


This is Exhibit**"A"**.... referred to in
the affidavit of **Don De Voretz**.....

sworn before me, this 2 day of
May, 2012



.....
A Commissioner of Oaths, etc.



DeVoretz CV 2011

Name: Don J. DeVoretz

Date of Birth: May 28, 1942

Highest degree: Doctor of Philosophy - August, 1968 - University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citizenship: Dual: Canadian and USA

Career:

- Professor of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 1968 – present
- Research Director Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2008-present
- Co-Director and Principal Investigator, RIIM, Simon Fraser University, 1996-2007
- Willy Brandt Guest Professor, Malmo University, 2004
- British Columbia Scholar in China, 2000 - 2001
- Research Fellow and Project Director, IZA, Bonn, 1999 - present
- Adjunct Professor, CD Howe Institute, 1995 - 1998
- Visiting Research Fellow, Fisheries Institute, Norwegian School of Economics and Business, Bergen, 1986, 1988 and 1992.

- Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Duke University, 1974 - 1975
- Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1975
- Visiting Rockefeller Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1969 - 1970
- Visiting Research Associate, Institute of Economic Development and Research, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, 1967 - 1968

Teaching Interests:

- Undergraduate and Graduate: economic development, economics of demography
- Senior supervisor to 54 M.A. students and 7 Ph.D. students

Scholarly Activities:

A. Past Published Work: Refereed

1. Alternative Planning Models for Philippine Educational Investment. *Philippine Economic Journal*, Fall 1969.
2. Migration in a Labor Surplus Economy. *Philippine Economic Journal*, XI(1): 58-80. 1972.
3. The Brain Drain and Income Taxation: Canadian Estimates. Co-author: D. Maki. *World Development*, 3(10): 705-716. 1976.
4. The Brain Drain and Income Taxation: Canadian Estimates. Co-author: D. Maki. In J. Bhagwati (ed.), *Proceedings of Conference of Human Capital Transfers*. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 1976. (N.B. Repeat of 3)
5. The Economic Impact of LDC Immigration on Country of Origin and Canada. *Economic Council of Canada*, February 1977.
6. Canadian Population Movements and Economic Development. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 1980.
7. The Size and Distribution of Human Capital Transfers from LDCs to Canada: 1966-1973. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 28(4): 779-800. 1980.

8. An Econometric Demand Model for Canadian Salmon. *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, March 1982.
9. The Immigration of Third World Professionals to Canada: 1968-1973. Co-author: D. Maki. *World Development*, 11(1): 55-64. 1983.
10. Harvesting Canadian Fish and Rents: A Partial Review of the Report of the Commission on Canadian Pacific Fisheries Policy. Co-author: R. Schwindt. *Marine Resource Economics*, 1(4). 1985.
11. Evidence from the Skilled-Unskilled Canadian Wage Index. Co-author: C. Reed. *Industrial Relations*, 39(3): 526-535. 1984.
12. The Substitutability of Foreign born Labour in Canadian Production: Circa 1980. Co-author: A.H. Akbari. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 25(3): 604-614. 1992.
13. Canada's demand for Third World highly trained immigrants: 1976-86. Co-author: S. Akbar. *World Development*, 20(8): 177-187. 1993.
14. The Demand for Farmed Salmon: Market Structure and Stability. Co-author: K.G. Salvanes. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, February 1993.
15. Human Capital Content of Canadian Immigration: 1966-1987. Co-author: R.G. Coulson. *Canadian Public Policy*, 19(4): 357-366. 1993.
16. Household Demand for Fish and Meat Products: Separability and Demographic Effects. Co-author: K.G. Salvanes. *Marine Resource Economics*, 12(1): 37-55. 1997.
17. Migration and the Labour market: Sectoral and Regional effects in Canada. Co-author: S. Laryea. In *Migration, Free Trade and Regional Integration in North America*, OECD Proceedings, 30: 135-153. 1998.
18. The Brain Drain is real and its costs us. *Policy Options*, September: 18-24. 1999.
19. Wealth Accumulation of Canadian and Foreign-born Households in Canada. Co-author: A. Shamsuddin. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 44(4): 515-553. 1999.
20. Why do highly skilled Canadians stay in Canada? Co-author: C. Iturralde. *Policy Options*, March: 59-63. 2001.
21. Canada: An Entrepot Destination for Immigrants. In R. Rotte (ed.), *Migration Policy and the Economy: International Experience*. Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 2001.

22. Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and the Rest of the World Regions. Co-author: J. Ma. *Canadian Population Studies*, 29(1): 53-69. 2002.
23. Citizenship, Passports and the Brain Exchange Triangle. Co-author: K. Zhang. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 6(2): 199-212. 2004.
24. Immigrant Public Finance Transfers: A Comparative Analysis by City. Co-author: S. Pivnenko. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research*, 13(1): 155-169. 2004.
25. Canadian Immigration Experience: Any Lessons for Europe? Co-author: S. Laryea. In K. Zimmerman (ed.), *European Migration: What Do We Know?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004.
26. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. Global Migration Perspectives No. 4, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva. October 2004.
27. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. Julian Simon Lecture, IZA, Bonn, 2005.
28. Labour Market Mobility between Canada and the United States: Quo vadis? Co-author: D. Coulombe. In T. Lemieux and R. Harris (eds.), *Social and Labour Market Aspects of North American Linkages*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press. 2005.
29. "Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment" *International Migration Review*, Summer 2006, Vol. 40, No. 2. (same as 28).
30. "The Economics of Canadian Citizenship" *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 6, (3/4): 435-468. 2006 Co-author: S. Pivnenko.
31. "Changing Faces of Chinese Immigrants to Canada" *Journal of Immigration and Integration*, 7, (3): 275-300. 2006 Co-author: S. Guo
32. "Chinese Immigrants in Vancouver: Quo Vadis?" *Journal of Immigration and Integration*, 7, (4): 425-477 2006 Co-author: S. Guo
33. "The Economics of Citizenship: A Common Intellectual Ground for Social Scientists" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Summer 34,(4)679:693 May, 2008.
34. "Managing Canada's Labour Market Needs in the 21st Century", Canada-Asia Commentary, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, October 23, 2008. P. 13. with C. Sas.

35. "Triangular Movement of Chinese Diaspora" *Journal of Immigration and Integration*, 2007 Co-author: S. Guo
36. "The Immigration Triangle: Quebec, Canada, and the Rest of the World" *Journal of Immigration and Integration*, Vol. 9, no. 4 pp.363:381 December, 2008 Co-author: S. Pivnenko
37. "An Auction Model of Canadian Temporary Immigration for the 21st Century " *International Migration* Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp.3-17: March 2008, Pages: 3-17
38. " An overview of 21st Century Chinese 'Brain Circulation' in D. Zweig and D. DeVoretz (editors) 21st Century Chinese 'Brain Circulation' Pacific Affairs Vol. 81, No. 2 2008, pp. 171-175.
39. "Managing Canada's Labour Market Needs in the 21st Century", Asia Pacific Foundation no. 52 Canada-Asia Commentary October 23, 2008, p. 13.
40. "Hotel Canada" Asia Pacific Foundation Canada-Asia 2009.
41. "Profiling at the Canadian Border: An Economist's Viewpoint" Asia Pacific Foundation Canada-Asia Commentary 2009.
42. "NAFTA's Labour Market Integration Experience" Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Forthcoming 2009.
43. "Selling Visas", Canadian Issues / Thèmes Canadiens, 2009.
44. " Canada's Secret Province: 2.8 Million Canadians Abroad" Asia Pacific Foundation Canada-Asia Canadians Abroad Project 2009.
45. "FSU Immigrants in Canada: A Case of Positive Triple Selection?" in G. Epstein and I. Gang (eds.) Migration and Culture Emerald Press 2011.
46. "Cultural Differences in the Remittance Behaviour of Households: Evidence From Canadian Micro Data " in G. Epstein and I. Gang (eds.) Migration and Culture Emerald Press 2011.

B. Past Published Work: Invited

1. Economic Development in Northeastern Wisconsin. *Economics of Northern Wisconsin*, Department of Resource Development, State of Wisconsin, Madison. 1967.

2. Education As An Asset in the Philippine Economy. Co-author: J. Williamson. *Proceedings of Second Population Conference*. Manila: University of Philippines Press. 1968.
3. A Dynamic Programming Model for the Philippine's Sector. *Proceedings of Second Population Conference*. Manila: University of Philippines Press. 1968.
4. Some Hypotheses Tested of a Choice-Theoretic Model of Rural Nigerian Investment. *Western Economic Journal*. 1971.
5. Some Economic Aspects of Canadian Migration. In P. Copes and G. Paquet (eds.), *Canadian Perspectives in Economics*. 1972.
6. An Econometric Demand Model for Canadian Salmon. Monograph published by Canada: Department of Fisheries and Oceans. June 1980.
7. The Uses and Abuses of Econometric Models in the Seafood Industry. *Proceedings of International Seafood Trade Conference*. Anchorage, Alaska. 1983.
8. Japanese Demand for a Key Canadian Fish Product: Kozunoko. *Proceedings of International Seafood Trade Conference*. Esbjerg, Denmark. 1986.
9. The Substitutability of Immigrants in Canadian Production Circa 1980. Co-author: A.H. Akbari. Monograph published by Canada: Department of Employment and Immigration. April 1987.
10. The Demand for Canadian Salmon Products in the E.E.C. and Australia-Asia. Monograph published by Canada: Department of Fisheries and Oceans. September 1988.
11. Immigrant Asset Accumulation Circa 1982/83. Monograph published by Canada: Department of Employment and Immigration. April 1988.
12. The Demand For Fish: A Review of Some Econometric Demand Literature. Centre for Applied Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo. 1988.
13. Immigration and Employment Effects. Institute for Research on Public Policy, Ottawa. October: 47. 1989.
14. Demand for Norwegian Farmed Salmon. Co-author: K.G. Salvanes. *Proceedings of International Seafood Trade Conference*. March: 52. 1990.

15. Analysis of the Norwegian Salmon Aquaculture Long Run Average Cost Function. Co-authors: K.G. Salvanes and C. Wright. *Proceedings of International Seafood Trade Conference*. Bergen Norway. March: 52. 1990.
16. Further thoughts on the Demand for Norwegian Salmon: Price Forecasts. Co-author: K.G. Salvanes. *Proceedings of the Salmon Forecasting Workshop*, Simon Fraser University. May 1989.
17. Some Econometric Problems With Salmon Price Forecasts. *Proceedings of the Salmon Forecasting Workshop*, Simon Fraser University. May 1989.
18. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration. *House of Commons*, Issue No. 16. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre. February 1990.
19. Estimating Canadian Fish Demand Functions: a Share Equation Approach. Co-author: K.G. Salvanes. *Proceedings of International Seafood Trade Conference*. Bergen, Norway. June: 20. 1994.
20. Immigration and the Canadian Labor Market. In S. Globberman (ed.), *The Immigration Dilemma*, Ch. 8: 173-195. Vancouver : Fraser Institute. 1992.
21. New Issues, New Evidence and New Immigration Policies for the 21st Century. In D.J. DeVoretz (ed.), *Diminishing Returns: The Economics of Canada's Recent Immigration Policy*, 1-30. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute; Vancouver: The Laurier Institution. 1995.
22. The Open Economy and its Impact. In H. Johnston and J.R. Wood (eds.), *Managing Change in the 21st Century: Indian and Canadian Perspectives*, 73-80. Calgary: Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute. 1998.
23. Canadian Human Capital Transfers: The USA and Beyond. Co-author: S. Laryea. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. 1998.
24. People Aspects of Technological Change: Immigration Issues, Labor Mobility, the Brain Drain, and R&D – A Canadian Perspective. *Canada-United States Law Journal*, 25: 67-72. 1999.
25. Immigration to Canada: 1986 and Beyond. Co-author: C. Iturralde. In *APEC Human Resource Development Workshop Proceedings*. IDE, Tokyo. 2000.
26. The Economic Performance of Jewish Immigrants to Canada: A Case of Double Jeopardy? Co-author: J.W. Dean. In D. Elazar and M. Weinfeld (eds.), *Still Moving*. London: Transaction Publishers. 2000.

27. Immigration to Canada: Some Economic Impacts. In *APEC-HRD-LSP Workshop Proceedings*. IDE, Tokyo. 2001.
28. Canadian immigration: economic winners and losers. In S. Djajic (ed.), *International Migration: Trends, policies and economic impact*. London: Routledge. 2001.
29. Asian Skilled Immigration Flows to Canada in the early 21st Century: A Supply-side Analysis. In Y.P. Woo (ed.), *Canada's Foreign Policy Dialogue and Canada-Asia Relations*. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. 2003.
30. Comments on Reitz. In 2nd edition W. Cornelius, P. Martin and J. Hollifield (eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 2004.
31. The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada. In P. Waxman and V. Colic-Peisker (eds.), *Homeland Wanted: Interdisciplinary Perspective on Refugee Settlement in the West*, Ch. 1. New York: Nova Science Publishers. 2004.
32. Immigrant Issues and Cities: Lessons from Malmö and Toronto. Willy Brandt Working Paper 2/04, IMER, Malmo University, Sweden. May 2004.
33. The Economics of Canadian Citizenship. Co-author: S. Pivnenko. Willy Brandt Working Paper 3/04, IMER, Malmo University, Sweden. September 2004.
34. International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: Quo Vadis? Human Resources and Social Development Canada/ Working Paper 2006 D-17
35. "Economic Integration of Highly Skilled FSU Immigrants in Four Countries: A Comparative Analysis." Ruppin Academic Center, Project No. 06-50 2009.

C. Books

1. Diminishing Returns: The Economics of Canada's Recent Immigration Policy. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute; Vancouver: The Laurier Institution. 1995.
2. Economics of Citizenship. Malmo: IMER 2008. ISBN 978-7104-079-4

D. Other Published Papers

1. SFU-UBC Centre of Excellence for the Study of Immigration and Integration: Some Remarks. RIIM Commentary Series #96-01, Simon Fraser University. 1996.
2. Immigration to Vancouver: Economic Windfall or Downfall? RIIM Commentary Series #96-02, Simon Fraser University. 1996.
3. The Political Economy of Canadian Immigration Debate: A Crumbling Consensus? RIIM Commentary Series #96-03, Simon Fraser University. 1996.
4. The Economic Performance of Jewish Immigrants to Canada: A Case of Double Jeopardy? Co-author: J.W. Dean. RIIM Working Paper #96-01, Simon Fraser University. 1996.
5. Ethics, Economics and Canada's Immigration Policy. RIIM Commentary Series #97-02, Simon Fraser University. 1997.
6. Canada's Independent Immigrant Selection Procedure: Quo Vadis. RIIM Commentary Series #97-05, Simon Fraser University. 1997.
7. Canadian Immigration Experience: Any Lessons for Europe? Co-author: S. Laryea. RIIM Commentary Series #97-06, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 59. 1997.
8. Wealth Accumulation of Canadian and Foreign-Born Households in Canada. Co-author: A. Shamsuddin. RIIM Working Paper #97-03, Simon Fraser University. 1997.
9. Canada's Immigration Labour Market Experience. Co-author: S. Laryea. RIIM Commentary Series #98-01, Simon Fraser University. 1998.
10. The Brain Drain or Gain? RIIM Commentary Series #98-06, Simon Fraser University. 1998.
11. International Metropolis Seminar on Barriers to Employment: Some Conclusions. RIIM Commentary Series #98-07, Simon Fraser University. 1998.
12. Canadian Human Capital Transfers: the USA and Beyond. Co-author: S. Laryea. RIIM Working Paper #98-18, Simon Fraser University. 1998.
13. Canada's Brain Drain, Gain or Exchange? Policy Options. RIIM Commentary Series #99-01, Simon Fraser University. 1999.

14. Immigrants and Public Finance Transfers: Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. Co-author: Y. Ozsomer. RIIM Working Paper #99-06, Simon Fraser University. 1999.
15. A Theory of Social Forces and Immigrant Second Language Acquisition. Co-author: C. Werner. RIIM Working Paper #99-25, Simon Fraser University. 1999.
16. Temporary Migration: An Overview. RIIM Special Issues #99-S0, Simon Fraser University. 1999.
17. Malaysian Immigration Issues: An Economic Perspective. RIIM Special Issues #99-S4, Simon Fraser University. 1999.
18. Temporary Canadian Migration: Quo Vadis? RIIM Special Issues #99-S7, Simon Fraser University. 1999.
19. A Canadian Evaluation Model for Unskilled Temporary Immigration. RIIM Commentary Series #00-02, Simon Fraser University. 2000.
20. Probability of Staying in Canada. Co-author: C. Iturralde. RIIM Working Paper #00-06, Simon Fraser University. 2000.
21. Some Immigrant Language Lessons from Canada and Germany. Co-authors: H. Hinte and C. Werner. RIIM Working Paper #00-20, Simon Fraser University. 2000.
22. An Analysis of Turn-of-the-Century Canadian Immigration: 1891-1914. RIIM Working Paper #00-21, Simon Fraser University. 2000.
23. A Theory of Social Forces and Immigrant Second Language Acquisition. Co-author: C. Werner. IZA Discussion Paper No. 110. 2000.
24. Why do highly skilled Canadians stay in Canada? Co-author: C. Iturralde. RIIM Commentary Series #01-01, Simon Fraser University. 2001.
25. Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepôt and Rest-of-the-World Destinations. Co-author: Z. Ma. RIIM Special Issues 01-S1, Simon Fraser University. 2001.
26. A Model of Optimal Temporary Migration for the 21st Century. RIIM Commentary Series #02-04, Simon Fraser University. 2002.
27. Human Capital Investment and Flows: A Multiperiod Model for China. Co-author: K. Zhang. RIIM Working Paper #02-14, Simon Fraser University. 2002.

28. Triangular Human Capital Flows: Some Empirical Evidence from Hong Kong and China. Co-authors: Z. Ma and K. Zhang. RIIM Working Paper #02-17, Simon Fraser University. 2002.
29. How Much Language is Enough? Some Immigrant Language Lessons from Canada and Germany. Co-authors: H. Hinte and C. Werner. IZA Discussion Paper No. 555.
30. Canadian Regional Immigration Initiatives in the 21st Century: A Candle in the Wind? RIIM Commentary Series #03-01, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
31. NAFTA's Labor Market Integration Experience: Lessons for the EU? RIIM Commentary Series #03-04, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
32. Sourcing Out Canada's Refugee Policy: The Safe Third Country Agreement. Co-author: P. Hanson. RIIM Commentary Series #03-06, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
33. Citizenship, Passports and the Brain Exchange Triangle. Co-author: K. Zhang. RIIM Working Paper #03-02, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
34. The Recent Economic Performance of Ukrainian Immigrants in Canada and the US. Co-author: S. Pivnenko. RIIM Working Paper #03-10, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 913. 2003.
35. The Immigration Triangle: Quebec, Canada and the Rest of the World. Co-authors: S. Pivnenko and D. Coulombe. RIIM Working Paper #03-11, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
36. DeVoretz, D. and S. Pivnenko, (2003) "The Recent Economic Performance of Ukrainian Immigrants in Canada and the US. IZA DP. 913
37. Immigrant Public Finance Transfers: A Comparative Analysis by City. Co-author: S. Pivnenko. RIIM Working Paper #04-02, Simon Fraser University. 2004.
38. The Economic Experience of Refugees in Canada. Co-authors: S. Pivnenko and M. Beiser. RIIM Working Paper #04-04, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 1088. 2004.
39. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. RIIM Working Paper #04-13, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 1217. 2004.

