may want to act as complainants in wage discrimination complaints where there is no effective pro-active pay equity law and there are a number of principled arguments for why they should properly be able to act as complainants:
b. Definition of Fair Wages Human rights statutes across Canada do not apply a uniform test for defining equality in wages. As noted above, the human rights codes in Newfoundland, PEI, Alberta and British Columbia apply the most restrictive definition of equal pay for the same or similar work. These codes then do not assist where men and women do different kinds of jobs even if they are of similar value. However, the human rights codes in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia apply a general prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. This general anti-discrimination clause should be able to provide access to equal pay for work of equal value. In the situation of a female-dominated workplace, these open-ended provisions could also provide the opportunity to argue that freedom from discrimination requires that proxy comparisons be made outside of a predominantly female workplace. In SEIU Local 204's successful Charter challenge to the repeal of pay equity legislation in Ontario, the Ontario Court General Division held that the proxy method of comparison jobs "an appropriate method of quantifying the extent of gender-based systemic wage discrimination" in the broader public sector: see SEIU Local 204 v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 508 (Gen. Div.) at 532. Private sector employees who are excluded from using the proxy method under Ontario's Pay Equity Act could try filing a complaint under the Human Rights Code and then arguing that the proxy method is the necessary tool to identify and quantify the wage discrimination in the public sector. c. Human Rights Decisions on Pay Equity There is case law to support the use of these anti-discrimination clauses to secure pay equity. The Ontario Divisional Court decision in Nishimura v. Ontario Human Rights Commission (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 347 is on point. Prior to the enactment of the pay equity act, female advertising employees with the Toronto Star filed a wage discrimination complaint with the provincial human rights Commission. The Ontario Code has a general prohibition against discrimination. The female employees in this case were specifically seeking equal pay for work of equal value. The Commission ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to address equal pay for work of equal value. But the Divisional Court ruled otherwise. It held that
The second relevant decision from the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench followed the analysis in Nishimura: Canada Safeway v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission [1999] S.J. No. 228(Sask. Q.B.). This case is "Round Two" of the pay equity complaint against Safeway. In December 1997, after the Court of Appeal's decision striking Barbara Hall's class action complaint, the Commission itself filed a class action complaint of wage discrimination naming both Safeway and the two unions, RWDSU and UFCW, as respondents. Safeway brought a motion to strike the complaint on the ground that the Commission has no jurisdiction under the Code to initiate or inquire into complaints grounded on the concepts of "pay equity" or "equal pay for work of equal value". They took the position that the Labour Standards Act already guaranteed equal pay for equal work and that this foreclosed any inquiry into a complaint founded on the broader concept of pay equity. The Court quoted from the headnote in Nishimura
The Court of Queen's Bench then ruled that
As a further note, in the same decision, the UFCW brought a motion seeking an order that, whether or not the Commission had jurisdiction to address pay equity, the matter should be deferred to arbitration under the applicable collective agreements. There were two branches to this argument.
The Court dismissed this motion and held that where "the essential nature of the dispute is a human rights violation and not one which only involves a dispute by the parties concerning the application, violation or interpretation of the collective agreement," the Commission has authority to intervene and it cannot be prevented from pursuing its investigation. These cases appear to establish that it is possible to pursue a claim for equal pay for work of equal value under a human rights law with a general prohibition against discrimination. 3. Employment Standards Legislation The final and most "traditional" way to resolve complaints under employment or labour standards legislation which will be determined by an employment standards adjudicator. Employment standards legislation has the advantage of applying to both the public and private sector. But these statutes have the disadvantage of using the most limited definition of fair wages -- equal pay for equal work. To access rights and remedies under these statutes, it is necessary to have men and women performing the same work in the same establishment but being paid at different rates. a. Advantages to using Employment Standards Legislation Although often overlooked, employment standards applications do have some utility. They can help close gaps within a job classification. And they may be able to help individual employees or groups of employees achieve a limited measure of equality before a full pay equity plan has been negotiated or where there is no access to pay equity legislation. It is worth noting that the existence of the Pay Equity Act in Ontario has not removed from adjudicators the jurisdiction to consider complaints under the Employment Standards Act. As was held in Hamilton Board of Education at para. 35:
Filing a complaint with the Employment Standards Branch is sometimes enough to convince employers to negotiate seriously and to settle the matter without a full hearing. In this respect, it can be a useful strategy to consider. b. Disadvantages to using Employment Standards
Legislation There are also limitations to using this approach. In Ontario, claims are very rarely made under the equal wages section (s. 32) and so labour standards adjudicators have little familiarity with the issue. In one recent case, Re Hamilton Board of Education (30 March 1998), the adjudicator took 6 years after the hearing to reach a decision in part because he "had inordinate difficulty analysing both the evidence and the issues, going beyond any difficulty which [he had] encountered in any other matter that [he could] recall". Conclusions Overall, the women who have the greatest difficulty in accessing rights to equal pay in the existing system are primarily
This paper turns now to consider alternative strategies which can be pursued to assist these and other women achieve pay equity. |
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| Where unions have not been possible
to achieve pay equity using the traditional methods discussed above, what should unions
do? What strategies should be considered for pushing the issue forward? This paper considers the following options:
Can these options address the barriers to achieving equity identified earlier: specifically, lack of coverage under existing statutes, unduly narrow definitions of equality under the applicable statute, or difficulty in engaging the enforcement mechanisms? A. Anti-Discrimination
Grievances under Collective Agreements Systemic discrimination grievances can be filed under the anti-discrimination clauses in collective agreements by arguing that the wage schedule is discriminatory to the extent that it fails to provide equal pay for work of equal value. Arbitrators under many labour laws are able to interpret and apply human rights statutes and pay equity statutes. In Ontario the Labour Relations Act expressly states that an arbitrator has the power to interpret and apply human rights and other employment related statutes. Section 48(12)(j) of the Act states:
The Canada Labour Code gives arbitrators even broader authority. Section 60(1)(a.1) gives arbitrators the power to interpret, apply and give relief in accordance with a statute relating to employment matters, whether or not there is a conflict between the statute and the collective agreement. One of the first issues which will arise in bringing a pay equity grievance under an anti-discrimination provision is what test the arbitrator should use to measure whether pay equity exists. It could certainly be argued that the definition of equal pay for work of equal value should apply as this is what is necessary to bring the wages in line with the applicable human rights law or pay equity law in the jurisdiction. Under Ontario's Pay Equity Act this tool for measuring the existence of discrimination involves three steps;
An arbitrator could be asked to adopt these methods in order to identify discrimination in a collective agreement wage schedule. Another issue which would likely arise is the scope of an arbitrator's power to issue a remedy for a systemic discrimination complaint. Because arbitrators generally do not have the power to amend the collective agreement, employers may argue that they can only issue a declaration that there has been a violation of the collective agreement due to discrimination. However, flowing either from their explicit statutory power to "apply" human rights and other employment-related statutes, or from their general authority to provide a remedy for a breach of the no-discrimination clause in a collective agreement, there is an argument that arbitrators can order a non-discriminatory wage schedule which would involve increases to the female job classes to eliminate wage discrimination. Apart from arbitrators under the federal Canada Labour Code, who can expressly give relief in accordance with employment-related statutes, the scope of arbitrators' remedial authority to interpret and apply human rights statutes has not yet been fully developed. B. Complaints Before
Labour Relations Boards As a rule, labour relations boards have not been used as a forum to deal with pay equity complaints. The exception is under the Manitoba Pay Equity Act which allows some pay equity disputes to be referred to the labour relations board in that province. However, the traditional forms of labour relations complaints may provide an alternate avenue of pay equity redress as outlined below. 1. Bad Faith Bargaining Complaint First, can bad faith bargaining complaints be used to address claims for equity? There is no legal mechanism to force employers to agree in bargaining to do something which they are not required to do, for example, to bring the pay equity process into the collective agreement. However, the employer's duty to bargain in good faith includes a duty not to make illegal demands. This is underscored in s. 54 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act which explicitly states that