40. The Economic Causes and Consequences of Canadian Citizenship. RIIM Working Paper #04-21, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 1395. 2004.
41. Brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. RIIM Commentary Series #05-01E, Simon Fraser University. 2005.
42. Self-Selection, Immigrant Public Finance Performance and Canadian Citizenship. Co-author: S. Pivnenko. RIIM Working Paper #05-07, Simon Fraser University. Also IZA Discussion Paper No. 1463. 2005.
43. The Changing Faces of Chinese Immigrants in Canada. Co-author: S. Guo. RIIM Working Paper #05-08, Simon Fraser University. 2005.
44. A Model of Foreign-born Transfers: Evidence from Canadian Micro data RIIM Working Paper #05-17.
45. International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: Quo Vadis? Industry Canada, 2006 and also IZA Discussion Paper No. 2197 2006.
46. *Chinese Immigrants in Vancouver: Quo Vadis?* RIIM Working Paper #05-20, Simon Fraser University.
47. *The Economics of Citizenship: A Common Intellectual Ground for Social Scientists?* RIIM Working Paper #05-29, Simon Fraser University.
48. *The Education, Immigration and Emigration of Canada's Highly Skilled Workers in the 21st Century*, RIIM Working Paper #06-16, Simon Fraser University
49. *Social Relations and Remittances: Evidence from Canadian Micro-Data* RIIM Working Paper #06-20, Simon Fraser University
50. "Economic Integration of Highly Skilled FSU Immigrants in Four Countries: A Comparative Analysis." Ruppin Academic Center, Project No. 06-50 2009.
51. "FSU Immigrants in Canada: A Case of Positive Triple Selection? IZA DP 4410

E. Seminars and Recent Conference Presentations (2000 - present)

1. Probability of Staying in Canada. Carleton University, Dept. of Economics. June 2000.

2. Probability of Staying in Canada. Ottawa: Industry Canada. June 2000.
3. Probability of Staying in Canada. University of Illinois, Dept. of Economics. October 2000.
4. Immigration to Canada: Some Economic Impacts. APEC-HRD-LSP Workshop, IDE, Tokyo. October 2001.
5. Triangular Flow of Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and Rest of the World. Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. February 2001.
6. Triangular Flow of Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and Rest of the World Regions. Saint Mary's University, Nova Scotia. March 2001.
7. Probability of Staying in Canada. IZA Workshop on Highly Skilled, Bonn. March 2001.
8. Probability of Staying in Canada. 3rd European Summer Symposium in Labour Economics, Buch, Germany. April 2001.
9. Triangular Flow of Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and Rest of the World Regions. China-Canada Roundtable on Globalization, Vancouver. May 2001.
10. Labour Market Transition of Canadian IMDB Immigrants. Canadian Economic Association Meetings, Montreal (with K. Zhang). May 2001.
11. Keine Integration ohne Deutschkenntnisse. Panel discussion with K. Zimmerman, R.L. Sommerville and C. Schmalz-Jacobsen, Berlin. May 2001.
12. Germany and Canada as Immigration Societies. Presentation to R. Sussmuth, Chair of Independent Migration Commission for Germany, Canadian Embassy and German Foreign Ministry, Berlin. June 2001.
13. Expenditure Patterns of the foreign-born in Canada. Metropolis Conference, Ottawa. October 2001.
14. Triangular Trade in Human Capital. International Metropolis Conference, Rotterdam. November 2001.
15. Immigration and Refugee Issues in Canada and Asia. CANCAPS Conference, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. December 2001.
16. The Competition for Brains: A Canadian Perspective. Industry Canada, Ottawa. December 2001.

17. Brain Gain, Drain or Circulation. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. January 2002.
18. Language and Immigration. Chairman, American Economic Association Meetings, Atlanta. January 2002.
19. Brain Gain, Drain or Circulation? R.F. Harney Lecture, University of Toronto. February 2002.
20. Brain Circulation between Ukraine, Russia and Germany. IZA Workshop, Bonn. February 2002.
21. Canada's Immigration Programme and U.S. Border Issues. Portland State University, Oregon. March 2002.
22. Brain Gain, Drain or Circulation. Seminar, Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa. May 2002.
23. Brain Gain, Drain or Circulation. Institute for Research on Public Policy, Toronto. May 2002.
24. A Canada-China Trade Visa. RIIM-APFC-Renmin University Roundtable, Beijing. June 2002.
25. Constructing a Brain Exchange Data base for Canada with Canadian, US and Chinese Censuses. Conference on Chinese Census, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. June 2002.
26. Labour Market Integration under NAFTA. Industry Canada, Ottawa. September 2002.
27. A Canadian Evaluation Model for Unskilled Temporary Immigration. John Deutsch Institute Conference on *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*, Queen's University, Kingston. October 2002.
28. The U.S. and Canadian Border: A Search for a Common Ground. Bellingham Four Corner Economics Club, Bellingham, Washington. November 2002.
29. NAFTA Visa: The preferred Entry Point? *Social and Labour Market Aspects of North American Linkages* Workshop, Industry Canada and HRDC, Montreal. November 2002.
30. Canadian Regional Immigration Initiatives in the 21st Century: A Candle in the Wind? EDCO Conference, Toronto. February 2003.

31. Trends in Vancouver Immigration :2004 and Beyond. B.C. School Trustees, Burnaby. February 2003.
32. NAFTA mobility after 911. *Borderlines: Canada in North America* Conference, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Vancouver. February 2003.
33. Immigration and Globalization. The Leon and Thea Koerner Foundation Lectures in Liberal Arts, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby. March 2003.
34. Asian Skilled Immigration Flows to Canada in the early 21st Century: A Supply-side Analysis. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: Foreign Policy Review, Ottawa. March 2003.
35. The 2002 Canadian Immigration Act: Old wine in a New Bottle? Coquitlam University Women's Club, Coquitlam, B.C. April 2003.
36. The Immigration Triangle: Quebec, ROC and the ROW. Canadian Economic Association Meetings, Ottawa. May 2003.
37. Some thoughts on an Indo-Canadian Research Chair. University College of the Fraser Valley, Abbotsford, B.C. May 2003.
38. Forecasting Vancouver's School Age Immigrant Population. ESL Metro Conference, West Vancouver. June 2003.
39. An Auction Market for Unskilled Temporary Immigrants. Trans-Atlantic Conference on Low Skilled Migration, German Marshall Fund, Brussels. June 2003.
40. Recent Immigration Issues in the EU. King Bedouin Research Series, Brussels. June 2003.
41. Recent Ukrainian Immigrant Economic Performance in Canada. IZA Seminar, Bonn. June 2003.
42. Free Trade Agreements and Immigration Trends. 7th Annual International Metropolis Conference, Vienna. September 2003.
43. Economic Implications of Citizenship for the Canadian Foreign-born. IMER, Malmo University, Sweden. September 2003.
44. Economic Impact of recent BC Immigration Flows. Community Dialogue Series: *Immigration and Migration: A British Columbia Dialogue*, Vancouver. October 2003.
45. Economic Performance of Immigrants. European Commission and the Library of Parliament Expert Panel, Ottawa. December 2003.

46. Canadian Immigration Issues in the 21st Century: A Made in Canada Response. Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa. December 2003.
47. Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants. Metropolis Canada, Conversation Series #15, Ottawa. December 2003.
48. An Economic Model of Immigrant Ascension to Canadian Citizenship. University of Bergen, Bergen. January 2004.
49. Ukrainian Immigrant Economic Integration into Canada. Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Hamburg. February 2004.
50. Ukrainian Immigrant Economic Integration into Canada. RWI, Essen. February 2004.
51. An Economic Model of Immigrant Ascension to Canadian Citizenship. IZA, Bonn. February 2004.
52. Labour Market Integration of Canada's Immigrant and Refugee Flows. International Labor Organization, Geneva. February 2004.
53. New Border Issues. Industry Canada Roundtable on International Migration of Skilled Workers, Ottawa. February 2004.
54. New Directions in the Economics of Canadian Immigration. 7th National Metropolis Conference, Montreal. March 2004.
55. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. Atlantic Metropolis and City of Halifax, Nova Scotia. April 2004.
56. Metropolis and Integration Issues. Swedish Ministry of Justice and Canadian Embassy, Stockholm. April 2004.
57. Working with the Canadian Diaspora. International Labor Organization and GTZ Migration and Development Seminar, Berlin. May 2004.
58. Immigration Issues and Cities: Lessons from Malmo and Toronto. Willy Brandt Lecture, Malmo, Sweden. May 2004.
59. The Economics of Canadian Immigrant Ascension to Citizenship. Seminar, IMER, University of Malmo. June 2004.
60. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. Julian Simon Keynote Address. IZA, Bonn. June 2004.

61. Economic Outcomes of Canadian Refugees. International Metropolis Conference, Geneva. September 2004.
62. The Economic Gains from Diversity. Volkswagen Foundation, Hanover. October 2004.
63. Quebec's Immigration Triangle. Atlantic Metropolis Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia. November 2004.
64. Recognition of the International Experience and Credentials of Immigrants/
Reconnaissance de l'expérience et des compétences acquises à l'étranger par les immigrants. Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Parliament, Ottawa. February 2005.
65. The Deflection of Immigrants at the Canada-United States Border, Border Security and Canada-US Integration, Western Washington University, April 28th, 2005.
66. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment. Migration Dialogue, German Marshall Fund, Toronto, 12 May 2005.
67. Importance of Citizenship in Economic Integration, IZA Ethnicity Meeting (Volkswagen Project) May 28 - 29, 2005 IZA, Bonn, Germany
68. "Survey of Chinese in Vancouver", 5th Canada-China Immigration Roundtable, Jinan University of China June 10-11th, 2005
69. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment., Capitalism and Entrepreneurship Dynamics, CIS University of Rome, July 6th-7th, 2005
70. "The Immigrant Credential Crisis" International Seminar in Canadian Studies, August 22nd, 2005. Simon Fraser University, SFUHC Vancouver, Canada
71. "Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment" Inter-Ministerial Seminar, Citizenship and Immigration, Canada, September 15th, 2005 Ottawa, Canada.
72. Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment, Dept. of Economics, Carleton University, Sept. 30th, 2005.
73. "Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment", Bann Forum, Bann, Canada Oct 7th, 2005.
74. "Canadian Immigrant Remittances", 10th International Metropolis Conference, Toronto, Canada

75. "Triangular Movement of Chinese Diaspora" *People on The Move: The Transnational Flow of Chinese Human Capital* Hong Kong, October 21-22nd 2005
76. "How much Is Too Much"? Public Lecture, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Canada Nov. 8th, 2005.
77. "How much Is Too Much"? Public Lecture, British Columbia Professional Economists Vancouver, Canada Nov. 15^h, 2005.
78. "Economics of Citizenship" Seminar at Migration Research Group, HWWA, Hamburg Germany. Feb. 18th 2006.
79. UNESCO International Forum on the Social Sciences-Policy Nexus. Buenos Aires, Argentinian, Feb. 18th-25th, 2006.
80. Lost Children and the 1978 Canadian Citizenship Act. Simon Fraser University, March 3rd, 2006.
81. "Reflections at the Border" CBSA Seminar March 16th, 2006.
82. : Integrating Immigrants: Building Partnerships that Work" Public Policy Forum, Toronto, March 19th, 2006.
83. "Canadian Demographic Trend: Economic Winners and Losers" Business Cluster Policy Secretariat of Ontario, Toronto, March 20th, 2006.
84. "The Economics of Citizenship, A Common Intellectual Ground for Social Scientists" Seminar University of Duesto, Bilbao Spain May 11th, 2006.
85. "The Economics of Citizenship, A Common Intellectual Ground for Social Scientists" Second Migrant Ethnicity Meeting IZA Bonn, May 14, 2006.
86. "Migration in North America: Security and Other Concerns" Santa Fe New Mexico, Oct. 23rd-24th
87. Asia Pacific Foundation Summit "Overseas Canadians: Issues in Trans Migration" Vancouver, Canada Oct. 26th, 2006.
88. Canadian Regional Immigration Experience" Decentralised Immigration Policy in Europe, IMISCOE Workshop, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Scotland, Nov. 2nd and 3rd, 2006
89. "Dual Citizenship: Some Thoughts" Migration Workshop, University of Duesto, Bilbao Spain, Nov. 6th, 2006.

90. "Disequilibrium in the Canada-Mexico Labour Markets: A case for expanding Canada's temporary foreign workers program?" Labour Markets in North America, Mexico City, Nov. 13, 2006.
91. "Triangular Movement of Chinese Diaspora" Canada-China Symposium on Social Inclusion Beijing, China Dec. 13-15th 2006.
92. "Triangular Movement of Chinese Diaspora" HKUST Nansha, China Dec. 17th, 2006
93. The Economics of Immigration Policy" CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis Amsterdam Netherlands Jan. 25, 2007.
94. The Economics of Old and New World Immigrant Ascension Modena, Italy April 24, 2007
95. Testimony to the European Commission on Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities Brussels, Belgium May 22nd, 2007.
96. Why the Chinese are Leaving Canada. B. C. Settlement Services Annual Meeting, Burnaby, B.C. Canada May 28th, 2007.
97. "Immigrants at the Border", Villa Madragone, Rome June 25-26th 2007.
98. "The New Canadian Diaspora", EDGE Conference, Vancouver, October 15th, 2007.
99. "Canadian Immigration and Citizenship" Being Canadian, Vancouver, Nov. 7th, 2007.
100. "Economics of Citizenship" Diversity, Integration and the Economy, Hamburg, Nov. 11, 2007
101. The Economic Performance of Former Soviet Union Immigrants in Canada, Raippan University, Israel, May 2008
102. Immigrants and NAFTA, University of Mexico de Norte, June 2008
103. Immigrants and Security: Profiling at the Border, Hons Bosch Stiftung, Berlin Germany, Sept. 2008
104. Economics of Immigration, Dept. of Economics, Kent University. Sept. 2008.
105. 'Border Thickness' ASEAN-Canadian Forum, November 25th-26th, 2008
106. Economics of Immigration, PSI London, England Feb 11th, 2009

107. "Border Thickness' COMPAS, Oxford University Feb. 12th, 2009
108. "Economics of Citizenship" Implications of Migrant Citizenship Acquisition Imiscoe Conference, Malmö University, May 14-16, 2009
109. "Factors Affecting International Marriage Survival" Imiscoe Conference, Lisbon, May 13-15th, 2009 (with N. Irastorza)
110. "The Economics of Citizenship" Metropolis Brown Bag, Ottawa June 23, 2009.
111. "The Economics of Immigrant Labour Market Discrimination" Imiscoe Conference, Stockholm University, September 9-10, 2009
112. "FSU Immigrants in Canada: A Case of Positive Triple Selection?" 14th International Metropolis Conference Copenhagen Denmark September 18th, 2009.
113. "Border Thickness: National Metropolis Conference Montreal, Canada March 18th, 2010.
114. "Canadians Abroad: The Economics of a Modern State Diaspora; University of Baroda, January 9th, 2011.
115. "Canadians Abroad: The Economics of a Modern State Diaspora" Association of Professional Economists of BC Victoria, BC March 2, 2011

F. Recent Honours

1. Director B.C. Metropolis 1996-2007.
2. IZA Senior Research Fellow 2000-present
3. Migration Research Group, Senior Research Fellow
4. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Senior Research Fellow and Research Director- Canadians Abroad Project 2008-present
5. Willy Brandt Guest Professor. IMER, Malmo University, Sweden. 2004.
6. Julian Simon Keynote Address AM² IZA, June, 2004
7. Canada Border Services Advisory Committee, June, 2005-2008

8. Board of Editors,

- a. Journal on Comparative Policy Analysis 2004-present
- b. Journal of Immigration and Integration 2002-present


DeVoretz



Biography

Dr. Don J. DeVoretz obtained his doctorate in Economics from the University of Wisconsin (Madison) in 1968. He was the Co-Director of RIIM, Vancouver's Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies and Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University. Dr. DeVoretz has held visiting appointments at Duke University, University of Ibadan (Nigeria), University of the Philippines, University of Wisconsin, and the Norwegian School of Economics and was the Willy Brandt Guest Professor at IMER, Malmo University in 2004. He is a Research Fellow with IZA (Germany), Migration Research Group (Germany) and currently the Research Director at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Dr. DeVoretz was named a British Columbia Scholar to China in 2000. In addition, Dr. DeVoretz's current research interests include the economics of immigration with special emphasis on "Brain Circulation" and citizenship issues which was supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung. His research findings have been reported in both professional journals as well as major print and electronic media. Dr. DeVoretz may be contacted at devoretz@sfu.ca

This is Exhibit**"B"**.... referred to in
the affidavit of **Don De Voretz**.....
sworn before me, this 12 day of
May, 2012




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Canada's Secret Province: 2.8 Million Canadians Abroad

Dr. Don DeVoretz

Canada's Secret Province: 2.8 Million Canadians Abroad

Dr. Don DeVoretz¹

Executive Summary

In 2008, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF) embarked on a three-year research project aimed at filling the information gap on the Canada's permanent overseas population. This paper estimates the total Canadian population living permanently abroad by drawing on information from two original studies of the research consortium of APF's Canadians Abroad Project -- empirical evidence that can be used to formulate future policy toward the Canadian Diaspora. A Diaspora member as used here means a Canadian citizen who has lived abroad for one year or more. This precision in terms of status and length of stay abroad -- Canadian citizen and one year or more -- eliminates the possibility of including foreign nationals who have no inherent right of return to Canada. Moreover, limiting the definition to those who have an absolute right of return to Canada means the data gathered can later be used to examine the possible impact of return migration on Canada's social programs and labour force.

Canada does not collect emigration statistics, so the research synthesized here offers a mixed approach involving Canadian Census data, the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB) and tax records. The Canadian Census can provide a comprehensive estimate of Canadians disappearing between censuses for both Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens. Using this methodology, outmigration rates are computed for the naturalized portion of the Canadian population for the 1996-2006 period. This yields a net exit rate for the period of 4.5%.

A similar census-based estimate for the Canadian-born population yields a low net exit rate for the 1996-2006 period (1.33%) which translates into 500,000 Canadian-born leavers over the 1996-2006 period. Thus, over this period the naturalized group exhibited a three times greater outmigration rate than the Canadian-born population. Moreover, given these exit rates for both the Canadian and foreign-born populations, a stock of 2.78 million Canadian leavers living abroad can be estimated.

An administrative data base maintained by Statistics Canada allows a more detailed calculation of the yearly outflow rates of various foreign-born Canadian immigrant cohorts between 1982 and 2000. Distinct exit patterns emerge across immigrant groups which may reveal divergent motivations for leaving over their lifetimes in Canada.

In sum, this 2009 estimate, based on the most current available data up to 2006, estimates Canada's Diaspora to be 2.8 million or around 8% of Canada's total population. In terms of size, one can think of these Canadians as a 'missing province.' In fact, of the 13 provinces and territories of Canada, only four

¹ Dr. Don DeVoretz is Research Director, Canadians Abroad Project at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. He can be contact at don.devoretz@asiapacific.ca. The research assistance of Ajay Parasram is noted with appreciation plus the helpful comments of Yuen Pau Woo.

can boast a higher population. With such a large exit rate of 4.5%, naturalized Canadians represent the fastest growing segment of this population.

Key findings of the study can be summarized as follows:

- A mixed methodological approach finds that approximately 2.8 million (~8%) Canadians live permanently abroad, with the majority of these citizens being Canadian born.
- 57% of Canadians living abroad are in the United States, Greater China, the United Kingdom and Australia.
- Outmigration rates for foreign born-Canadians range from negative (meaning net inflows of a specific census group, as in the case of India) to as high as 30% in the case of Taiwan.
- Of the Canadian-born citizens living abroad, men have a higher exit rate (1.60%) than women (1.05%).
- 21-25 year old Canadian-born citizens had exit rates more than double the average.
- Canadian citizens who identify themselves ethnically as French had a net return rate of 29%.
- Second generation South Asian and Chinese-Canadian citizens had exit rates of -9.92% and 11.04% respectively, suggesting a highly mobile generation.
- Males who were naturalized aged between 21-30 years old and who arrived in 1992 had the greatest propensity to leave between 1996 and 2006.

I. Introduction

In 2006 Kenny Zhang estimated that 2.7 million Canadian citizens lived permanently abroad *circa* 2006. This paper sets out to evaluate this estimate by providing detailed information derived from a new set of estimates of Canadian citizens living abroad based on two original studies by the research consortium of APF's Canadians Abroad Project. Canada does not collect emigration data on Canadian citizens leaving Canada, thus a variety of indirect methods have been employed in the past to estimate portions of Canada's overseas permanent population.² Given this lack of primary emigration data, no definitive estimate of both naturalized and Canadian-born citizens living abroad exists.

Thus, APF, under the aegis of the Canadians Abroad Project, commissioned a series of studies using primarily Canadian sources to estimate the size and composition of Canada's overseas population. Canada's census data and an administrative data base, the Longitudinal International Migration Database (IMDB), compiled by Statistics Canada provided disaggregated estimates of both the Canadian-born and naturalized portions respectively of the Canada's Diaspora. An evaluation of these sources in turn will allow us to infer a "best or meta estimate" of both the size and composition of Canadian citizens resident abroad.³ Though I have some case study-based estimates of population size that are more current than 2006 data, I do not include these figures in the meta-estimate. In the interest of consistency, this paper bases its empirical findings on the Census and IMDB approach only.

Central to the estimate of Canada's Diaspora is the concept employed to define membership in the Canadian Diaspora. The conservative, but precise, definition of the Diaspora must first recognize the individual Canadian's substantial attachment to Canada while simultaneously recognizing a substantial commitment by the Diaspora

² See Aydemir and Robinson, "Return and Outward Migration among Working Age Men," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Catalogue No. 11F0019MIE-No. 273: Statistics Canada.

³ In this context a meta estimate refers to an estimate owing to an evaluation of all other plausible existing estimates.

member to living abroad. Given these two criteria, membership in the Canadian Diaspora is defined as: a Canadian citizen residing abroad for one year or more.⁴ In this sense the definition is limiting but still allows a great deal of flexibility since Canadian citizens can be Canadian-born or naturalized and are not limited by occupation, age or presence in the labour market.⁵ This precision in terms of status (Canadian citizen) and length of stay abroad (one year or more) is a byproduct of the goal of the Canadians Abroad Project which attempts to assess the social and economic implications derived from its overseas Diaspora. Citizenship status is central to the definition of the Canadian Diaspora since it eliminates the possibility of including foreign born sojourners (i.e. landed immigrants, foreign students, temporary foreign workers, etc.) who have no inherent right of return to Canada. Limiting the definition to those who have an absolute right of return to Canada ensures that I can later infer the approximate possible impact of return migration on Canada's social programs and labour force. Given this narrow, but precise definition of a Canadian Diaspora member, I now turn to alternative methodologies and data sources used to estimate the size of the Canadian Diaspora.

II. Methodological and Data Issues

As noted earlier, Canada does not collect exit information on Canadians leaving the country. Hence the most direct methodology, to count Diaspora members (i.e. a Canadian administrative exit data set) is not available. Instead three alternative methodologies are available to estimate the size and describe the dimensions of Canada's overseas permanent population. First, it is possible to employ a forward census survival technique on two or more recent Canadian censuses to infer the loss of population owing to net emigration under a precise set of assumptions.⁶ Simply speaking, this method counts citizens and permanent residents during a census according to certain characteristics, and then observes whether these people are absent from future censuses, adjusting for mortality. Next, several Canadian administrative data sets allow emigration estimates across several portions of the Canadian population. For example, an analysis of the longitudinal IMDB allows a count of a portion of the Canadian immigrant base after 1981.⁷ Other data sets allow an even more limited insight into the composition of Canada's Diaspora populations.⁸ Finally, administrative and census records exist in the destination countries housing Canada's Diaspora. Again, these destination country records are more or less inclusive of the true number of Canadian citizens resident in the reporting countries.⁹ Thus, I conclude at this point that no one ideal data set exists to estimate the size of the Canadian population abroad. Instead, from a variety of sources it will be possible to calculate components of Canada's offshore population and from these estimates construct a meta-estimate.

A. *Canadian Census Data Sources: 1996-2006*

The Canadian Census has been used in the past to estimate portions of Canada's population which have "disappeared." It must be pointed out that when I use census data I can only estimate a global net exit count or rate

⁴ Suggestions have been made to include non-citizens such as permanent resident immigrants residing abroad. These sub-populations may have strong attachments to Canada but given their status and lack of automatic re-entry rights, they represent less interesting groups for policy analysis. For example, in the case of another SARS outbreak, Canadian citizens resident in the infected area have an automatic right of return while the other groups do not.

⁵ This lack of age restriction allows retirees to be included while the absence of labour force status allows students and a multitude of others to be included.

⁶ Net migration would be defined as the number of leavers over a period minus the number of new immigrants over this period.

⁷ Note the IMDB does not reveal whether the immigrants who disappear in the data set are actually Canadian citizens.

⁸ Others have used tax-filer records to infer the movement of a small set of Canadians who file taxes while abroad. While citizen status is reported in tax filer records, of course they represent a massive understatement of Canadians abroad since many overseas Canadians do not pay taxes.

⁹ Dual citizenship recognition distorts the 'head count' in the resident countries. For example, many naturalized Canadian citizens report themselves as Chinese in Hong-Kong since China forbids dual citizenship.

of emigration.¹⁰ In addition, I can only estimate who leaves Canada and not where they go. Thus, this section will provide a comprehensive set of estimates on Canadian leavers by birth status, year of entry into Canada (if applicable) and period of exit. However, where these Canadians reside and their demographic and economic features cannot be inferred from this data source. To make inferences about these features, I will appeal to other sources.

Victor Chen (2009) provides the most comprehensive estimates of foreign-born Canadians disappearing from a recent and comprehensive census data set. Using the 20% sample of the 1996, 2001 and 2006 censuses he provides the following estimates contained in Tables 1-3. Chen's methodology was straight-forward. He grouped individual respondents in each sample year by five constant demographic characteristics:

- Gender
- Year of birth,
- Year of immigration (if applicable),
- Residence in a census metropolitan area (CMA),
- Country of birth

This allowed Chen to deduce the changes in the relevant population size over the 1996-2001 and 2001-2005 periods and infer a decrease or increase in the relevant population size when netted for mortality. Thus, a decrease (increase) in population would imply a net outmigration from (net return migration back to) Canada.

The underlying methodology can be stated as follows: Over any five-year interval, the actual calculation of the change ($dN_{l,m}$) in the weighted count of (l th) population appears in Equation 1 while the percentage change ($Z_{l,m}$) of the weighted count of (l th) population group appears in Equation 2.¹¹

$$dN_{l,m-vs-m+5} = N_{l,m}^{(5)} - N_{l,m+5} = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{l,m}} w_{i,m} \cdot (1 - R_i^{(5)}) - \sum_{i=1}^{n_{l,m+5}} w_{i,m+5} \quad (1)$$

$$Z_{l,m-vs-m+5} = \frac{dN_{l,m-vs-m+5}}{N_{l,m}^{(5)}} \times 100\% \quad (2)$$

If equation 1 yields a positive (negative) value then the net out migration (in-migration) rate is revealed. I next turn to Chen's calculations under equation 1 to report Chens's estimates of outmigration levels by country of origin for the period 1996-2006.

¹⁰ A net rate estimate arises since a forward (or backward) census survival technique essentially counts the number of residents at day 1 and day $n+1$. Clearly, movement could have occurred between these dates as people leave and return. A gross estimate would simply count all the leavers.

¹¹ Where $dN_{l,m}$ is the absolute change in the size of the (l th) group between periods (m) and ($m+5$). R_i is the five year mortality adjusted by the weight count ($w_{i,m}$) in census year (m).

i. *Outmigration Levels and Rates 1996-2006 for Naturalized Canadians***Table 1: Countries with High Positive Outmigration Rates: 1996-2006**

Country	Num.	Out-Rate
Hong Kong	44710	23.98 %
United States	15130	10.64 %
Taiwan	14060	30.37 %
Iran	7620	15.14 %
France	5090	11.47 %
South Korea	4460	10.10 %
Japan	1630	12.50 %
Australia	1130	10.44 %
Singapore	620	12.02 %

Source: Chen, V.Z. 2009

Table 1 reports Chen's estimated cumulative outmigration levels and outmigration rates for the stock of foreign-born Canadian citizens from key immigrant areas who were resident in Canada for the period 1996-2006 using the methodology outlined above.¹² The outmigration rates for the foreign-born Canadian émigrés emanating from Taiwan (30%), Hong Kong (24%), the Iran (15%), United States (11%), Japan (12 %), Singapore (12%), France (11), Australia (10%) and S. Korea (10%) all demonstrate a robust outward movement pattern over these ten years. It is important to note that these countries sent to Canada a diverse set of immigrants ranging from predominately refugees (Iran) to business and professionally trained immigrants (USA, Japan, Australia). In addition, political tensions in Hong Kong and Taiwan coupled with a latter period of quiescence may have led to these high reported exit rates.

Table 2: Countries with Negative Outmigration Rates: 1996-2006

Country	Num.	Out-Rate
Netherlands	-40	-0.15 %
Philippines	-200	-0.12 %
Greece	-270	-0.72 %
Italy	-2370	-2.10 %
Vietnam	-5050	-4.66 %
India	-9090	-4.17 %

Source: Chen, V.Z. 2009

At the other extreme are the immigrant source countries which actually exhibit net increases in their migration rates, particularly India (-4.2%) and Vietnam (-4.7%). In the case of India, a large "chain based" family class of immigrants substantially outweighed the out-movement of prior Indian immigrants during this period.

¹² Appendix tables 1 and 2 report Chen's raw numbers for computing the rates reported in Tables 1 to 3 including his important mortality adjustments.

Table 3: Countries with Low Positive Outmigration Rates: 1996-2006

Country	Num.	Out-Rate
China	5230	2.74%
Poland	4620	4.83%
Sri Lanka	3800	6.29%
Jamaica	3710	4.39%
United Kingdom	3680	1.34%
Lebanon	2840	5.91%
Germany	2290	4.27%
Trinidad & Tobago	2270	4.74%
Portugal	2180	2.06%
Hungary	1150	8.12%
Guyana	570	0.95%
New Zealand	380	7.00%
Haiti	230	0.63%


Source: Chen, V.Z. 2009

Table 3 portrays the actual complexity of recent emigration rates with a mixture of single digit outmigration rates across a variety of immigrant sending countries. These single digit rates appear for new immigrant sending states (China), older vintages of Canadian immigrants from the UK, Germany, Portugal and Poland and the refugee producing areas of Sri Lanka and Lebanon.

Tables 1 to 3 report a wide range of net exit rates, indicating the diversity of experiences in the outmigration process for resident foreign-born Canadian citizens during the 1996-2006 census period.¹³ The average net rate of emigration for all the countries reported in Tables 1 and 2 with positive outmigration rates is 8.7%, which is large for a ten-year interval. However, Chen estimates a 4.5% exit rate for the period 1996-2006 for the entire foreign-born Canadian citizen population.

In order to extrapolate the 4.5% average net outmigration rate over any immigrant cohort's lifetime to reveal any stock's entire outflow, we must know the outmigration rates over the cohort's lifetime. Chen provides such data which will allow us to draw some inferences about the cumulative outflows of the foreign-born population as the stock ages. I first report Chen's lifecycle outflow estimates in Figure 1 below. Concentrating on the life-cycle rates of immigrants who arrived between 1960 to 1996 (old immigrant vintage), I note that their leaving rates 1996-2000 (blue line) between ages 21-50 are equal or exceed their reported average rate of 4.5%. Given these historical trends, it is reasonable to extrapolate that over 30 years, at least 27% of this cohort would leave Canada if the age-specific rates reported in Figure 1 were maintained.

¹³ Again, it must be noted that these rates are lower bound estimates of movers since this is a net rate which deducts for inter-census period return movement of immigrants who may have been resident in Canada during the 1996-2006 period.

Figure 1: Out-Migration Rates by Age Group and Immigrant Vintage (%)

Source: Chen, V.Z. 2009

ii. *Outmigration Levels and Rates 1996-2006 for Canadian-born citizens*

The largest reported group of Canadian citizens living in the United States is reported to be Canadian-born citizens and for this reason alone it is important to report the size of this Canadian-born outflow world-wide.¹⁴ Chen again provides estimates of this outflow in Table 4.

Table 4: Canadian-born Outmigration Levels and Rates, 1996-2001

Canadians by Birth:	1996 Weighted count (rounded)	1996 weighted count (5-year mortality adjusted, rounded)	1996 weighted count (10-year mortality adjusted, rounded)	2001 weighted count (rounded)	2001 weighted count (5-year mortality adjusted, rounded)	2006 weighted count (rounded)
Total	20,761,610	20,498,730	20,108,830	20,112,880	19,729,200	19,581,700
Absolute Out 96 - 01	Absolute Out 01- 06	Out-Rate 96 - 01	Out-rate 01- 06	Overall Out-rate		
385,850	147,500	1.88 %	0.75 %	1.33%		

Source: Chen, V.Z. 2009

An inspection of Table 4 shows the high absolute outmigration levels for Canadian-born citizens, especially between 1996-2001 with 385,850 leavers. In total, the estimated number of Canadian-born leavers for the ten-year period 1996-2006 exceeds 500,000. However, given the large base population of approximately 20 million, this translates into a low net exit rate of only 1.33% of total Canadian-born citizens. In addition, as is well known, Canadian-born

¹⁴ See DeVoretz 2009.

emigration is largely driven by economic forces in the United States and the economic downturn after 2001 caused a collapse in the net outmigration rate to 0.75%.¹⁵

In sum, Chen reports a vastly different story for the naturalized and Canadian-born population, in terms of outflow rates between 1996-2006. In short, the Canadian-born population has a low net exit rate for this period (1.33%) and the naturalized group has a three times greater outmigration rate of 4.5%.

Given these outmigration estimates for the 1996-2006 period, it is possible to estimate a global Canadian overseas citizen population stock if I apply these leaving rates to Canadians living abroad pre-1996, so long as we are willing to invoke two major assumptions: the recent past (1996-2006) mirrors the more distant past (e.g. 1976-1996) in terms of age-specific mortality rates and exit rates. Given these assumptions hold, it is possible to construct an estimate of the number of total Canadian leavers living abroad that was generated over the period 1976-2006 or the last 30 years.¹⁶ As can be seen by an inspection of Table 5 the total estimated Canadian citizen population level is 2.78 million under these set of assumptions.

Table 5: Estimates of Post-1976 Canadian population Living Abroad

2006	0			0	
1996	29,610,757	35.3	10	98.7885%	1,062,590
1986	26,100,587	31.6	20	96.8492%	918,240
1976	23,449,793	27.8	30	93.9585%	800,360
Total					2,781,190

Source: Author's construction

B. Conditioners of Census-based Exit Rates

a. Canadian-born

These reported countrywide exit rates estimated for the Canadian population by foreign birth status do not reveal the richness in the underlying patterns of emigration. Key demographic conditioners such as, age, length of time in Canada, place of residence in Canada all condition the emigration rate. This section of the paper both highlight these features and allows a composite picture to be drawn on who leaves and when. Central to this description is to portray the likelihood of Canadian citizens leaving over their life cycle to better appreciate the possible socio-economic impact derived from emigration, and perhaps return migration.

The demographic conditioners which affect the exit rates for the Canadian-born portion of the emigration population are offered in Table 6 below.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ 1978 is a crucial benchmark year since after 31 years a portion of this population could still be living abroad under normal mortality conditions.

Table 6: Absolute Flows and Return Rates for Canadian Born Population: 1996-2006

	1996 (weighted count, rounded)	2001 (weighted count, rounded)	2006 (weighted count, rounded)	Out: 96 – 01	Out: 01 – 06	Overall Out Rate (96 – 06) %
Total¹⁷	20,761,610	20,112,880	19,581,700	385,850	147,500	1.33
Female	10,372,270	10,111,760	9,903,540	158,370	54,940	1.05
Male	10,389,340	10,001,120	9,678,160	227,480	92,560	1.60
21-25	1,547,560	1,470,990	1,460,050	72,050	6,200	2.60
26-30	1,603,450	1,563,060	1,546,440	35,210	9,860	1.43
31-35	1,973,700	1,931,840	1,918,990	33,330	870	0.88
36-40	1,953,720	1,920,670	1,903,620	20,990	-1,200	0.51
41-45	1,710,170	1,682,880	1,666,970	11,090	-9,040	0.06
46-50	1,456,360	1,424,130	1,407,700	10,600	-17,730	-0.25
51-55	1,115,420	1,083,260	1,057,230	5,350	-16,040	-0.50
African	51,210	52,280	53,460	-1,280	-1,500	-2.70
Arab	61,760	61,310	66,050	140	-5,210	-4.15
Asian: South	29,210	29,140	34,890	30	-5,810	-9.92
Asian: S (East Indian)	135,340	132,650	141,070	-5,450	-970	-2.33
Asian: E/SE	137,920	173,770	131,010	4,510	520	1.87
Asian: E/SE (Chinese)	179,290	20,490	187,100	4,900	-14,210	-2.65
Asian: West	19,980	854,570	24,270	-570	-3,880	-11.04
Canadian	6,417,680	4,895,990	7,287,130	-2,196,890	1,099,550	-7.45
European: British	6,121,140	2,066,680	5,540,020	1,133,590	-756,600	3.49
European: French	3,510,000	985,980	1,808,650	1,392,570	208,970	29.24
European: German	1,073,130	532,120	1,049,960	74,090	-82,240	-0.40
European: Italian	537,670	451,960	572,640	1,980	-45,630	-4.11
European: Other East	453,050	1,223,610	560,610	-4,560	-117,380	-13.69
European: Others	1,251,770	472,980	1,299,520	15,700	-93,920	-3.20

Notes: a. Excluding Indigenous Peoples

Canadian-born citizens as reported above had a low overall exit rate (1.33%) for the 1996-2006 period, however, the male exit rate of 1.60% was greater than the female rate of 1.05%. In addition, the exit rate was age specific with the 21-25 year old rate almost double the average rate. This may be a byproduct of both youth and the mobility associated with seeking an international education. Beyond age 45 the exit rates for Canadian-born citizens collapse.

The most dramatic variations in exit rates for the Canadian-born population are reported by ethnicity. Those who self identify as French had a substantial net return rate of 29%. This alone begs for an explanation. In addition, the

¹⁷ Aged 0 to 71 in 1996.

exit rates for newer vintages of second generation Canadians who claimed either South Asian (-9.92%) or Chinese (-11.04%) ethnicity were high and is indicative of a mobile second generation. In sum, the low average exit rates for Canadian-born Canadian citizens disguises the robust exit rates in the second generation and for some specific age groups.

b. Naturalized Canadians

Table 7: Return Rates for Pre-1996 Naturalized Canadians in 1996-2006

	1996 (weighted count, rounded)	2001 (weighted count, rounded)	2006 (weighted count, rounded)	Out-migration 1996-2000 (%)	Out-migration 2001-2005 (%)	Out-migration 1996-2005 (%)
Total	2,644,880	2,503,360	2,475,180	4.48	-0.05	4.20
Female	1,366,440	1,303,780	1,291,350	3.93	-0.02	3.82
Male	1,278,440	1,199,580	1,183,830	5.07	-0.07	4.62
21-25	250,110	222,760	214,200	10.68	0.27	13.83
26-30	357,000	332,690	327,390	6.51	0.15	7.60
31-35	448,930	427,010	424,970	4.47	-0.02	4.34
36-40	441,760	418,550	417,060	4.67	-0.10	4.10
41-45	423,480	401,780	400,090	4.22	-0.20	3.19
46-50	407,050	393,070	386,590	1.98	-0.25	1.22
51-55	316,540	307,500	304,880	0.47	-2.17	-2.67
1960-1967	304,010	298,120	299,860	0.57	-1.80	-2.25
1968-1971	266,200	254,740	255,140	3.05	-0.54	0.86
1972-1974	272,100	255,000	261,500	5.25	-0.66	1.16
1975-1977	247,920	237,380	229,950	3.33	0.37	4.94
1978-1981	274,420	267,630	264,980	1.66	-0.11	1.37
1982-1986	276,690	267,560	267,510	2.57	-0.31	1.47
1987-1989	280,850	269,670	264,440	3.29	0.19	4.12
1990-1991	236,800	219,940	216,420	6.48	0.07	7.02
1992-1993	2,66880	225,810	218,590	14.82	0.12	16.71
1994-1995	219,010	207,520	196,790	4.62	0.72	8.65


Table 7 reveals the differential exit rates by age, gender and year of entry for Canada's older vintage (pre-1996) of naturalized Canadian citizens. Clearly a male naturalized citizen between the ages of 21-30 who arrived in 1992 would have the greatest propensity to leave Canada during the 1996-2005 period. For example, almost 17% of the 1990-1991 cohort had left in that ten-year period. Moreover, in the pre-1996 naturalized cohort aged 21-45 (the peak earning years), over 33% had left Canada.

Table 8 describes the exit rates for the newest vintage of naturalized Canadians who arrived between 1996 and 2000 and left between 2001-2005. In this short five year leaving period, over 16% of the 1997 arrivals had left with a heavy concentration of leavers in the male older age bracket (31-45).

Table 8: Migration Exit Rates for Newer Vintage Naturalized Canadian Immigrants: 2001-2005

	2001 (weighted count)	2006 (weighted count)	Outmigration Rate 2001-2005 (%)
Total	556,560	528,900	4.5
Female	292,340	280,370	3.76
Male	264,220	248,530	5.34
21-25	65,630	65,760	-0.46
26-30	102,840	98,110	4.49
31-35	124,110	115,070	7.40
36-40	105,790	99,560	5.60
41-45	79,210	74,410	5.44
46-50	51,430	48,780	3.85
51-55	27,550	27,200	-1.14
1996	115,550	109,190	5.0
1997	118,610	101,200	16.33
1998	96,010	93,520	1.97
1999	103,750	101,050	2.01
2000	122,640	123,940	-1.66

In Figure 2 I report Chen's exit rates by Canadian cities for naturalized Canadian citizens between 1996 to 2005 to reveal the regional nature of these outflows. Concentrating on the older immigrant vintage reveals that the post 1996 naturalized cohort previously resident in Vancouver, Montreal and Ottawa experienced high exit rates.

Figure 2: Exit Rates for Old and New Immigrant Vintages by CMA (%)

In sum, reporting the exit rates by demographic and foreign-birth status reveals the complexity of the emigration process. Young males generally dominate the exit process with certain ethnic groups (French) or immigrant cohorts by year of entry (1997) exhibiting extraordinarily high emigration rates over a short period. Nonetheless, the exit process is best described for the naturalized group by the older vintage of immigrants who over their economic lifetime exhibited a 33% exit rate. In sharp contrast, the Canadian-born cohort reported in Table 6 had only a 4.7% exit rate over their economic life.