Thus, unions can argue that an employer cannot propose a collective agreement provision which is discriminatory. For example, unions can argue that an employer cannot propose a wage schedule or benefits provision which does not achieve equal pay for work of equal value. As a corollary, the duty to bargain in good faith could be interpreted to include a duty not to resist union proposals which seek to implement pay equity. The good faith bargaining duty provides a means for unions to address during bargaining those collective agreement provisions which they believe to be discriminatory. For example, a union may put forward a bargaining proposal to remove or amend a collective agreement provision on the grounds that it is discriminatory and therefore illegal. If the employer will not agree to the proposal, or will agree to it only in exchange for something else, the union may consider bringing a bad faith bargaining complaint. Unions should not have to compromise on other issues in order to obtain agreement to proposals which seek to bring the collective agreement in line with human rights obligations. Through the process of a bad faith bargaining complaint, the labour board would have to determine whether or not the proposal at issue is one that is required by law or whether it is one of a number of possible legal alternatives. If a union's proposal was the only legal alternative, an employer's resistance to it should constitute bad faith bargaining. If the union proposal is not the only legal alternative, the employer would likely be able to resist it in favour or another method of responding to the collective agreement discrimination. b. Unfair Labour Practice Complaint The second labour relations board option may be an unfair labour practice complaint. If an employer lays off or contracts out women's jobs because they have been awarded pay equity adjustments, arguably this can be characterized as an unfair labour practice. Such lay offs or contracting out by the employer could also constitute intimidation, coercion or a reprisal for attempting to exercise rights integral to labour relations. Such conduct could also interfere with the union's representation of its members in relation to the right to receive non-discriminatory wages. Evidence that the lay offs or contracting out were motivated by anti-pay equity animus would be important. Under the Canada Labour Code, the labour board has the power to issue substantive interim orders which may be useful in blocking the lay offs or contracting out pending a resolution of the dispute. c. Conclusions on labour board complaints The labour board route is worth seriously considering. While labour boards often lack expertise in discrimination matters and accordingly there may be the risk of setting negative precedents, at the same time, labour board applications are the fastest way to get a remedy and the remedies can be powerful. Even where a party is covered by a provincial pay equity law, they may not want to proceed under that law because of the delays inherent in the process and the difficulty of getting orders when the case is before the commission's review officers. By contrast, complaints of bad faith bargaining or unfair labour practices can come on much more quickly before the labour board than would complaints regarding reprisal under the pay equity legislation. C. Charter of Rights
Litigation While acknowledging that Charter litigation is expensive and brings with it its own uncertainties, the Charter could be used in two respects. First, it could be used to gain access to pay equity for some groups of workers. Second, it could be used to protect gains which have been made under existing pay equity legislation. 1. Gaining Access to Pay Equity The Charter can be useful in promoting pay equity if it is possible to find that an employer is "government" and therefore subject to the Charter. If bound by the Charter, the employer must pay wages that are non-discriminatory or risk being in contravention of the Charter's s. 15 equality guarantee. To construct this argument it is useful to refer to the SCC's decision in Eldridge v. British Columbia (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th) 577. In that case, the Court held that the failure of hospitals and the British Columbia Medical Services Commission to provide sign-language interpreters for hearing-impaired persons seeking medical services violated s. 15 of the Charter. The case includes an extended discussion of what constitutes "government" for the purposes of applying the Charter and of when private actors can be subject to Charter scrutiny. The Court found that government should not be able to evade its Charter responsibilities or escape Charter scrutiny by delegating the implementation of their policies and programmes to private entities. Therefore, the Charter will apply to private entities insofar as they act to further or implement a specific government programme or policy. The reasoning in Eldridge can help us think creatively about the full range of bodies which may be subject to the Charter. For example, the Charter may apply to employers in the broader public sector or it may apply where government has "privatized" some of its functions. If these employers are paying discriminatory wages, it could be argued that these wages are in violation of s. 15 the Charter. In the recent case of Perera v. Canada (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 341 the Federal Court of Appeal held that it was possible under s. 15 of the Charter to make a claim against a government agency alleging systemic discrimination in employment. Perera is an employment equity case rather than a pay equity case but the same logic applies. In Perera, employees of a federal government agency claimed that with respect to promotions, work assignments, performance appraisal reviews, etc. they had been subject to systemic and individual discrimination on the basis of race, national and ethnic origin and colour contrary to the Charter. They sought systemic remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The respondent employer in Perera brought a motion to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. While the Federal Court Trial Division struck the portion of the claim which requested pro-active systemic remedies such as hiring programmes, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the