C. IMBD- Based Exit Rate Estimates:

As was noted earlier, an alternative Canadian-based data source to estimate outward migration for naturalized Canadians is the IMDB. This is an administrative data base which collects "tombstone data" upon a permanent immigrant's arrival in Canada which in turn is electronically collated to the immigrant's income tax record. In short, the absence of a tax filer record in a particular year indicates his/her disappearance owing to death, lack of income, lack of filing or separation from Canada.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada has estimated onward migration rates for select immigrant source countries over the period 1982 to 1997 as reported in Figure 3.¹⁸ The onward migration rate which consists of a combination of actual and estimated outmigration rates plus a residual flow (other) is high for a select group of countries or regions: the USA (33%), Northern Europe (27%) Hong Kong (23%), Oceania (22%) and around 18% for Taiwan and Lebanon.¹⁹ Of the remaining reported countries, all experienced an onward migration rate below 15% with


¹⁸ Onward migration is defined as disappearances in a cohort minus reported deaths, estimated deaths, and non-tax filers.

¹⁹ Actual emigration rate occurs when a respondent writes the date he left the country on the first page of his T1 return. Estimated emigration occurs when a member of a unit does not file an income tax form for two years or files from outside Canada. The other category equals onward migration: reported minus estimated emigration.

some major immigrant-sending countries (India, Philippines, Vietnam and China) experiencing onward migration rates well below 10%.

How do the IMDB based estimates of emigration compare to Chen's census-based findings for the period 1996-2006? In terms of orders of magnitude, Chen's estimates are obviously smaller since they cover only the 1996-2006 exit window, while the IMDB exit window covers 16 years.²⁰ Nonetheless, regardless of the data source, a few countries (e.g. USA, Hong Kong and Taiwan) dominate the exit experience based on census or IMDB data. However, Oceania and Northern Europe have high exit rates based on the IMDB data source.

Figure 3: Onward Migration: Percent by Country of Last Permanent Residence



Source: B. St-Jean, 2009

There is one further glaring discrepancy in the two source estimates of exit rates. The average onward migration rate derived from Figure 3 is 12.4%, which is more than 2.5 times greater than the exit rate of 4.5 % as reported by Chen for the 1996-2006 period. However, a combination of the actual and estimated outmigration rates reported in Figure 3 would yield an exit rate similar to Chen's estimate. Again, it must be noted that the IMDB data does not control for Canadian citizenship and hence I would always anticipate an over estimate owing to this discrepancy.


Even given the definitional limits inherent in the IMDB, this data set allows the researcher to compute the time path of exit for any cohort by years in Canada. A sample of the results derived from this computation is provided in Figures 4 to 6 below.

Figure 4 reveals that immigrants from the USA leave very shortly after arrival (years 1 to 3) and then their rates of exit subside while Hong Kong immigrants wait at least three years before leaving in substantial numbers. Immigrants from China, Lebanon and Pakistan follow the Hong-Kong pattern while the UK-sourced immigrants

²⁰ The onward migration rate is computed for 16 years for any cohort. In other words, in the 17th year a cohort is dropped from the IMDB, thus underestimating the cohort's exit rate since some will leave after retirement.

follow the USA pattern of a short stay. The Philippines and Vietnam, albeit with low exit rates, are mainly concentrated in immigrants who have been in Canada for 18 or more years.


Figure 4: Onward migration by years since landing according to the definition of emigration and the country of the last permanent residence (USA)



Source: B. St-Jean (2009)


The case of Lebanon is important, as it is the oft cited example since 2006. As Figure 6 below illustrates, the case of Lebanese emigration mimics the Hong-Hong experience and to that extent, Lebanon is not exceptional. Figures 4 to 6 reveal a diverse exit pattern for Canada's immigrants. Immigrants from wealthy countries tend to have high exit rates after a brief stay, whereas people from less wealthy countries or countries with political stress leave after five or more years of residency in Canada.

Figure 5: Onward migration by years since landing according to the definition of emigration and the country of the last permanent residence (Hong Kong)



Source: B. St-Jean (2009)

Figure 6: Onward migration by years since landing according to the definition of emigration and the country of the last permanent residence (Lebanon)



Source: B. St-Jean (2009)

III. Destination Country Estimates

A core question emerging from this work and relevant for future policymaking asks where Canada's overseas population resides. Table 9 provides estimates of the Canadian Diaspora by resident country derived from multiple sources and thus, when appropriate, I provide a range of estimates. For the purposes of this analysis, I will concentrate on the fourth column of Table 9, the average estimate. The USA had just over 1 million Canadian citizens in residence in 2001 or 36% of the total Canadian Diaspora. Greater China – Hong Kong, China and Taiwan -- had an additional 292,000 Canadian citizens in residence in 2006. The only other significant destination countries are the UK and Australia with 70,000 and 27,289 Canadian citizens respectively in residence in 2008. In sum, these major residential areas account for over 57% of Canada's Diaspora. The remaining reported destination countries all have less than 10,000 Canadians in residence and point to a pattern of a widely dispersed, but minor world-wide Canadian population resident in several countries.²¹

²¹ Several of the countries listed in Table 9 below have been profiled as part of the Canadians Abroad Project, and these country profiles are accessible online at www.canadiansabroad.ca.

Table 9: Country Profile Table -- Population Estimates, Select Countries

Country	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Average	Source
United States	945,060	1,062,640	1,003,850	US Census, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF)
Singapore	5,140	---	5,140	Foreign Ministry of Singapore
United Kingdom	70,000	---	70,000	UK Census, National Statistics Labour Force Survey
Hong Kong	150,000	250,000	200,000	Canadian Consulate and APF
Trinidad & Tobago	3,700	5,000	4,350	Canadian High Commission
Australia	--	--	27,289	OECD
China	---	---	40,000	APF
Taiwan	--	--	52,500	APF
Japan	---	--	7,067	OECD
Republic of Korea	2,468	14,879	8,673	OECD, APF
Mexico	--	--	5,768	OECD
New Zealand	--	--	7,770	OECD
Philippines	--	--	7,500	DFAIT
Singapore	--	--	5,140	APF
Thailand	--	--	5,000	DFAIT
Vietnam	--	--	1,000	APF

IV. Conclusions

Canada's exit rates as reported by several authors (Chen, Zhang, and Benoit St-Jean) illustrate a consistent pattern. In fact, Zhang's global estimate *circa* 2006 of 2.7 million Canadian citizens living abroad can be replicated from Chen's census-based estimates. Moreover, Chen's immigrant country of origin exit rates are replicated in many cases with independent estimates derived from the IMDB. This leads me to conclude that Chen's census based exit rates and my 2.8 million stock measures are my preferred or 'meta' estimate of the Canadian population living abroad. Thus, almost 9% of Canada's citizen based population lives overseas with the dominate portion being Canadian-born citizens. The outflow of recent naturalized immigrant cohorts has been substantial, with several immigrant origin countries exhibiting high exit rates after five years of residence in Canada. Finally, 57% of Canada's Diaspora resides in the USA, greater China, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The remainder is dispersed world-wide in small numbers.

Appendix Tables**Appendix Table 1: Older Vintage of Immigrants: Aged 21 to 55, Landing Years 1960-1996**

Selected Country	1996 weighted rounded	1996 weighted rounded 5-year survival	1996 weighted 10-ye survival	2001 weighted rounded	2006 weighted rounded	Out-migration 96-00	Out-Migration 01-05
Australia*	9,600	9,520	9,390	8,740	8,440	780	170
China	117,880	116,720	114,930	109,780	113,940	6,940	-5,950
France	36,280	35,940	35,420	33,270	32,140	2,670	610
Germany	51,190	50,640	49,780	48,030	47,310	2,610	-140
Greece	38,710	38,200	37,420	36,050	37,690	2,150	-2,420
Guyana	56,370	55,910	55,210	54,880	54,710	1,030	-530
Haiti	33,450	33,170	32,740	31,750	32,160	1,420	-840
Hong Kong	166,690	165,450	163,570	135,310	122,150	30,140	11,280
Hungary	13,160	13,010	12,780	11,600	11,650	1,410	-280
India	164,780	163,330	161,110	159,840	164,150	3,490	-6,530
Iran	32,470	32,210	31,820	27,840	27,160	4,370	290
Italy	115,250	113,750	111,400	114,140	113,880	-390	-2,090
Jamaica	80,140	79,460	78,410	76,660	74,570	2,800	290
Japan*	9,690	9,600	9,450	8,680	8,300	920	230
Lebanon	43,990	43,660	43,160	41,480	40,530	2,180	450
Netherlands	26,260	25,960	25,500	25,510	25,720	450	-670
New Zealand*	5,560	5,510	5,430	5,190	5,050	320	60
Philippines	132,800	131,740	130,120	128,990	128,890	2,750	-1,520
Poland	92,360	91,600	90,440	86,730	85,810	4,870	-240
Portugal	106,540	105,550	104,020	102,720	101,620	2,830	-430
Singapore	5,260	5,220	5,160	4,790	4,540	430	190
South Korea	30,150	29,860	29,420	27,190	26,120	26,780	630
Sri Lanka	46,290	45,950	45,450	42,890	41,900	3,060	490
Taiwan	29,460	29,200	28,800	21,850	18,400	7,350	3,050
Trinidad & Tobago	45,150	44,730	44,080	42,540	41,490	2,190	400
United Kingdom	271,130	268,260	263,820	263,070	259,780	5,190	-1,150
United States	134,820	133,620	131,770	121,340	117,090	12,280	2,400
Vietnam	102,890	102,190	101,160	103,260	105,690	-1,070	-3,460
Yugoslavia	30,960	30,670	30,230	23,700	13,920	6,970	9,340

Source: Chen's calculation from 1996 – 2006 Census of Canada

Appendix Table 2: New Immigrants: Age in 2001: 21 to 55, Landing Years 1996-2000

Selected Country	2001 weighted rounded	2001 weighted rounded 5-yr survival	2006 weighted rounded	Out-Migration 01-05
Australia*	1,440	1,430	s.p.	180
China	76,610	76,090	71,850	4,240
France	9,000	8,950	7,140	1,810
Germany	3,930	3,900	4,080	-180
Greece	s.p.	s.p.	s.p.	
Guyana	4,960	4,930	4,860	70
Haiti	3,530	3,510	3,860	-350
Hong Kong	23,070	22,870	19,580	3,290
Hungary	1,380	1,380	1,360	20
India	57,510	57,110	63,160	-6,050
Iran	18,660	18,510	15,550	2,960
Italy	1,370	1,360	s.p.	110
Jamaica	6,170	6,130	6,260	-130
Japan*	3,610	3,590	3,110	480
Lebanon	4,890	4,860	4,650	210
Netherlands	2,070	2,060	1,880	180
New Zealand*	s.p.	s.p.	s.p.	
Philippines	33,530	33,310	34,740	-1,430
Poland	5,240	5,200	5,210	-10
Portugal	1,620	1,610	1,830	-220
Singapore*	s.p.	s.p.	s.p.	
South Korea	14,850	14,730	13,570	1,160
Sri Lanka	15,110	15,010	14,760	250
Taiwan	17,650	17,490	13,830	3,660
Trinidad & Tobago	3,800	3,770	4,090	-320
United Kingdom	10,860	10,780	11,140	-360
United States	10,510	10,440	9,990	450
Vietnam	7,190	7,160	7,680	-520
Yugoslavia	9,690	9,620	4,370	5,250


*Source: Chen's calculation from 1996 – 2006 Census of Canada

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This is Exhibit "C" referred to in
the affidavit of **Don De Voretz**.....

sworn before me, this 13 day of
May, 2012



.....
A Commissioner of Oaths, etc.



CANADIANS ABROAD



CANADA'S GLOBAL ASSET

*Canadians abroad are
a major asset for Canada's international affairs.
How can we deepen our connections
with citizens overseas for the benefit
of all Canadians?*



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada initiated the Canadians Abroad Project as part of a policy research consortium and is deeply grateful to its project supporters—the Royal Bank of Canada Foundation, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Government of British Columbia, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, and Western Economic Diversification—for their generous investment of time and money. More than just a research report, the findings of this project provide a platform for policy development and public awareness about Canadians abroad, and an opportunity to tap into Canada's global asset.

Don DeVoretz, Research Director
Kenny Zhang, Senior Project Manager

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For further information, please contact Kenny Zhang:

Tel: 1.604.630.1527

Fax: 1.604.681.1370

Email: kenny.zhang@asiapacific.ca






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FOREWORD

In the same way that globalization has connected distant corners of the earth through trade, finance, and information flows, increased international mobility—especially of the highly skilled—is connecting Canadian citizens to the world in new and challenging ways. An increasingly globalized world is changing the way we think about immigration, residency, citizenship, human capital, and the panoply of government policies that affect these issues.

The flow of people between Canada and Asia has been an integral part of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's research for many years. In the 1980s and most of the 1990s, the focus was on immigration from Asia. Indeed, this period saw the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Asian immigrants and the transformation of cities such as Toronto and Vancouver. By the turn of the century, however, we observed that a substantial number of these immigrants had disappeared. Some had gone to third countries, especially the U.S., but most of them had returned to their places of origin. Hong Kong stood out because of the special circumstances (and uncertainty) around the return of the then British territory to Chinese rule in 1997.

The more we looked into this phenomenon, the more we became convinced that the issue of Canadians abroad was more than a one-off story about Hong Kong. In 2009, we released our first estimate of citizens living overseas and came up with the astonishing figure of 2.8 million. This figure has since been validated by further APF Canada research and is today widely accepted as the best estimate of the number of Canadians living overseas. In 2007, we formally launched the Canadians Abroad project, which consisted of in-house and commissioned research, workshops and conferences, policy consultations, and information dissemination. This report is the culmination of that work.

While the phenomenon of Canadian citizens living overseas is not new, the concept that Canada is actually an emigrant nation is foreign to many people. That's partly because Canada receives more immigrants as a share of its population than most other countries, and has done so for many years.

Indeed the notion that Canadians (including recent immigrants) would choose to live abroad does not fit with the country's self-image. At times this is reflected in attitudes that are dismissive or resentful of

Canadians who choose to live overseas as "disloyal". At the government level, it is reflected in often narrow, piecemeal and reactive policies. Derogative perceptions of Canadians abroad include: Big-name stars pursuing their careers in film, sports, or other high profile careers; citizens who from time to time get into trouble overseas and require consular assistance; and immigrants who couldn't make it in Canada, have returned to their native countries and are therefore "citizens of convenience."

This report is an attempt to paint a more complete and nuanced picture of Canadians abroad and to better understand the policy implications of a Canadian diaspora that is nearly a tenth the size of the total population. Our research has led us to conclude that Canadians abroad should be seen more as an asset than as a liability, and that a more conscious and coordinated approach to policy is needed to unlock the potential—and mitigate the risks—of this overseas citizenry. An important starting point is to foster their attachments to Canada—through political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national interests.

The Canadians Abroad project was led by Don DeVoretz and Kenny Zhang, who not only produced much of the original research, but who were also tireless in their outreach activities to the policy, academic, and practitioner communities. Heather Kincaide played a major role in report production and was part of the research team, along with Victor Chen and Ajay Parasram.

We would also like to thank our advisory group for their contributions and support including Satwinder Bains, François Bertrand, Miro Cernetig, Tung Chan, André Cyr, Patrick Johnston, Martha Justus, and Eugene Kwan. Many others contributed to the project through data collection and analysis, case studies, commissioned papers, and advice. The full project can be found at the project website www.canadiansabroad.ca


Yuen Pau Woo

President and CEO

Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Canadians have always had mixed feelings about their fellow citizens who choose to live outside of the country. For more than three decades, concerns about “brain drain” and the liabilities associated with Canadians abroad have shaped public debate about Canadian emigration. Canadians have often expressed concern about their country’s ability to remain competitive when highly-skilled medical professionals, intellectuals and business leaders leave Canada. Furthermore, recent evacuations of Canadian citizens from Lebanon, Egypt and Libya have sparked debate about the rights and responsibilities of Canadians abroad, especially naturalized Canadians with multiple citizenships.

Increasingly, however, the Government of Canada, provincial governments and the media are recognizing that Canadian citizens abroad are potentially a large asset. Nevertheless, there is very little evidence-based research that government agencies can use to inform their policies regarding Canadians abroad. In order to fill this gap, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF Canada) conducted three years of research to produce *Canadians Abroad: Canada’s Global Asset*. The research report aimed to:

- Determine the number and demographics of Canadians living abroad for periods of more than one year
- Better understand the attachments these Canadians have to Canada
- Ascertain how Canadians feel about citizenship rights, taxation and consular services for Canadians abroad
- Identify pressing policy issues and recommend possible solutions

KEY FINDINGS

Since Canada does not keep exit data on émigrés, one of the basic challenges of researching Canadians abroad is determining how many there are and where they live.

Chapter One presents our findings on demographics. Using Canadian census data from 1996, 2001, and 2006, we determined that there were approximately 2.8 million Canadians living abroad as of 2006, or approximately 9 per cent of Canada’s population. This 9 per cent figure is much higher than the

Our team defined a “Canadian abroad” as a Canadian citizen, naturalized or born in Canada, who has been living outside of Canada for one year or more since acquiring Canadian citizenship.

percentage of Americans living abroad (1.7 per cent), about equal to the percentage of Britons (9 per cent) and lower than the percentage of New Zealanders (21.9 per cent).¹

Canadians can be found in almost every country. Currently just over one million Canadians are living in the U.S., and the vast majority of them were born in Canada. Hong Kong SAR is the jurisdiction with the second-largest number of resident Canadian citizens (about 300,000), the majority of whom were born in Hong Kong.

Individuals born in Canada make up the majority of Canadians abroad (58 per cent), but it is naturalized Canadians that make up the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad, with an exit rate of 4.5 per cent between 1996 and 2006. By contrast, individuals born in Canada who chose to live overseas had an exit rate of 1.33 per cent.

The tendency to move abroad also decreases substantially with age. Between 1996 and 2006, young people between the ages of 21 and 25 were the most likely to move abroad, and men were more likely to move abroad than women.

For citizens born in Canada:

- Emigration from Canada is driven largely by economic forces in the U.S.
- The most dramatic variations in exit rates occurred according to ethnicity
- Individuals who claimed French background have a high net return rate to Canada of 29 per cent
- Exit rates were high for individuals who claimed an Eastern European, South Asian or Middle Eastern background, and indicate a mobile second generation

For naturalized Canadians:

- The largest variation in exit rates occurred by country of origin
- Countries of origin with high exit rates from Canada tend to be developed countries/ jurisdictions (Hong Kong SAR, U.S., Taiwan, France)
- Immigrants from mainland China and India had very low rates of exit between 1996 and 2006. Considering that substantial immigration from mainland China only began in the late 1990s, the relatively small number of returnees is not surprising. More recent anecdotal evidence suggests that exit rates amongst Chinese immigrants are increasing.

Chapters Two and Three explore emigrant attachment to Canada and citizenship issues. Our research indicates that Canadians abroad generally retain strong, multi-dimensional attachments to Canada. Our findings from a 2010 survey of Canadians living in Hong Kong SAR reveal that:


- Two-thirds of respondents have immediate and or extended family members residing and/or studying in Canada
- 43% of respondents reported that they or their children go to school in Canada or to a school with a Canadian curriculum
- Approximately one in four respondents retains a professional practice license in Canada
- Three in five respondents intend to return to Canada

¹ Association of Americans Resident Overseas website; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Hugo, et al, 2003

Although many of Canadians living abroad actively retain connections to Canada, the ad hoc policies of the Government of Canada actually discourage attachment and narrow the definition of citizenship. Two of the most problematic policies relate to voting rights and citizenship. Canadians who have been abroad for more than five years are not permitted to vote in Canadian elections. Furthermore, the 2009 amendment to the Citizenship Act restricts citizenship by descent to one generation born abroad. The latter policy means that Canadians cannot pass on Canadian citizenship to their grandchildren born abroad.

These policies reflect an attitude that Canadians abroad should not have the same rights as those Canadians who live permanently in Canada. Opinion polls by the APF Canada, however, indicate that the majority of Canadians do not hold this view. In a 2010 poll of Canadian residents, sixty-six per


CANADIANS IN HONG KONG: MULTI-DIMENSIONAL TIES WITH CANADA (%)




Note: * Parents, spouse, children, brothers, sisters. ** Uncles, aunts, grandparents, cousins.

Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011

VIEWS OF CANADIAN RESIDENTS ON POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING CANADIANS ABROAD



Source: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2010



cent agreed that a child of Canadian parents should be a Canadian citizen regardless of where the child was born.

Consular services and taxation issues are particularly central to many public debates about Canadians abroad. Chapter Four outlines Canada's approach to consular services and dispels the myth that Canadians at home regularly subsidize consular services for Canadians abroad. Chapter Five discusses the taxation issue further by exploring how the impact of emigrants on the federal and provincial treasuries depends on age, length of time abroad, foreign birth status and human capital, such as post-secondary education.

Chapter Five also explores how returnees fare in the Canadian job market. Our research suggests that some Canadians face significant economic disincentives to return to Canada. While Canada-born returnees, with the exception of females aged 25-35, generally earn higher salaries than their counterparts who never left Canada, naturalized Canadians earn less. As naturalized Canadians make up an increasingly large percentage of Canadians abroad, this finding could have serious implications for government programs aimed at enticing Canadians abroad back to Canada. After all, will naturalized Canadians abroad be interested in returning to Canada if they face relatively poor economic prospects?

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the federal and provincial governments of Canada take a more proactive and coordinated approach to engaging with Canadian citizens abroad. Government at all levels must recognize that Canadians living abroad are a significant global asset and are an important part of the Canadian landscape.


This is not to suggest that individual federal and provincial government departments have not already demonstrated great interest in Canadians abroad. However, we believe that there is a case for better policy coordination and some centralization of functions. This could amount to the creation of a standalone agency or department, or it could be a special secretariat within an existing ministry that is tasked with policy coordination and development, as well as support for cross-departmental and civil society initiatives. A first step in the creation of a new agency or secretariat would be for all relevant federal departments to produce an audit of their activities that pertain to Canadians abroad, and to map the extent to which these activities connect with each other.

The creation of a dedicated agency overseeing Canadians abroad would pave the way for a more fundamental reassessment of underlying issues that drive outmigration, return migration, attachment, and the beneficial linkages that citizens living overseas can bring to Canada. We believe a special Parliamentary Committee on Canadians Abroad should be created.

The need for more study and deliberation on issues concerning Canadians abroad should not be an excuse to delay more immediate and practical actions that can lead to benefits for Canadians abroad and at home, and which do not require fundamental policy changes. The underlying goal of these actions is to foster attachments to Canada in practical ways—through political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national interests. Examples include:

- ❑ Support for overseas networks of Canadians to connect with their counterparts in Canada for commercial, research, and social improvement goals. An example of such a network is the C100 group in Silicon Valley.
- ❑ Staffing and funds for Canadian posts abroad to be more active in their outreach to Canadian citizens, by way of promotional and networking events, information dissemination, and public diplomacy.
- ❑ Partnerships with universities and colleges to establish a stronger link between Canadian alumni groups and networks of Canadians abroad. The “family” of overseas Canadians should include non-Canadians who have strong attachments to the country, for example through study in Canadian post-secondary institutions. It should also include the growing number of Canadian Overseas Schools that deliver high school curricula to foreign nationals (many of whom later attend Canadian universities).
- ❑ The creation of a global, cross-sector non-governmental organization (in addition to a coordinating government agency or policy secretariat) to link various national and regional Canadian networks overseas.
- ❑ Funding for more research on the incentives and obstacles for outmigration and return migration, and on ways to foster attachment to Canada that is in the national interest.
- ❑ The modernization of bilateral double taxation and/or social security agreements, especially with countries that have large populations of overseas Canadians. These mechanisms make it easier for Canadians to live and work abroad, as well as for foreigners to live and work in Canada. They can also address, to some extent, the problem of negative fiscal transfers in the case of Canadians who are abroad during their most productive (tax generating) years.

There is undoubtedly a balance sheet when it comes to Canadians abroad, with liabilities (and contingent liabilities) as well as assets. Public attention has recently focused excessively on liabilities. Unlike items on a typical financial balance sheet, however, Canadians abroad can't be defined by accountants. They are real people, often highly skilled and very mobile, who make personal and professional choices based on changing circumstances, incentives, and motivations—much as all Canadians do. Whether or not Canadians abroad end up as an asset or a liability for Canada, therefore, is not a foregone conclusion, but is predicated on the Canadian policy response.





CHAPTER 1

Demographics of Canadians Abroad

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Emigration from Canada is not a new phenomenon. Immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth century often entered Canada for brief periods before leaving for the U.S., while Canada-born Quebecois left for northeastern parts of the U.S. in large numbers. By the mid-twentieth century, Canada's so-called "brain drain" to the south raised anxieties and produced ad hoc policy responses that attempted to reverse the exodus.² However, for a number of reasons, these outflows of Canadians did not create a population of citizens living abroad that was comparable to the one that exists today.

The concept of Canadian citizenship was not formalized until 1947, after which time the possibility of being a Canadian citizen living abroad became a reality. Thirty years later, the decision to permit dual citizenship in Canada set the stage for a larger population of Canadians abroad. Under the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1977, Canadians would no longer have to give up their citizenship if they opted to become the citizen of another country that also recognized dual citizenship. The Canadian Citizenship Act 1977 also removed ethnic criteria for immigration and citizenship and created the possibility of a more diverse population of Canadians at home and abroad.

In addition, changes to immigration policy in the 1970s opened the door to highly educated and mobile would-be Canadian citizens. Applicants for immigration in the economic admissions class were assessed under a point system that heavily favoured educational attainment, language facility, and youth.³ By the early 1990s the goal of successive governments was an immigration target of one per cent of Canada's population, or 300,000 immigrants a year, equally divided between economic and non-economic immigrants.⁴ As a result, more than three million immigrants were admitted

In the late 1960s, the federal government created tax holidays to attract academics back to Canada.

³ In fact, the points-assessed entry gate is so stringent that if the test were applied to the Canada-born population *circa* 2006, less than half of Canadians could immigrate to their own country.

⁴ Neither of these goals have been met, since total admission numbers rarely exceeded 250,000. In addition, only 25 per cent of these, or 50,000 immigrants per year, were evaluated and admitted under the points system.


to Canada between 1990 and 2010, with about one million in the highly mobile economic immigrant category.

What is interesting, however, is that rapidly developing economies such as China and India, two large immigrant source countries for Canada, are now attracting back some of their citizens who made Canada home (naturalized Canadian immigrants and students who studied in Canada).⁵ China now takes back over 30 per cent of its overseas-educated elite.⁶ And India now allows a form of dual citizenship that permits holders to work in India without a visa, while restricting some aspects of political participation.⁷ In short, the change in Canadian immigrant selection by both source country (China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and India) and Canada's preference for economic immigrants has created a substantial naturalized emigration pool.

Canada's pool of potential citizen émigrés is also impacted by the differing rates of citizenship-acquisition by country of origin. The two countries that send the largest number of people to Canada, China and India, recently experienced a quick (75 per cent) ascension to Canadian citizenship after their waiting period (approximately five years) had expired. Our research indicates that traditional immigrant source countries (Italy, Germany, U.S., and Netherlands) exhibit modest rates of citizenship ascension. Thus, one implication for future Canadian emigration is clear. The potential pool of naturalized émigrés will grow fastest from the newer immigrant source countries that have exhibited substantial rates of inflows into Canada since 1990.⁸

METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

Counting the number of Canadian emigrants is a fundamentally different process than counting the number of Canadian immigrants. When a person enters Canada as a permanent immigrant, a well-documented process begins, starting with the landings record. This record includes all of the immigrant's pertinent demographic, educational and economic background. This information is also updated for permanent residents in Canada in order



⁵ Two interesting variants of foreign student sojourners have arisen in Canada. First is the typical solo foreign student who when finishing her degree leaves Canada. In fact, Canada has the lowest foreign student retention rate of all OECD countries. In addition, some 1.5- and second-generation Canadian immigrants are acquiring their post-secondary education in Canada and then leaving Canada.

⁶ Zweig, 2008

⁷ India *circa* 2011 has introduced a merged long term visa status for both components (Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Indian Overseas Person (IOP) of its overseas population in Canada. In effect, dual citizens of Canada can now retain their Canadian citizenship while living in India on a long-term basis with many benefits of Indian citizenship conferred on them except the right to vote and stand for political office.

⁸ During this period, neither China nor India offered its foreign nationals the option of dual citizenship.

to create a longitudinal record.⁹ In contrast, no such detailed records are kept for Canadian émigrés, as is the practice in Europe, Australia and many other countries. This absence of “gateway” emigration data is a political decision in North America, since free emigration implies an absence of control including recording exit information.¹⁰ This means that the most direct method to count Canadians abroad is unavailable.

The Canadians Abroad Project used a 20 per cent sample of the 1996, 2001 and 2006 census data, and grouped individual respondents in each sample year by five demographic characteristics:

- Gender
- Year of birth
- Year of immigration (if applicable)
- Residence in a census metropolitan area (CMA)
- Country of birth

This method deduced the changes in the relevant population size over the 1996-2001 and 2001-2005 periods and inferred a decrease or increase in the relevant population. When mortality is taken into account, a decrease in population would imply net outmigration from Canada over this period. This allows us to estimate the number of people who left Canada between 1996 and 2006, and who remained abroad as of 2006. An increase in the population would imply a net return migration to Canada over the same time period.¹¹

This approach does have some inherent limitations. Firstly, we can only estimate a net exit emigration rate over a specific period, not how many people lived abroad for more than one year between these time periods. Furthermore, we can estimate who leaves Canada, but not where they go or details about their later work history. For that kind of information, census and official records in destination countries and representative sample surveys must be used.

Is it possible to estimate the population of Canadians living overseas if we apply these leaving rates to Canadians living abroad before 1996? The answer is yes, if we are willing to make a major assumption: the recent past (1996-2006) mirrors the more distant past (1976-1996) in terms of age-specific mortality rates and exit rates. If the assumption holds, then it is possible to estimate the number of Canadians who left to live abroad during the period 1976-2006, or the last thirty years.¹² As Table 1-1 indicates, under this assumption, we can estimate that the number of Canadian citizens living abroad adds up to 2.78 million.

⁹ The original landings record is referred to as a “tombstone” record, which is electronically clipped to the immigrant’s yearly tax file to create an administrative longitudinal file (IMDB). The IMDB is of paramount importance in estimating the number of emigrants who are naturalized Canadian citizens.

Care must be taken when stating that no records are kept on Canadian emigrants. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) requires that taxes on capital gains and other forms of income are paid when a citizen leaves the country permanently. So some tax records are kept on Canadian émigrés. In addition, the Canada Revenue Agency can grant Canadian citizens “deemed foreign resident” status, which implies that CRA does have some information on the number of Canadians living permanently abroad.

¹¹ Please see Appendix I for additional information on methodology

¹² 1978 is a crucial benchmark year, since after thirty-one years, a portion of this population could still be living abroad.


TABLE 1-1: ESTIMATION OF THE NUMBER OF CANADIANS ABROAD

Year	Population of Canada	Median Age	Years to 2006	Survival Rate	Estimated number of Canadians Abroad(2006)
2006	—	—	0	—	0
1996	29,610,757	35.3	10	98.7%	1,062,590
1986	26,100,587	31.6	20	96.8%	918,240
1976	23,449,793	27.8	30	93.9%	800,360
Total					2,781,190

Source: DeVoretz (2009)

KEY TRENDS

Our study found that there were approximately 2.8 million Canadian citizens living abroad as of 2006, or approximately 9 per cent of Canada's population. This 9 per cent figure is much higher than the percentage of Americans living abroad (1.7 per cent), about equal to the percentage of Britons (9 per cent) and lower than the percentage of New Zealanders (21.9 per cent).¹³ It is also interesting to note that, of Canada's thirteen provinces and territories, only four have populations greater than 2.8 million.

FIGURE 1-1: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LIVING ABROAD: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON¹⁴

¹³ Association of Americans Resident Overseas website; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Hugo, et al: 2003


¹⁴ Note: This chart is compiled using information from various secondary sources, including, the Association of Americans Resident Overseas, website; Bergsten and Choi, 2003; DeVoretz, 2009; High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2001; Hugo, et al: 2003; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; The World Confederation of Institutes and Libraries for Chinese Overseas Studies website; Vertovec, 2005; Zhang, 2006. The definition of population abroad for each country may vary considerably. Some define their population abroad by citizenship, some by ethnicity or both. Also some sources calculated their population abroad during a specific time period, while others may include generations of population living abroad.

As mentioned previously, determining destination countries for Canadian emigrants is difficult because Canada does not keep exit data. The Canadians Abroad team utilized a variety of sources to estimate the numbers of Canadians in selected destination countries (Table 1-2). The United States alone is the current place of residence for just over one million Canadians abroad, the vast majority of whom are Canada-born. Hong Kong SAR is the foreign jurisdiction with the second largest number of resident Canadian citizens (approximately 300 000), the majority of whom are Hong Kong-born.

TABLE 1-2: CANADIAN CITIZENS IN SELECTED DESTINATIONS

Destination	Estimate	Source
United States	1,062,640	Coulombe and DeVoretz, 2009
Hong Kong SAR	300,000	Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011
United Kingdom	73,000	UK Office of National Statistics Labour Force Survey, 2009
Lebanon	45,000	DFAIT
Australia	27,289	Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005
China	19,990	Chinese Census 2010
South Korea	14,210	OECD, International Migration Database, 2008
Germany	13,390	OECD, International Migration Database, 2008
France	11,931	OECD, International Migration Database, 2006
Japan	11,016	OECD, International Migration Database, 2008
Egypt	10,000	DFAIT
New Zealand	7,770	Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005
Philippines	7,500	DFAIT
Haiti	6,000	DFAIT
Mexico	5,768	Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005
Switzerland	5,243	OECD, International Migration Database, 2008
Singapore	5,140	Foreign Ministry of Singapore
Thailand	5,000	DFAIT
Trinidad & Tobago	5,000	Parasram, 2009
Belgium	4,145	Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005

Our analysis of census data shows that individuals born in Canada make up the majority of Canadians abroad (58 per cent), but overall, had a low net exit rate of 1.33 per cent during the 1996-2006 period. Naturalized Canadians make up the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad with an exit rate of 4.5 per cent.



Reporting exit rates for Canada-born and naturalized Canadians, however, hides the complex variations in the tendency within these groups to live abroad. The tendency to move abroad, for example, drops substantially with age. Young people aged 21 to 25 had the highest tendency to move abroad, with exit rates double the average for Canada-born individuals and triple the average for naturalized Canadians. Other key trends for both groups will be discussed in greater detail below.

CITIZENS BORN IN CANADA

TABLE 1-3: OUT-MIGRATION RATES FOR CANADIAN BORN POPULATION, 1996-2006

	1996 (weighted count, rounded)	2001 (weighted count, rounded)	2006 (weighted count, rounded)	Out: 96 - 01	Out: 01 - 06	Overall Out Rate (96 - 06) %
Total¹⁵	20,761,610	20,112,880	19,581,700	385,850	147,500	1.33
Gender						
Female	10,372,270	10,111,760	9,903,540	158,370	54,940	1.05
Male	10,389,340	10,001,120	9,678,160	227,480	92,560	1.60
Age in 1996						
21-25	1,547,560	1,470,990	1,460,050	72,050	6,200	2.60
26-30	1,603,450	1,563,060	1,546,440	35,210	9,860	1.43
31-35	1,973,700	1,931,840	1,918,990	33,330	870	0.88
36-40	1,953,720	1,920,670	1,903,620	20,990	-1,200	0.51
41-45	1,710,170	1,682,880	1,666,970	11,090	-9,040	0.06
46-50	1,456,360	1,424,130	1,407,700	10,600	-17,730	-0.25
51-55	1,115,420	1,083,260	1,057,230	5,350	-16,040	-0.50

For those born in Canada, the most dramatic variations in exit rates occurred according to ethnicity. Our analysis found that those individuals born in Canada who self-identify as French, for example, have a high net return rate to Canada of 29 per cent. Exit rates for second-generation Canadians who claimed an Eastern European, South Asian or Middle Eastern background, were high, and are indicative of a mobile second generation.

Emigration from Canada is driven largely by economic forces in the U.S. The economic downturn after 2001, for instance, caused a collapse in the net outmigration rate from 1.88 per cent during 1996-2001 to 0.75 per cent during 2001-2006.¹⁶

¹⁵ Persons aged 0 to 71 in 1996.

¹⁶ DeVoretz, 2009

NATURALIZED CANADIANS

a) Exit Rate by Country of Origin

As Tables 1-4 and 1-5 illustrate, naturalized Canadian citizens demonstrate a wide range of exit rates based on country of origin.

TABLE 1-4: COUNTRIES WITH HIGH OUTMIGRATION RATES: 1996-2006

Country	Num.	Out-Rate
Hong Kong SAR	44710	23.98 %
United States	15130	10.64 %
Taiwan	14060	30.37 %
Iran	7620	15.14 %
France	5090	11.47 %
South Korea	4460	10.10 %
Japan	1630	12.50 %
Australia	1130	10.44 %
Singapore	620	12.02 %

Source: DeVoretz (2009)

Naturalized Canadians originally coming from the countries listed in Table 1-4 show robust cumulative outmigration levels and outmigration rates for the 1996-2006 period. These countries send a diverse set of immigrants to Canada, ranging from predominately refugees (Iran) to business and professionally trained immigrants (U.S., Japan, Australia).

TABLE 1-5: IMMIGRANT SOURCE COUNTRIES WITH LOW EXIT RATES: 1996-2006

Country	Num.	Out-Rate
Mainland China	5230	2.74%
Poland	4620	4.83%
Sri Lanka	3800	6.29%
Jamaica	3710	4.39%
United Kingdom	3680	1.34%
Lebanon	2840	5.91%
Germany	2290	4.27%
Trinidad & Tobago	2270	4.74%
Portugal	2180	2.06%
Hungary	1150	8.12%
Guyana	570	0.95%
New Zealand	380	7.00%
Haiti	230	0.63%


Source: DeVoretz (2009)

Table 1-5 shows that many immigrant groups do not participate in substantial emigration from Canada. China, for example, is a major immigrant-source country for Canada, but Chinese immigrants have yet to exhibit any substantial exit from Canada. Whether these exit rates will increase as China develops economically remains to be seen. Furthermore, many immigrants from Sri Lanka, Haiti and Guyana entered Canada as refugees, a group which has low exit rates.


It is clear from the above tables that the circular flow of emigrants during 1996-2006 between Canada and the rest of the world predominantly took place between developed countries. There was little return migration between Canada and less-developed immigrant source countries.

b) Exit Rate by Length of Stay in Canada

Emigration rates of naturalized Canadians vary over the length of stay in Canada. Exit rates for Hong Kong sourced immigrants peak after four to five years of residence in Canada, or just after the minimum waiting period required to gain Canadian citizenship.¹⁷ Conversely, exit rates for Indian immigrants to Canada decrease after four years of residency. The low exit rate of around one per cent or less amongst immigrants from India is no doubt owing to two forces, namely the immigrant entrance class (family) and until recently, slow economic development in India.



¹⁷ Three years is the legally defined waiting period for citizenship acquisition. In practice the process takes slightly longer.



CHAPTER 2

Emigrant Attachments to Canada

When 2.8 million Canadian citizens live outside the country on a long-term basis, to what extent, if any, do they stay connected to Canada? This question has been a long-standing cornerstone of the public debate about Canada's expatriate population,¹⁸ especially since the evacuation of over 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006 (see Box 2-1) and from Egypt in 2011.

Many Canadians questioned whether these evacuated citizens paid Canadian taxes and, if not, why Canadian tax dollars were being spent to bring them back to Canada. In other words, paying tax was seen as an indicator of attachment.

There appears to be widespread disagreement about the degree to which Canadians living abroad are attached to Canada and what criteria should be used to determine a real or strong connection. Some argue that "if you're going to be a Canadian, you have to have some substantive ties. If you keep giving citizenship indefinitely to your progeny and their progeny, the ties are pretty questionable."¹⁹

Currently Canadian policies tend to discourage attachment to Canada by citizens living abroad. Canadian citizens are prohibited from voting in general elections after residing abroad for five years. Furthermore, Canadians cannot pass on Canadian citizenship to their grandchildren born abroad. Other measures, such as taxation policy and professional licensing regulations, tend to discourage citizens from maintaining their ties with Canada while living abroad.²⁰

This chapter will discuss the types of attachments and some problematic policy areas.

MEANINGS OF ATTACHMENT

In general, the attachment to Canada of a citizen living overseas refers to interactive ties or linkages between the individual citizen and Canada. The

Chant, 2006; McGregor, 2009a; 2009b.

¹⁹ McGregor, 2009b.

²⁰ Zhang, 2009b.

development of transportation and communication technologies has dramatically changed the way in which these ties or linkages can be maintained. Michael Fullilove, a former adviser to Australia's Prime Minister Paul Keating, recently observed a trend common among diaspora communities worldwide:

*"Connectedness has grown exponentially, as the telegraphy, the press, radio, television and transcontinental telephony have given way to computers, satellite television, the Internet, email, chat rooms, blogs, Internet telephony such as Skype, video-sharing sites such as YouTube, and social networking communities such as Facebook and MySpace. This trend, which has enabled information flows and interactions between people who are physically distant, has naturally benefited Diaspora communities."*²¹

These kinds of connectedness shape relationships between Canadian citizens abroad and the state of Canada. Three things are important to keep in mind when considering the attachment of Canadians abroad to Canada. First, attachment to Canada is a two-way relationship between citizens abroad and the state of Canada. The ties or links have to be observed from an interactive perspective between individuals and the state. Second, the ties and links can take place on many different levels and are typically multi-dimensional (see Table 2-2). Third, Canadians abroad, like many other diaspora groups, are attached to both sides of the world—Canada as their homeland and the country in which they are living. These two types of attachment shape ties between Canada and the rest of the world, and can be a unique asset for Canada.