statement of claim should stand. The Court referred to the systemic remedies that Canadian Human Rights Tribunals had awarded in Action Travail and Robichaud and ruled that "the courts must have, under section 24 of the Charter, the power to impose similar remedies when they deem it appropriate." The Supreme Court of Canada in Delisle v. Canada (2 September 1999) also suggested that where a person is employed by an entity which is "government", where the employer interferes with rights under the Charter, these infringements can be challenged under the Charter directly and need not be protected and enforced separately under other statutes. Although that case dealt with an allegation that freedom of association had been violated by excluding members of the RCMP from collective bargaining statutes, the analysis with respect to the application of the Charter to government-employers would be equally applicable with respect to allegations that s. 15(1) equality rights had been infringed. 2. Protecting Pay Equity Gains The second alternative is to use the Charter to enforce or maintain pay equity adjustments that have already been won under existing pay equity legislation. In Ontario, a number of unions have been able to use the Pay Equity Act to secure pay increases for their female employees in the broader public sector. Now, broader public sector employers in the health care sector are arguing that pay equity is putting them at a competitive disadvantage and that if their pay equity obligations are not removed, they will be forced to go out of business. These are workplaces which receive virtually all of their funding from government and they cannot make the pay equity adjustments without further funding. The Charter argument could be applied in two ways. First, following the analysis in Eldridge above, it could be argued that the government is really the "employer" and that the government's failure to properly fund pay equity is a violation of s. 15. There are difficulties making this argument in Ontario because of specific amendments to the Ontario Pay Equity Act. In 1992, the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal ruled that in light of the degree of control that the Ministry of Community and Social Services exerted over the Kingston Children's Aid Society (through regulating standards, reviewing and monitoring services provided, conducting audits, and particularly funding), the Ministry was the employer for pay equity purposes. Because the Ministry decisions had a substantial and direct impact on the compensation practices at the Children's Aid Society, the Ministry was found to be the employer for pay equity purposes and a small broader public sector workplace without appropriate male comparators was able to seek pay equity using male comparators at the Ministry itself: Kingston Children's Aid Society [1992] 3 P.E.R. 116 (P.E.H.T.). In response to this ruling, the Ontario government amended the Pay Equity Act to explicitly provide in s. 1.1 that "For the purposes of this Act, the Crown is not the employer of a person unless the person is considered to be a civil servant, a public servant or a Crown employee under the Public Service Act." Nevertheless, the argument could still be used elsewhere in Canada where broader public sector employers are unwilling or unable to distribute pay equity adjustments. Second, a Charter challenge could be directed at the legislation and procedures which govern the allocation of services in the health care sector. For example, in Ontario, the Harris government has decided to privatize home care for people discharged from hospital. The government has established a number of regional Community Care Access Centres which act as brokers in awarding home care contracts. The government gives the money for publicly funded home care to the Access Centres. Home care agencies then submit bids in a system of competitive tendering and the Access Centres award the contracts. Obviously lowest cost becomes the determining factor. Under this scheme, the non-profit broader public sector agencies which have to date been providing the services and which have achieved proxy pay equity plans for their employees must compete against for-profit private sector employers who, being private sector employers with predominantly female workforces, do not have the same pay equity obligations. To the extent that this system operates to disproportionately impose downward pressure on women's wages and conditions of employment it could be argued that it violates s. 15 of the Charter. |
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| This last example of employers
lobbying to remove their pay equity obligations is an important reminder that whatever
legal strategy and legal forum we choose to advance pay equity claims, we have to remain
engaged in the political forum as well. In the public sector and in the national print
media, there is a serious backlash against both the cost of pay equity and the concept of
pay equity. It is important for unions and labour lawyers to think about what we can do in
terms of public education to make sure that the backlash doesn't wipe out support for pay
equity altogether. The current legislative approaches for addressing wage discrimination have not led to the achievement of pay equity for all women yet and, in the end, it well may be that we need better legislation. Clearly, looking for legislative change is a slow and necessarily long-term project. The fact is that, whatever flaws it may have, pro-active pay equity laws have been able to advance pay equity more broadly and more effectively than any complaints-based mechanism. It is necessary to lobby for
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CAVALLUZZO HAYES SHILTON
McINTYRE & CORNISH |