TYPES OF ATTACHMENT: THE STATE PERSPECTIVE

Many countries have mechanisms for keeping the state connected with its diaspora. One mechanism focuses on diaspora building, which cultivates and recognizes diaspora communities, while another emphasizes diaspora

BOX 2-1: THE EVACUATION OF CANADIANS FROM LEBANON IN 2006

On July 12, 2006, fighting broke out between Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and Israeli soldiers. At the time of the conflict, it was estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 Canadians were visiting or residing in Lebanon. The Government of Canada announced that it would evacuate—at its own cost—any of its nationals who wanted to leave Lebanon, leading to the largest mass evacuation program the country has ever mounted.

According to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada voluntarily evacuated 14,370 people by the end of the crisis. The cost of the evacuation was \$85 million, according to CTV News.

The evacuation ignited a debate about the rights and obligations of Canadian citizens who live permanently overseas, especially those with dual citizenship.


There was debate about those who were termed "Canadians of convenience." These are people with multiple citizenships who immigrated to Canada, met the residency requirements to obtain citizenship, moved back to their home country, and continue to hold Canadian citizenship.

Many argued that if a Canadian passport was the only connection these expatriates had with Canada, their attachment was questionable. Others suggested that citizenship should expire after a certain period if the person in question did not live in Canada. Others said a longer residency in Canada should be required before an immigrant can obtain Canadian citizenship.

Others wanted to see dual citizens who lived outside the country pay Canadian taxes. They argued that if these people do not pay taxes, they should be forced to relinquish their citizenship. Many questioned why "tens of millions of dollars" were spent on individuals who are citizens but who do not reside in Canada.

As a rule, Canada asks citizens to reimburse the government for their evacuation from foreign lands. But in this case, the federal government decided that taxpayers would foot the bill. Ottawa similarly agreed to waive evacuation charges after the devastating 2004 tsunami.

For more information, please refer to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (2006).



²¹ Fullilove, 2008:9.

integration, which draws members into reciprocal ties with their homeland.²² A summary of diaspora building and diaspora integration in selected countries is found in Table 2-1.

TABLE 2-1: DIASPORA MECHANISMS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Types and Examples of Diaspora Mechanisms	Country Examples*
Diaspora Building	Cultivating a Diaspora: Celebrating national holidays; honouring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; extended media coverage	Haiti; India; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Mexico; Morocco
	Recognizing the Diaspora: Expanded consular units; commissioning studies or reports; improving statistics; maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit; or dedicated ministry	Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Benin; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, Syria
Diaspora Integration	Extending rights:: Permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies	Colombia, Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal
	Extending rights:: Providing pre-departure services; extensive bilateral agreements; intervening in labour relations; supplementing health; welfare and education services support; upholding property rights	Ireland, Mexico, Philippines
	Extracting obligations: Taxing expatriates; customs/import incentives; special economic zones; investment services; tax incentives; matching fund programs; diaspora bonds and financial products; facilitating remittances, fellowships, skilled expatriate network	Brazil, China, Eritrea, India, Mexico, Philippines, Syria, U.S.

**Note:* Examples indicate countries that have "many nation-building activities, a bureaucratic unit, legislative representation, social justice focus, [and] initiatives to leverage the diaspora."

Source: Alan Gamlen, 2008: 845-846.

TYPES OF ATTACHMENT: THE INDIVIDUAL'S PERSPECTIVE

From the individual's perspective, the relationship between a citizen abroad and his/her home country can take place on different levels.

TABLE 2-2: MULTI-LEVEL INDIVIDUAL CONNECTIONS TO CANADA


Levels of Connection	Levels of Connection	Examples*
Personal level	Friends, classmates, business clients, colleagues who are Canadian or reside in Canada	Personal visit; phone call/email/online chat; business with Canadian clients; work for Canadian company or organization
Family level	Parents, spouse, children, relatives who are in Canada or Canadians	Personal visit; phone call/email/online chat; return to Canada; call home
Community level	Schools, professional associations, business organizations, religious groups, social networks that are in Canada or Canadians	Study programs; retain professional practice license in Canada; donate time/money; volunteer, networking; sense of belonging; interested in Canadian news
Government/state level	Service departments, other agencies	Apply or renew passport; pay tax; vote in Canadian elections; eligible for pension plan; registered at the Registration of Canadians Abroad (ROCA)

Note: *Zhang, 2009a; 2009b; 2010.

A recent survey of Canadian citizens in Hong Kong SAR²³ provides some information about the multi-dimensional connections Canadians living in Hong Kong maintain with Canada. Survey results suggest that family ties with Canada are extensive for most respondents, with around two-thirds having immediate and/or extended family members residing and/or studying in Canada. Education ties are also extensive as 29 per cent of respondents indicated that their children attend or will attend schools in Canada. Another 14 per cent send or intend to send their children to Hong Kong schools that offer Canadian curriculum. About one in four respondents also retains a professional license to practice in Canada. Nearly one in five respondents said they still paid taxes in Canada while living in Hong Kong. However, only one in ten respondents are either doing business with clients in Canada or work in Hong Kong for Canadian companies or organizations.

²³ Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011.

FIGURE 2-1: CANADIANS IN HONG KONG SAR: MULTI-DIMENSIONAL TIES WITH CANADA



Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011

The same survey also found that more than three in five respondents (62 per cent) plan to return to live in Canada, 21 per cent of whom said they consider doing so all the time. About half of the respondents plan to return to Canada within ten years.

FIGURE 2-2: CANADIANS IN HONG KONG SAR: TIES TO CANADA



Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011

The survey results also suggest that not all individuals have the same degree of attachment to Canada. About one in six respondents reported that they will never return to Canada to live. One third have never considered Canada home. Three in ten never visit Government of Canada websites. Two in five have never made a phone call to the local Canadian Consulate General, and another 37 per cent have never visited the local office of the Canadian Consulate General. Furthermore, one in five does not want to receive information from the Canadian Consulate General.²⁴

BOX 2-2: "CAPTAIN CANADA" IN VIETNAM

Toronto-born Graham has earned the nickname "Captain Canada" for his enthusiastic involvement in Canada-oriented activities in Vietnam, where he has lived for the past fifteen years. He is involved with the Canadian consulate and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Ho Chi Minh City. He is also an enthusiastic participant in his city's annual Canadian Thanksgiving dinner and Terry Fox Run. Graham keeps up to date on current affairs in Canada by reading CBC news online and through his involvement with Canadian organizations in Vietnam.

GLOBAL ATTACHMENT

Canadians abroad, like many other diaspora groups, are attached to both sides of the world—Canada as a homeland and the country in which they live. Nearly 57 per cent of Canadians abroad live in the U.S., Greater China (Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau and Taiwan), the United Kingdom and Australia,²⁵ countries that represented a total of 83.5 per cent of Canada's export market and 65.5 per cent of its import market in 2010.²⁶

In addition, Canadians abroad are connected in a global network, through a variety of available civil society and government run mechanisms. C100 (see Sidebar 2-3), for example, is a U.S.-based non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Canadian technology entrepreneurship and investment through partnerships among Canadians in Silicon Valley. This kind of attachment shapes exceptional ties between Canada and the rest of the world and is a unique asset for Canada.

PROBLEMATIC POLICY AREAS

The attachment of Canadians abroad to Canada can be multi-dimensional and often takes place on different levels. This reality is much more complicated than a simple assessment based on whether a citizen lives in Canada or pays Canadian taxes. The complexity of attachment also suggests that some policies in Canada related to citizens abroad are problematic and need to be revisited.

TAX RULES DISCOURAGE TIES TO CANADA

When people questioned whether citizens overseas paid Canadian taxes,²⁷ they may not have realized that Canadian tax rules specifically define tax obligations based on resident status under the following options provided by the Canada Revenue Agency:

- A factual resident is someone who left Canada but is considered to be a resident of Canada for income tax purposes;
- A deemed resident is someone who lives outside Canada and who severs his/her residential ties with Canada, but is deemed a resident of Canada for income tax purposes;
- A non-resident is someone who is considered to be an emigrant for income tax purposes, and for all following years, if this situation does not change, will be considered a non-resident;
- A deemed non-resident (effective after February 24, 1998) is a factual resident of Canada and a resident of another country with which Canada has a tax treaty

BOX 2-3: C100—SUPPORTING CANADIAN ENTREPRENEURS

C100 is a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Canadian technology entrepreneurship and investment.

C100 is made up of a select group of Canadians based primarily in Silicon Valley, including executives of leading technology companies, experienced startup entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. C100 members are passionate about leveraging their collective experience, expertise and relationships to help mentor and grow a new generation of successful Canadian-led technology companies.

C100 Charter Members include startups, CEOs, top executives of companies such as Apple, Cisco, Electronic Arts (EA), eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Oracle, and venture investors with more than \$8 billion in capital.

Source: <http://www.thec100.org/>

²⁵ DeVoretz, 2009.

²⁶ Statistics Canada, 2011.

²⁷ More detailed discussion on taxes can be found in Chapter 5.

According to the website of the Canada Revenue Agency, as a factual resident or deemed resident, a person is subject to federal tax like any other resident of Canada. As a non-resident or deemed non-resident, a person has to report certain types of income from Canada.²⁸ In other words, and contrary to popular belief, Canadians abroad are liable for tax payments to the Canadian treasury if they file a Canadian tax return.

Currently, Canada's rules regarding income tax payments allow citizens to make a rational choice. The problem is that some people cut their residential ties to Canada in order to be eligible for non-resident or deemed non-resident status.

Residential ties include:

- ☐ a home in Canada;
- ☐ a spouse or common-law partner or dependants in Canada;
- ☐ personal property in Canada, such as a car or furniture;
- ☐ social ties in Canada.

Other ties that may be relevant include:

- ☐ a Canadian driver's licence;
- ☐ Canadian bank accounts or credit cards;
- ☐ health insurance with a Canadian province or territory.

Once these ties are cut, it is difficult for Canadians abroad to resume their attachment to Canada.

FIVE YEAR LIMIT ON VOTING RIGHTS

Under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which came into effect on April 17, 1982, every Canadian citizen has the right to vote and to be a candidate in an election. In 1993, Bill C-114 introduced voting rights for Canadian non-resident voters who had been abroad fewer than five-years. Can this five year limit stand up to legal challenges under the Charter?

Voting rights for non-resident citizens are now common in many countries, but the significance of the overseas vote varies widely according to the proportion of citizens living overseas and the turnout of those who are eligible to vote.²⁹

There are four systems for overseas voters to participate in elections:³⁰

- 1. Vote in home district.** Expatriates have to travel back to their country of origin in order to vote.
- 2. Vote abroad in home district.** Expatriates can vote in polling stations abroad but the votes are counted as if they were resident in an electoral district within their country of origin.



Canada Revenue Agency (website), 2011.

²⁹ Bauböck, 2005.

³⁰ Collyer and Vathi, 2007.

3. Vote abroad for direct representation. Expatriates elect their own representation in legislative elections.
4. Expatriates are not allowed to vote, although elections are held in the country.

In a sample of 144 countries, Michael Collyer and Zana Vathi found that 115, or 80 per cent, allowed citizens who reside permanently outside the country to participate in elections in their home country.³¹


TABLE 2-3: SURVEY OF OVERSEAS VOTING SCENARIOS

Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Country Examples
1. Vote in home district	13	9	Chile, China, Costa Rica, Israel, Lebanon
2. Vote abroad for home district	89	62	Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, U.K., U.S.
3. Vote abroad for own representation	13	9	Algeria, France, Italy, Haiti, Portugal
4. Not allowed to vote	22	15	Denmark, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, India, South Africa
5. No elections	7	5	Bhutan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, U.A.E.,
Total	144	100	

Source: Collyer and Vathi, 2007:16; 29-36.

In Collyer and Vathi's survey, Canada falls under scenario 2. Expatriates can vote in polling stations abroad but their votes are counted as if they were resident in an electoral district within their home country. Under Canadian law, voting has to be exercised under certain conditions that relate to residency requirements.

The right of Canadians living abroad to vote in federal elections³² by special ballot is provided for in section 222 of the Canada Elections Act.³³ In order to qualify, a Canadian living abroad must have resided in Canada at any time before making the application, must have been living outside the country for less than five consecutive years immediately before applying, and must intend to return to Canada to resume residence in the future.³⁴



³¹ Ibid.

³² Six months after moving outside Canada, citizens are no longer eligible to vote in either municipal or provincial elections. See Elections Canada (2009) for details. For reasons of simplicity, we discuss federal elections only.

³³ The Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c.9).

³⁴ The five consecutive year requirement does not apply to employees of the federal or provincial public service, international organizations of which Canada is a member and to which Canada contributes, persons who live with an elector as described above, or persons who reside with a member of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Why does the legislation specify a five-year period for voting eligibility as opposed to four or six? And what evidence can be used to determine whether a citizen resident abroad intends to return to Canada?

Canadians living abroad (with the exception of military personnel and diplomats) were not allowed to vote at all until 1993, when Bill C-114, an Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, was introduced in the House of Commons. Under Bill C-114, all Canadians living or travelling outside the country—not just military personnel and diplomats—can vote, provided they have not been absent from Canada for more than five years and intend to return home at some time in the future. They must also apply for a special ballot.³⁵

Parliamentary debates about Bill C-114 shed some light on the reasoning behind the five-year limit. Some Members of Parliament argued that Canada did not have official statistics on the number of Canadians living abroad and that the right to vote might be granted to citizens who were not paying Canadian income taxes. Other lawmakers were in favour of granting the right to vote to any Canadian citizen with no time limit as long as they were able to prove their intention to return to Canada. Ultimately, Parliament compromised and decided to set a time-limit of five years while maintaining as a requirement the intention to return to Canada.

That decision is likely to result in thousands of Canadians abroad losing their voting rights in Canada. This number could include everyone from retired hockey stars now living in the U.S. to celebrities and employees of Canadian companies who are on long-term postings abroad.³⁶

CITIZENSHIP BY DESCENT LIMITED TO ONE GENERATION

Bill C-37, an Act to amend the Canadian Citizenship Act, came into effect on April 17, 2009, one year after the Royal Assent. The legislation restricted citizenship by descent to one generation born abroad (with some exceptions). Some organizations and individuals involving Canadians abroad have voiced their concerns about this change.

On October 23, 2009, the Executive Committee of The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong³⁷ issued a position paper after extensive consultation with the Chamber's membership.³⁸ The Chamber recommended that Canadians born abroad should retain the ability to have children outside of Canada after completing the same residency requirements as Permanent Residents seeking citizenship.

BOX 2-4: BILL C-37

Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Canadian Citizenship Act, came into effect on April 17, 2009.

The purpose of the Act was to address the issue of the so-called "lost Canadians"—people who think of themselves as Canadians and who wish to participate in Canadian society, but have either ceased to be citizens, or for various legal reasons, were never considered Canadian citizens in the first place.

The Citizenship Act was amended to give Canadian citizenship to those who lost it or never had it, due to outdated provisions in existing and previous legislation.

But the Act was also amended to preclude Canadian citizens from passing citizenship down to children born abroad after one generation.

(Penny Becklumb, 2008)

Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 2007.

³⁵ Yuen Pau Woo, 2008.

³⁷ The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong is a proactive, non-governmental body representing more than 1,200 members with business interests in Canada, Hong Kong and mainland China. Founded in 1977, it is the biggest Canadian business association outside Canada and one of the largest and most influential business groups in the Asia Pacific region.

³⁸ The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, 2009.

Just before Bill C-37 came into effect on April 17, 2009, the Canadian Expat Association³⁹ launched an online petition to prevent the bill's enactment.⁴⁰ Addressed to Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the petition complained that the amendments to prevent citizenship from being passed from generation to generation failed "to take into consideration that Canadians in fact are strongly connected to this great nation but due to no fault of their own were born outside of Canada..." As of the beginning of 2010, 2,441 people had signed the petition.

Created by Canadians in Singapore, a website, www.amendc37.ca, discusses citizenship issues and the consequences of Bill C-37. The website states that:

"This legislative change has significant implications to Canadian expatriates, the families of adopted children born abroad and the global organizations hiring Canadians in any position outside Canada, including the U.S. Real people and real lives are seriously impacted and we've created this site to:

- Learn how Bill C-37 impacts you, your loved ones or future generations
- Communicate with others affected
- Help you act to amend Bill C-37
- Attract support & resources to help fight Bill C-37's '2nd generation' clause."

Despite the anger and anxiety of many Canadian expats about this legislation, some are not even aware of the policy change. In Hong Kong, for instance, a recent survey indicated that 76 per cent of Canadians are not aware of this new law.⁴¹


CONCLUSIONS

The attachments between Canadian citizens abroad and the state of Canada may take place on different levels and may be multi-dimensional. It would be problematic to assess attachment based on a single observation, such as whether a citizen lives in Canada, or pays Canadian taxes. Similarly, one cannot assume that all individuals would like to stay connected to Canada to the same degree.

Canada's case-by-case approach to its diaspora has limited its ability to tap into the global Canadian network. Current tax rules, voting and citizenship rights are the key problem areas that have severe impacts on the attachment of overseas Canadians to Canada.

BOX 2-5: A CANADIAN DAD'S DILEMMA


Michael was born in Toronto and has lived in China for 14 years. He has two children, both of whom were born in China. "I don't agree with the new citizenship policy personally because I'm thinking about the future of my family," he says. "If my kids decide to stay in China, what about their children? They'll probably be stateless." He feels that the Canadian government should revoke the 2009 amendments to the Citizenship Act.



³⁹ The Canadian Expat Association is a non-profit, non-governmental organization linking Canadians living abroad under one bilingual platform. The association, which opened its doors in the summer of 2007, enables members to search in both French and English for global events, and to read articles and obtain information that enhance their lives overseas. As an advocate for Canadian expatriates, the association plays a key role representing Canadians who previously had no collective voice.

⁴⁰ <http://www.petitiononline.com/cexpat01/petition.html>

⁴¹ APF Canada, 2011.



CHAPTER 3

Citizenship Issues for Canadians Abroad

What does it mean to be a Canadian citizen? Does residing abroad make a Canadian citizen less Canadian?

Many become Canadians at birth while others become Canadian citizens through immigration and naturalization. Living in or outside Canada is very much a personal choice – and the right of mobility is guaranteed under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom*.

Globalization, international migration and the emergence of multi-ethnic nations (citizen states instead of traditional single-nation states) have reshaped the international system.⁴² This has made it difficult to distinguish between ethnic-based-, citizenship-based-, or residency-based- loyalty, identity, rights and responsibilities in discussions about nation building and emigration.

Gradually, Canadian citizenship policy is becoming more restrictive,⁴³ and we have seen recent amendments to the *Citizenship Act*, as well as the newly revised Canadian citizenship guide.⁴⁴ The fundamental question is whether Canada's citizenship policy should be different for Canadians at home and Canadians abroad?

WHO IS CANADIAN?

A Canadian citizen is a person who possesses Canadian citizenship by birth or through the naturalization process under the *Canadian Citizenship Act*.⁴⁵ Prior to 1947 and the introduction of the first *Citizenship Act*, there was legally no such thing as Canadian citizenship. Both native born and naturalized citizens were considered to be British subjects.⁴⁶ The first person to become a Canadian citizen was William Lyon Mackenzie King, the tenth Prime Minister

Boll, 2007; Fullilove, 2008.

Macklin & Cr peau, 2010.

⁴⁴ It is meant to educate prospective Canadians about Canadian history, politics and society. More details see *Study Guide – Discover Canada The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf>

⁴⁵ Minister of Justice, 2011.

⁴⁶ Government of Canada, 1998.

of Canada. He became a Canadian citizen on January 3, 1947,⁴⁷ eighty years after Canada became an independent nation in 1867.

The *Canadian Citizenship Act* has changed over time. The most significant changes occurred in amendments to the Act in 1977 (see Box 3-1) and in 2009 (Box 2-4, p. 24). The Act suggests that being Canadian is not an ethnic concept, but rather is founded on citizenship.

ACQUISITION OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP

According to the *Canadian Citizenship Act*, people generally acquire Canadian citizenship in two ways: at birth or by naturalization. Citizenship can be conferred by birth or descent from a Canadian citizen (*jus sanguinis*, or 'law of blood') or based on the soil principle, when citizenship is transmitted by birth in the country that is conferring citizenship (*jus soli*, or 'law of soil'). Canadian citizenship can also be granted if a person has gone through the immigration and naturalization process according to the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*.

Canada amended its *Citizenship Act* in 2009 and limited the transmission of Canadian citizenship by descent to the first generation (see Box 2-4). This new blood principle has no impact on Canadians in Canada because the automatic and unconditional soil principle guarantees Canadian citizenship. The amendment only affects Canadian citizens who leave the country.

CITIZENSHIP AND MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIPS

Since 1977, any Canadian citizen, whether born in Canada or a naturalized Canadian, may hold more than one citizenship. Canada is one of nearly ninety-three countries in the world that officially allow some form of dual- or multiple-citizenship.⁴⁸ This can result in a number of different scenarios including the following:

- ❑ A baby born in Canada to Swedish parents is considered a dual citizen of Canada (soil principle) and Sweden (blood principle).
- ❑ A baby born in Canada to a French mother and a Bangladeshi father is a citizen of Canada (soil principle), France (blood principle) and Bangladesh (blood principle).
- ❑ A person born in Canada who immigrates to Paraguay and naturalizes as a Paraguayan citizen is a dual citizen of Canada (soil principle) and Paraguay (naturalized). If this person was born to a Taiwanese parent, she/he will also have Taiwan citizenship (blood principle).

BOX 3-1: CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT CHANGES IN 1977

In 1977, the Citizenship Act made extensive changes to the law. The effect was to make citizenship more widely available (for example, by reducing the period of residency required from five to three years), and to remove the special treatment for British nationals and the remaining discrimination between men and women.

The act also provided that Canadians could hold dual citizenship, reversing the previous situation in which citizenship was lost upon the acquisition of the citizenship of another country.

An important conceptual change also came about in 1977, when citizenship became a right for qualified applicants rather than a privilege as it had been in the past.

(Government of Canada, 1998)

⁴⁷ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1947.


⁴⁸ Renshon, 2001.

- A person born in the U.S. who immigrates to Canada and becomes a naturalized Canadian citizen is a dual citizen of the U.S. (soil principle) and Canada (naturalized).
- A baby born in the U.S. to Canadian parents working under a NAFTA visa will be a dual citizen of the U.S. (soil principle) and Canada (blood principle for the first generation only).
- A baby born in Australia to a Canadian tourist will be a citizen of Canada (blood principle for the first generation only), but not of Australia at birth. She/he may have a chance of becoming an Australian citizen when she/he turns ten years old.⁴⁹

These scenarios suggest that a person who has never moved outside Canada may hold one or more citizenships. At the other extreme, a person who is born outside Canada to Canadian parents may be stateless if the baby happens to be in a country where nationality is not determined by the soil principle, only by the blood principle.


Among Canadian citizens living in Hong Kong, for example, 16 per cent were born in Canada and 12 per cent hold Canadian citizenship only (see Charts 4-1 and 4-2). This mixture mirrors the complexity of identity.⁵⁰

CHART 3-1: PLACE OF BIRTH



Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011.

CHART 3-2: CITIZENSHIP STATUS



Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011.

Australia grants citizenship to children born in Australia regardless of the parents' status if the child resides in Australia from birth to the age of ten (cited in Macklin & Cr  peau, 2010).

CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

In the field of social sciences, identity is a general term used to describe a person's expression of individuality or group affiliations (such as national identity and cultural identity). Psychological identity relates to self-image (a person's perception of him or herself), self-esteem, and individuality. Components of identity include a sense of personal continuity and of uniqueness from other people. In addition, people acquire social identities based on their membership in various groups—familial, ethnic, and occupational, among others. These group identities, in addition to satisfying the need for affiliation, help people define themselves.

Canadians abroad, especially those who became citizens through the naturalization process, are sometimes called “citizens of convenience”⁵¹ or “foreigners holding Canadian passports.”⁵² Such pejorative terms reflect the negative views of some people in Canada towards Canadians abroad.

A recent poll by APF Canada, however, found that a majority of Canadians believe their overseas compatriots are still ‘real’ Canadians, and believe that their counterparts living outside Canada should have the same rights as those living in Canada.⁵³


For individual Canadians who live abroad, one of the most important questions is whether or not their Canadian identity remains strong. According to an online survey by APF Canada, nearly two-thirds of Canadians who live abroad still view Canada as their home and 69 per cent have plans to return to Canada in the future.⁵⁴ Many do business globally and see themselves as global citizens or transnational citizens.⁵⁵

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP

What are the legal rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizens? According to the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, three rights are reserved to Canadian citizens: the democratic right to vote and to stand for election (section 3), the right to an education in a minority language (English or French, section 23) and the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada (section 6).

BOX 3-2: FOUR YEARS IN PROVENCE

“Although I live in France, I definitely consider myself to be Canadian,” says Amélie, a Quebec-native who has lived abroad for four years. All of her family members still live in Quebec and she remains in contact with them mostly through telephone calls and email. She reads *La Presse* online (Cyberpresse) every day and is registered with the Canadian Embassy in France. Although they are enjoying their lives in France, Amélie and her husband plan to return to Quebec in the near future to pursue career opportunities and to be closer to their families.



⁵¹ Turner, 2006.

⁵² APF Canada, 2007.

⁵³ APF Canada, 2010.

⁵⁴ Zhang, 2007.

⁵⁵ Canadians in China, 2000-2010; Zhang, 2007.

The 2010 edition of *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship – Study Guide* spells out the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship and emphasizes that in Canada, rights come with responsibilities (See Box 3-3).

A Canadian citizen's right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada (or their so-called mobility rights) is guaranteed by the Charter, while there is no evidence in Canadian law to support arguments that Canadians living abroad cannot or will not fulfill their responsibilities as citizens of Canada.

PROBLEMATIC POLICY AREAS

Value Based Citizenship?

The amended *Citizenship Act* suggests that Canada is attempting to add the value principle to citizenship through birthright. When Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney announced that the new citizenship law was in effect and limited citizenship by descent, his department stated explicitly that the new law protects “the value” of Canadian citizenship.⁵⁶

This value principle, as a cornerstone concept in Canadian citizenship, is not new. It has been a topic of continuing public debate in Canada's French and English communities for many decades. In general, the Quebecois view the value of citizenship in terms of a citizen's mission, faith, patriotism and responsibility. In their opinion, Canadians moving to other countries devalue their Canadian citizenship.⁵⁷ Admittedly this view is not universal in Quebec. For example, writer Jean Syndical expressed a different view as early as 1923. Syndical wrote: “Stop beating on the people who leave; stop telling them that you have forgotten the providential mission of French Canadians, that you have no faith, that you are not patriotic; stop throwing the responsibility on their shoulders.” For Syndical, the real responsibility [in terms of citizenship] lies with those who run the government and the economy.⁵⁸ His arguments may still be relevant today.

The English Canadians' view of the value of citizenship, has tended to focus more on the cost-benefit of citizens living abroad.⁵⁹ According to this view, if Canadian citizens do not reside in Canada, they do not pay taxes, and

BOX 3-3: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship Rights:

- Mobility Rights
- Aboriginal Rights
- Official Language Rights and Minority Language Education Rights
- Multiculturalism

Citizenship Responsibilities:

- Obeying the law
- Taking responsibility for oneself and one's family
- Serving on a jury
- Voting in elections
- Helping others in the community
- Protecting and enjoying our heritage and environment

(*Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010*)

⁵⁶ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009.

⁵⁷ Ramirez, 2007:219.

⁵⁸ Syndical, 1923.

⁵⁹ Ramirez, 2007:219; Macklin & Cr  peau, 2010.

therefore should not qualify for certain government services made available through tax revenue, or at least not without paying for them.⁶⁰ The impression is that Canadian citizens who choose to live in a different country are “free riders.” Former Canadian politician Tom Kent sums up the sentiment in the following way: “The duty to pay taxes should be inherent in citizenship.”⁶¹

Some consider the above argument to be too narrow because it is based on what they consider to be a faulty premise that links citizenship to paying taxes. They argue that despite the appealing rhetoric of “No taxation without representation,” the fact is that noncitizens (temporary and permanent residents) do pay taxes yet cannot vote, while citizens living in Canada who pay no taxes can still vote. Income tax is payable to the government by all those who earn income within the country, regardless of citizenship status. Sales tax is payable by all consumers, be they citizens, tourists, temporary workers, refugees, permanent residents or even irregular migrants. The same is true for property taxes, capital gains taxes and so on. Citizens who do not earn income or persons in receipt of income support may pay no income tax, but their formal access to the legal entitlements of citizenship is not precluded on that basis.⁶²

Statelessness

A few months after the most recent amendments to the *Citizenship Act*, a child was born stateless as a result of amendments to the law:

Rachel Chandler was born to a naturalized Canadian, who was working in Beijing in September 2009. Her father was born in Libya, where Rachel’s grandparents met while teaching at an English school. Rachel’s paternal great-grandparents fought in World War II and descended from generations of Irish, Canadians and Americans. Though her father had lived in the Toronto area since he was two years old (until moving to Beijing to work in 2007), Rachel was not deemed Canadian because she is a second-generation Canadian born abroad. She is also not considered a Chinese citizen because her parents are not legally married. As a result, she is not eligible for Chinese citizenship, health services, travel documents, or protection from any state.⁶³ When Canadian officials were confronted with this dilemma, they suggested that Rachel’s father, Patrick, ask Ireland whether it would be willing



⁶⁰ Chant, 2006.

⁶¹ Kent, 2008.

⁶² Macklin & Crépeau, 2010: 23-24.

⁶³ Bramham, 2009.

to bestow citizenship on Rachel, even though only Patrick's father (Rachel's grandfather) was an Irish citizen.⁶⁴

Rachel is not alone. Chloe, who was born a month later in Brussels to Canadian and Algerian parents, is still stateless.

The two girls and their parents are confronting the increasingly common problem of securing nationality for the children of the 214 million people who choose to live, work and study outside their home countries.⁶⁵

Gender Discrimination

If Canadian citizens living abroad have to return to Canada to give birth in order to ensure that their children are deemed to be Canadian citizens, this places a large burden on women.

In many cases, Canadian mothers are forced to take extended leave from their jobs to return to Canada because pregnant women cannot fly after the fetus reaches a certain age. This can have very damaging effects for women pursuing careers abroad, and imposes extra costs and inconvenience.

International Experience

The current Citizenship Act unduly burdens Canadian citizens who live and work internationally. Their international ventures include, but are not limited to:

- ❑ Canadian businesses with employees based overseas;
- ❑ Canadian charities and non-governmental organizations based abroad;
- ❑ International government-structures (United Nations/Commonwealth, etc.) and associated groups;
- ❑ Canadians working for non-Canadian businesses, NGOs and governments overseas;
- ❑ Canadian students and scholars studying or teaching abroad.

Canada emphasizes the importance of maintaining its presence on the international stage. It encourages private initiatives to compete globally,

⁶⁴ National Post, 2010.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

and promotes international education at home and abroad. It would be ironic if Canadian citizenship policy punishes Canadians who are engaged in international work.

Equity

The current *Citizenship Act* also creates two tiers of Canadians.⁶⁶ The law creates separate rules for children and/or grandchildren of Canadians born in Canada and abroad. This undermines the spirit of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, as well as the principle of the 1977 *Citizenship Act*.


The Charter guarantees rights and freedoms. Every individual is equal under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability (section 15). The 1977 *Citizenship Act* was also based on the principle of equity. It is unclear whether this citizenship policy will stand when confronted with potential legal challenges based on equity.


CONCLUSIONS

Canadian citizenship is defined by the *Canadian Citizenship Act*, which clearly demonstrates that being a Canadian citizen is not an ethnic or nation-based concept, but a citizenship-based definition. People can acquire Canadian citizenship at birth by *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli*, or by naturalization. The complexity of resulting dual- or multiple-citizenship can create difficulties in terms of loyalties, identities, and the rights and responsibilities of Canadians at home and abroad.

Canadian citizenship policy creates a number of problem areas including stateless children, gender discrimination, the lack of appreciation of international experience, and inequalities under the law.

⁶⁶ National Post, 2009.





CHAPTER FOUR

Safety and Consular Services

On February 26, 2011, the government of Canada announced that it had sent a military transport aircraft to Libya to evacuate Canadians due to the growing political unrest in the region. At press time, the Canadian operation had evacuated 238 Canadians.⁶⁷ In January 2011, another Canadian evacuation operation took place in Egypt where the political situation was becoming precarious. The largest-ever evacuation of Canadians occurred in Lebanon in July 2006 (See Box 2-1 on page 17). Many Canadians feel bitter because they believed that taxpayers were footing the bill to evacuate Canadians who have not lived in Canada for many years and do not pay taxes.

CONSULAR SERVICES

What kinds of consular services are provided to Canadians abroad? Who pays for these services?

“Consular” is the word used to describe the services that a country provides for its citizens abroad. Canada’s consular services operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through a network of more than 260 offices in over 150 countries. The network includes embassies, high commissions, consulates, consulates headed by honorary consuls, and offices. These offices provide different levels of services to Canadians travelling, working, studying, or living abroad.⁶⁸

Canadians seek consular assistance abroad for many reasons. Some need advice about local conditions or Canadian regulations, but the majority use consular help to replace lost, stolen or expired passports. With the number of Canadians living overseas increasing each year, many require consular assistance in filing citizenship applications and in registering themselves as

DFAIT, 2011a.

DFAIT website, 2011.

⁶⁹ Please also consultate more details about extensive consular services by the Government of Canada at DFAIT, 2004.

Canadians abroad. Other reasons for requesting for consular assistance include financial destitution, medical emergencies, family distress, arrest and detention, child abductions, deaths, evacuations following natural disasters or violent conflicts, and kidnapping.⁶⁹

PERFORMANCE BY NUMBERS

Increase in Number of Cases Handled

Between 1993 and 2003, the number of cases handled by consular services increased by an average of 7.5 per cent per year. In 2003, Canadian consular officers handled a total of 184,054 cases. Of these, passport-related requests made up 63 per cent, citizenship applications 17 per cent, and ROCA (Registration of Canadians Abroad) made up 11 per cent. The remaining 9 per cent were divided among loss and theft, general assistance, arrest and detention, and legal/notary.⁷⁰

In 2009, the number of cases handled by Canadian consular officers had reached nearly half a million. Routine passport, citizenship and ROCA services declined to 70 per cent of the annual total in 2009 compared with 2003, while assistance services grew to 30 per cent. Of these assistance services, 25 per cent were handled only by DFAIT's (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) Emergency Operation Call Centre. A minority of these calls were severe enough to warrant further attention from DFAIT. In fact, real consular cases opened and emergency crisis situations managed (last two rows in Table 4-1) only accounted for 5 per cent of consular services.

TABLE 4-1. CONSULAR SERVICES PROVIDED IN 2009

Types of Consular Services	Number	%
Passport service delivered	155,558	34.0
User accounts opened in the Registration of Canadians Abroad service	134,029	29.3
Calls handled at DFAIT's Emergency Operation Centre	114,000	24.9
Citizenship applications processed	29,839	6.5
Consular cases opened*	24,018	5.3
Emergency crisis situations managed	16	0.003
Total	457,460	100.0

Note: *Excludes passport services, citizenship applications and Registration of Canadians Abroad service.

Source: DFAIT, website 2010.

⁶⁹ Please also consultate more details about extensive consular services by the Government of Canada at DFAIT, 2004.

⁷⁰ DFAIT, 2004.

Distress Situations


In cases of distress, the majority of incidents involve arrest or detention, in most cases in the U.S., China or Mexico (see Chart 4-1).

TABLE 4-2: DISTRESS CASES ABROAD FROM 2005 TO 2009


	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Arrest/Detention	1924	1744	1843	2022	1977
Assault	198	190	174	220	193
Medical Assistance	721	774	813	787	871
Well-being/Whereabouts	802	788	694	621	663
Childrens' Issues	204	165	168	167	248
Deaths	871	908	908	974	1079
Total	4720	4569	4600	4791	5031

Source: DFAIT, website 2010.

CHART 4-1: NUMBER OF ARREST/DETENTION CASES:2009



Source: DFAIT, website 2010.



Recent Evacuations

Recent evacuations by the Canadian government shed light on the risks facing Canadians living overseas, including war, natural disasters, and civil unrest.

TABLE 4-34 RECENT CANADIAN OVERSEAS EVACUATIONS

Year	Case Description	Canadian Citizens Evacuated	Cause
2004	Storms in Cayman Islands and Haiti	Few	Natural disaster
2004	Tsunami in Southeast Asia	500	Natural disaster
2005	Crisis in West Africa	200	Social unrest
2006	War in Lebanon	14,000	War
2008	Political unrest in Bangkok	122	Violent conflict
2011	Political unrest in Egypt	300 +	Violent conflict
2011	Political unrest in Libya	238 (ongoing)	Violent conflict

Source: The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007: 9; DFAIT, 2009; 2011.

CONSULAR FEES

There was discussion following the Lebanon evacuation in 2006 that non-resident Canadians should pay higher passport fees to maintain their Canadian citizenship.⁷¹ It has also been debated whether taxpayers should be footing the bill to rescue every Canadian caught in a foreign trouble spot.⁷² The question whether non-resident citizens should be protected by the Canadian government is discussed by Macklin and Crépeau (2010).⁷³

Cost Recovery Basis

According to DFAIT, the federal department that has a mandate to provide consular services to Canadian citizens, part of Canada's consular services is provided for a fee on a cost recovery basis, while other services are free of charge.⁷⁴ A few examples of these services are listed below and a dollar symbol ('\$') indicates which services are provided for a fee.⁷⁵

Services related to emergencies

- Assisting in arranging an evacuation in the event of war, civil unrest, or a natural disaster, as a last resort (\$).
- Arranging help in a medical emergency by providing a list of local doctors and hospitals.
- Arranging for a medical evacuation if the necessary treatment is not available locally (\$).
- Comforting and assisting victims of robbery, sexual assault, and other violence.

⁷¹ Chant, 2006.

⁷² National Post, 2011.

⁷³ Macklin and Crépeau, 2010.

⁷⁴ DFAIT, 2011b.

⁷⁵ The same DFAIT document also spells out the services that are NOT offered by Canadian consular officials.

Services related to legal issues

- ☐ Providing a list of local lawyers.
- ☐ Providing information about local laws and regulations.
- ☐ Seeking to ensure fair treatment once arrested or detained.
- ☐ Notarizing Canadian documents (§).

Other services

- ☐ Replacing a lost, stolen, damaged, or expired passport (§).
- ☐ Transferring funds if urgent financial assistance is required (§).
- ☐ Contacting relatives or friends to request assistance in sending money or airline tickets.
- ☐ Contacting next of kin in case of accident or detention by police.
- ☐ Accepting citizenship applications for approval by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
- ☐ Providing advice about burying a Canadian abroad or assistance in repatriating remains to Canada.
- ☐ Advising police in Canada to contact next of kin in case of death.

As a general rule, the costs of operations, such as the evacuation of Canadians, are fully reimbursed by individuals to the Canadian government. In selected cases, however, evacuation costs are waived for humanitarian and/or political considerations. This was the case in the evacuation of 500 Canadians from Tsunami-affected areas of Southeast Asia in 2004 and the evacuation of 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in 2006.

Fee Collection

Canadian consular services receive fees from the travelling public including non-resident Canadians. All the fees collected are used to maintain and improve Canadian consular services around the world. These fees are collected when one applies for a passport or, in some instances, when a special service is provided.⁷⁶

There are two main fees:

- ☐ **Consular Service Fee:** A consular fee of \$25 is included in the cost of all adult passports. In 1995, this fee was instituted as a way to provide the program with a sound funding base. **Revenues were supposed to, and largely did, match expenditures.**⁷⁷
- ☐ **Consular Specialized Services Fees:** These fees are collected when a specialized service is provided (see examples mentioned above).

In addition to these two types of fees, non-resident adult Canadians, depending on where they live, have already paid between 11 per cent and

⁷⁶ DFAIT, website 2008.

⁷⁷ DFAIT, 2004.

15 per cent more in passport fees than their counterparts in Canada (Table 5-4). Moreover, according to DFAIT's financial statements from 2009-2010, revenue from consular affairs in 2010 reached \$102 million while expenses for consular affairs totalled \$62 million, resulting in a \$40 million surplus.⁷⁸

TABLE 5-4 CANADIAN PASSPORT FEES

Canadian Passport						
Location	Age Group		24 pages	Different from those in Canada	48 pages	Different from those in Canada
Living in Canada	Adults	16 or over	\$87	—	\$92	—
	Children	3 to 15	\$37	—	\$39	—
		Under 3	\$22	—	\$24	—
Living in the U.S. or Bermuda	Adults	16 or over	\$97*	11%	\$102	11%
	Children	3 to 15	\$37*	0%	\$39	0%
		Under 3	\$22	0%	\$24	0%
Living abroad	Adults	16 or over	\$100	15%	\$105	14%
	Children	3 to 15	\$35	-5%	\$37	-5%
		Under 3	\$20	-9%	\$22	-8%

* **Please note** that the fee for a 24-page passport is C\$87 and that the fee for a 48-page passport is C\$92 if the application is submitted in person at a service location in Canada or mailed from within Canada.

Source: Passport Canada, website 2011.

CHALLENGING POLICY AREAS

In 2007, Dr. Claude Denis, a political science professor at the University of Ottawa, analyzed cases involving Canadian tourists in Mexico who died violently and found that many of their families used the media to pressure the Canadian government to obtain justice from Mexico. Family members and a sympathetic public regularly call for assistance for fellow Canadians stranded abroad following natural disasters and war. A lot of public attention was also paid to the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen “rendered” by the U.S. to Syria, where he was tortured. These cases have contributed to the image of Canadians abroad predominantly as “citizens in trouble.”⁷⁹

In 2004, the Office of the Inspector General made nine recommendations to improve Canada's consular affairs. The first recommendation was to ask DFAIT to develop a comprehensive, forward-looking strategic policy that

⁷⁸ DFAIT, website 2011-01-31.

⁷⁹ Denis, 2007.

would govern the delivery of consular services.⁸⁰ In 2007, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade produced a report reviewing the 2006 evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon. The document put forth five policy recommendations, the gist of which were to improve Canada's response to large-scale crises overseas.⁸¹

In addition to other recommendations by the Office of the Inspector General and the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a strategic policy on protecting Canadian citizens overseas should also focus on the following challenges:

Changing Mindsets

The concept of "citizens in trouble abroad" has created a negative mindset in Canada and influenced policy makers to focus on crisis responses. However, crisis situations actually only account for 5 per cent of the cases of Canadian consular services each year; emergency assistance, including evacuations, are generally operated on a cost-recovery basis; and revenues collected from consular fees largely match expenditures.

Working with All Partners

The safety of Canadians abroad is a complicated issue that involves individuals who choose to go abroad; employers/organizations that hire them for overseas work; Canadian governmental departments that operate consular services; and host countries that have rules and regulations Canadians must adhere to.

As a country with a long tradition of international peacekeeping work, Canada must continue to build a capacity to work with local partners to manage country-specific risks and deliver consular services to Canadians.⁸² The government of Canada must also build stronger relations with Canadian organizations that work globally to ensure the safety of all Canadians living outside the country.

BOX 4-1: RISKS ABROAD

Canadians may be exposed to various risks when they are abroad. According to the government of Canada's websites, the most common risks include:

- Overseas Fraud
- Terrorist Attacks
- Dual Citizenship Friction
- Natural Disasters
- Pandemics
- Upcoming Elections

(DFAIT, website 2011; Government of Canada, 2010)

DFAIT, 2004.

⁸¹ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007.

⁸² For example, Canada needs to extend the Consular Services Sharing Agreement with more countries. Currently, Canada has such an agreement with Australia. In countries or regions where Canada does not have an office, Canadians can obtain consular assistance from the Australian consulate, such as in Hawaii, Bali, and Samoa. Canada in turn provides similar services to Australians in countries where they do not have an office, such as Guatemala, Ivory Coast, etc. (DFAIT, 2004)





CONCLUSIONS

This chapter illustrates that demand for consular services has grown quickly in recent years. While many people feel frustrated that, as tax-payers, they are helping foot the bill for evacuations of Canadians living overseas, in fact, such crises make up only about 5 per cent of all the cases Consular Services deal with each year. In addition, emergency assistance, including evacuations, is generally operated on a cost-recovery basis and revenues collected from consular fees largely match expenditures on consular services.

This chapter has also shown that protecting the safety of Canadian citizens abroad is a very complicated task that involves Canadian individuals, organizations, governments, and international communities. The biggest policy challenges include turning our mindset to be more objective and balanced, and working with all stakeholders.

A comprehensive, forward-looking strategic policy has to have mechanisms to protect the safety of all Canadians. It should also have ways to fully utilize the potential contribution of citizens no matter at home or abroad.





CHAPTER FIVE

Economics of Emigration: Taxation and Economic Performance of Returnees

This chapter examines the economic impact of emigration from Canada in two areas: taxation and economic outcomes for returned Canadian emigrants. The taxation question is particularly important because tax revenues pay for social services for all Canadians, including would-be and returned emigrants. This section evaluates the impact of emigration on these federal and provincial tax revenues. If emigrants receive more in public services than they contribute through taxation, this could have severe ramifications for Canada's public finances.

In the second half of this chapter, we review whether there are financial disincentives for Canadians abroad to return to Canada. If so, government programs designed to encourage Canadians to return may face substantial obstacles.

TOPIC 1: TAXATION

Canadians living permanently abroad can apply to the Canada Revenue Agency for deemed non-resident or non-resident status. If awarded either status, these Canadians are not taxed on income earned outside of Canada.⁸³ The logic of this provision is two-fold. First, by meeting the stringent requirements needed to become a deemed non-resident it is difficult for these Canadians to enjoy any public goods financed by the Canadian taxpayer.⁸⁴ Second, a Canadian émigré is still subject to any income tax in his/her country of residence. As a result, many Canadian émigrés pay income taxes, but not to Canada.


Under a pay-as-you-go tax regime, Canada's treatment of its deemed non-resident émigrés would have little impact on the Canadian treasury if the federal and provincial governments enjoyed a balanced budget or there was a flat income tax rate. Under those conditions, an absent Canadian would have no net impact on federal or provincial treasuries.

This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. case in which American citizens must report their world-wide income and are liable to pay U.S. taxes if their income is above a certain threshold.

⁸⁴ Among the criteria of being deemed a non-resident: no bank accounts in Canada, no residential property, and no immediate family members living in Canada.

In the real world, however, Canada has a progressive tax system, which implies that if Canada's émigrés were previously high-income earners while resident in Canada, then leaving will have an impact on the Canadian treasury. In addition to paying higher taxes, high-income earners also do not consume many tax-payer financed benefits (such as welfare and unemployment benefits). Furthermore, Canadian taxpayers while resident in Canada have a variable impact on the Canadian treasury over the course of their lifetimes.

FIGURE 5-1: LIFETIME TAX TRANSFERS: CANADA-BORN INDIVIDUALS




Canada-born residents consume most of their public services before entering the labour force in the form of education and healthcare and upon retirement by consuming healthcare and retirement benefits. Conversely, during a Canadian-born resident's economically active years (ages 30-65), taxes collected would likely exceed taxpayer-financed benefits, leading to a net transfer to the Canadian treasury (see Figure 5-1). In the case of naturalized Canadians, most come to Canada after the age of 25. As a result, their early education and healthcare expenditures are not paid by Canadian taxpayers.

In sum, an emigrant's impact on the Canadian treasury depends upon the emigrant's age, length of time abroad, birth status, and human capital. For example, if all of Canada's émigrés were over the age of 65 or under the age of 25, then the Canadian treasury would gain by their absence. On the other hand, if a professionally trained Canada-born émigré left at the age of 30 and returned at age 65 or older, the impact on the Canadian treasury would be negative.

What impact do emigrants of various ages have on federal and provincial treasuries? Figure 5-2 depicts yearly average tax transfers for Canada-born males across three age groups (25-35, 36-61, and 62 and above) living in

Canada in 2006.⁸⁵ If any of these age cohorts left Canada there would be a net loss to Canada's treasury. The most substantial annual loss (\$14,370) to the federal treasury occurs when peak earners aged 36-61 emigrate. This annual tax loss via emigration falls to half (\$7,443) for the youngest emigrant cohort (ages 25-35).

FIGURE 5-2: YEARLY NET FEDERAL TREASURY TRANSFERS BY AGE GROUP, EMPLOYED CANADA-BORN MALES: 2006



Source: Author's calculations from 2006 Canadian Census.

Figure 5-3 reports the transfer patterns for naturalized male Canadians in 2006. As is the case with males born in Canada, annual taxes paid are a positive function of age with only the oldest cohort receiving any sizable government expenditure. However, unlike males born in Canada, the oldest naturalized Canadian cohort make the largest annual transfers (\$15,032), followed by the middle aged (\$12,059) and youngest groups (\$6,704).⁸⁶ As with Canadian-born males, if any of these age groups were to leave Canada, there would be a net loss to the Canadian treasury.

⁸⁵ Canada-born males aged 62-80 make a positive contribution to the treasury in this example because we restricted the sample to employed seniors. If all seniors are included, the transfer would be negative.

⁸⁶ As noted above, this positive tax transfer is due to the use of only employed older people in the census sample. If the entire 65 and over population were included, there would be a negative transfer.





FIGURE 5-3: YEARLY NET FEDERAL TREASURY TRANSFERS BY AGE GROUP, EMPLOYED NATURALIZED CANADIAN MALES: 2006



Source: Author's calculations from 2006 Canadian Census.

It is possible to restrict our analysis to Canada-born and naturalized males working in professional occupations in order to illustrate the lost transfers derived from this critical emigration group. Again, the treasury transfers are a positive function of age, with the largest annual transfers for both Canada-born (\$32,709) and naturalized Canadians (\$33,450) occurring in the group that is 62 years of age and older.⁸⁷ The middle-aged (36-61) Canada-born and naturalized male professionals, if living in Canada, would respectively transfer \$25,607 and \$21,344 to the Canadian treasury annually. The 25-35 age cohort, if present in Canada, would transfer approximately \$10,000 regardless of birthplace. In short, if any of these male cohorts of employed Canadian citizens left Canada, there would be an annual net loss to the federal treasury.

Figure 5-1 delineated the age structure of the total treasury transfer with respect to the loss of a Canada-born émigré. What it does not depict is the federal and provincial share of this potential transfer. A large fraction of the reported taxes embedded theoretically in Figure 5-1 actually accrue to the provinces, which are responsible for costly education and healthcare services. The treasury transfer patterns resulting from the emigration and potential return of a Canadian citizen will differ at the provincial level for the selected age groups.

The level of education received in Canada impacts treasury transfers at the provincial level. Census data reveals that a post-secondary trained, male Canada-born taxpayer aged 36 to 61 living in British Columbia in 2006 paid less in annual combined income and consumption taxes to the provincial

⁸⁷ See above for the exception to this conclusion.

government than the annual contribution necessary to repay the government for the healthcare and education costs spent on him since birth. For example, for the male Canadian-born 36-61 cohort, past educational and contemporary health expenditures equal \$10,700, while only \$7,857 was paid in personal income and sales taxes.⁸⁸ Beyond age 61, healthcare costs rise to \$8,000, which is well beyond this cohort's provincial tax payments (\$5,556). This situation would lead to a drain on the provincial treasury in the absence of indirect taxes (provincial sales tax).⁸⁹ Emigration of naturalized male citizens aged 61 years or older would result in a net gain to the provincial treasury. In all other cases, emigrants younger than 61 years of age would imply a saving on health care costs but a loss in recompense for past educational expenditures to the provincial treasury.

The experience of naturalized male full-time employees in British Columbia reveals a similar pattern. The health costs of those over the age of 62 exceed their annual income-tax payments and only their annual sales-tax payments offset their annual healthcare costs. In addition, education and healthcare costs greatly exceed tax payments for the younger groups even when we factor in sales-tax revenues. In the case where the foreign-born Canadian obtained education abroad, these results will change dramatically for the 25-61 year-old age group since their Canadian subsidized education costs collapse to zero and healthcare costs are less than \$2,000.

In sum, several important emigrant tax transfer patterns emerge at the provincial level. First, the return of a life-long emigrant upon retirement will impose a tax burden at the provincial level for two reasons. First, an educated Canada-born citizen who was absent between the ages of 25-61 did not contribute to education costs in Canada via tax payments. The shortfall or tax gap must be made up by resident Canadian tax payers. Secondly, returnees over the age of 61 will not cover their healthcare costs with income taxes alone, unlike Canadians over the age of 61 who never left Canada. Thus, the return of long-term émigrés concerns provincial treasury officials since resident Canadian taxpayers must make up for this shortfall.⁹⁰



⁸⁸ The \$2,843 annual shortfall is made up for through other provincial tax sources and federal transfers.

⁸⁹ This deficit in the 62-80-year-old age bracket becomes even more pronounced if we make the employment outcomes of this age cohort more realistic. If we include all males who report income rather than full-time employed males, the provincial tax payments for naturalized (Canada-born) males aged 62-80 would fall to \$1,324 (\$1,280), which represents a fraction of their healthcare costs.

⁹⁰ Please see Appendix III for discussion on challenges related to analyzing the impact of emigration on the treasury

One potential policy response would be to more strongly link the provision of services to residency, rather than citizenship, and to develop a provident fund for Canadians who intend to one day return from abroad. In this way, Canadians abroad could contribute to the shared cost of their pension and healthcare and not experience disruptions in the provisions of these services.

TOPIC 2: ECONOMIC OUTCOMES FOR RETURNED ÉMIGRÉS

The Canadian government and many Canadian corporations and universities have expressed interest in attracting highly skilled Canadians abroad back to Canada.⁹¹ However, the big question is whether there are sufficient financial incentives for them to return to Canada. Are the skills and broader cultural outlook obtained while abroad readily transferable in the Canadian labour market?

The literature abounds with optimistic networking stories of Chinese or South Asian immigrants to North America returning to their countries of origin armed with investment funds, additional skills and social networks. But does this paradigm of knowledge and skill transfer hold for Canadian émigrés returning to Canada? This is a key question as Canada's émigré population is still largely born in Canada, although naturalized Canadians now make up a significant and growing minority (42 per cent). Unlike the typical cases cited in the literature, most Canada-born émigrés reside in developed countries while naturalized Canadians are widely dispersed across developed and less-developed regions.⁹²

Canadians returning from developed countries will arrive with a different set of skills and social networks than those who return from less-developed regions. This does not mean that there may not be economic and cultural advantages whenever a Canadian émigré returns. However, it is possible that a naturalized Canadian émigré will experience discrimination upon return from a developing country. The education and labour market experience gained in an emerging economy may not be recognized in the Canadian

⁹¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011.

⁹² Fifty-two per cent of all Canadian émigrés, regardless of place of birth, reside in Australia, France, the U.S. and the U.K. (DeVoretz, 2009).

labour market. On the other hand, foreign job experience, social networks and education acquired by Canadians while residing in the U.S. or Europe may yield a positive reward upon return to Canada.

CENSUS FACTS

The available literature suggests that individuals who return to Canada will be more productive given the new skills they acquired abroad and their ability to exploit previously established social networks in their home country.⁹³ In this section we attempt to determine if this is true and whether returning Canadians with overseas experience outperform corresponding cohorts that stayed in the country. In other words, was it a good investment to leave Canada?

The 2006 Canadian census asks three questions that will allow us to trace the economic outcomes of Canadian citizens who return to Canada. The questions were: country of birth, country of citizenship and place of residence five years prior to the census date (2001). The answers allow us to compare the earnings of long-term naturalized Canadians who returned to Canada prior to 2006 and naturalized Canadians who never left Canada.

Our research indicates that for naturalized Canadians, there is no short-term income gain from their foreign experience. Instead, there is an earnings penalty that actually increases as the naturalized Canadian ages or returns to Canada later in life. For example, naturalized males in the 25-35 year-old age group who return to Canada after five years abroad earn \$1,122 less a year than naturalized resident Canadians who never left. For males aged 36-61, earnings are \$8,279 less than naturalized resident Canadians who

BOX 5-1: THE MASTER'S STUDENT RETURNS

John is a thirty-year-old Canadian who recently completed his Masters degree in Leiden, Holland following a year teaching in South Korea and several years of travel. Like many young Canadians, he was motivated to pursue employment outside of Canada by a desire to broaden his perspectives and attain a variety of cultural experiences. Upon returning to Canada, John was surprised to discover that, due to his lack of Canadian contacts, he continued to have problems finding work. Nevertheless, he feels that the time he spent abroad should increase his career options in the long run because he gained a better understanding of Canada's place in the world and international politics.

⁹³ See Tian and Ma, 2006 for a review of the literature.

never left. This pattern continues for female naturalized returnees but in a more pronounced way. The penalties may be short term, however, and only longitudinal data can determine if the earnings penalties will persist.


We now turn to the Canada-born émigré group, who largely live in the U.S. and other developed economies. Our research reveals a substantial income gain for the Canada-born émigré population that returns to Canada. For example, Canada-born males who were living abroad for five or more years and returned home in 2006 earned ten to twenty per cent more than the similarly aged cohort that did not move away. For Canada-born females the same trend held for all age groups except females aged 25-35, who did not outperform Canadian women who never left Canada.


An important question from the perspective of resident Canadians is: did these returnees make a net contribution to Canada's treasury after their return? Our analysis of 2006 census data shows that Canada-born male émigrés who return to Canada transfer more to the Canadian treasury annually than Canadians who never left the country. For female émigrés who return to Canada, however, there is no difference. In the case of naturalized Canadians, the treasury transfers were smaller for returnees when compared to naturalized Canadians who never left Canada.

Overall, our census-based analysis indicates that naturalized Canadians who return to Canada have a difficult adjustment period, while Canada-born returned émigrés have exceptional outcomes. These findings raise key questions about programs aimed at encouraging naturalized Canadians abroad to return to Canada. Will naturalized Canadians be interested in returning if they face relatively poor economic prospects?

BOX 5-2: THE GLOBAL ACADEMIC

Melinda is a mid-career, naturalized Canadian professor who was born in Europe but was seeking a full-time tenure-track position at a university in Vancouver. After a series of temporary teaching positions, she decided to return home to Europe to gather additional job skills which would enable her to compete in the Vancouver university teaching market. She worked for a total of seven years in Europe as an economist in a research capacity with two renowned international organizations. In 2007, a university job opportunity arose in Vancouver that required the particular skill set she had obtained in Europe and, upon obtaining the job, she returned to Canada on a full-time basis.





CHAPTER SIX

Canadian's Views at Home and Abroad

Canadians living abroad lack a political avenue to air their concerns.

After five years outside of Canada, they lose their right to vote and, unlike emigrants from some of the other diaspora-producing countries, Canadian émigrés lack a political presence in Canada. They do not have an overseas Member of Parliament, for example, or a government agency that can articulate or help ameliorate their concerns.


Indeed, in the media coverage of the evacuation of 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in 2006, some questioned whether the evacuees were in fact “real” Canadians. Are Canadian residents aware and sympathetic to issues surrounding the population of Canadians living abroad? In 2010, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada posed four questions to a sample of Canadian residents.⁹⁴

Figure 6-1 presents the outcome of the survey. Sixty-six per cent of respondents agreed that children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada. There was little variation in this opinion across Canada by age, education or income.

The opinions of Canadian residents on the core issues of citizenship and voting rights were slightly more ambiguous. Sixty-three per cent of the respondents favoured the continuation of Canada’s dual citizenship policy, which enables Canadians to hold two or more passports. However, this group varied by age, place of residence, income and educational level.

Finally, when asked if they supported voting rights for dual citizens abroad, only a slight majority were in favour of granting voting rights to Canadian citizens who have been living abroad for more than five years. In effect, those polled appear to make a distinction between voting rights and citizenship rights for Canadians abroad.

⁹⁴ The online survey polled 2,903 people on behalf of APF Canada by Angus Reid Public Opinion between March 3 and 10, 2010. The national results are accurate within a margin of plus or minus 1.8 per cent, nineteen times out of twenty. The results were weighted by geography, gender and age according to the latest census data of Statistics Canada. See Asia Pacific Foundation (2010) for further details.

FIGURE 6-1: CANADIAN VIEWS ON POLICY QUESTIONS AFFECTING CANADIANS ABROAD

Source: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2010.

The poll demonstrated a strong positive response (73 per cent) for the establishment of a central body to co-ordinate issues affecting Canadians living abroad.

Canadian residents who were sampled were aware of key political issues arising from Canada's growing population abroad and strongly supported this group with the exception of voting rights. But how do Canadians living abroad view these and other issues? We look to the results of two surveys: The Global Canadians survey,⁹⁵ which polled Canadian citizens living across Asia and the U.S. in 2007, and a 2010 survey that focused specifically on Canadian citizens living in Hong Kong SAR.⁹⁶

OPINIONS OF CANADIANS LIVING IN ASIA AND THE U.S.

Rights of Canadians Abroad

In the 2010 survey of Canadians living in Hong Kong SAR, the majority of respondents said that Canadian citizens abroad should have equal rights to Canadians abroad in all respects. Specifically:


- 79 per cent of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens should be entitled to dual citizenship
- 80 per cent held that children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada
- 66 per cent of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens abroad should have the same voting rights as Canadian citizens living in Canada
- Just over half (53 per cent) of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens abroad would benefit from a central agency to coordinate issues
- 20 per cent agreed that Canadian citizens abroad should pay more for passport services than Canadian citizens living in Canada

⁹⁵ For full methodology please see Appendix I

⁹⁶ For full methodology please see Appendix II

While a majority agreed that the founding of an agency for Canadians abroad would be beneficial, most respondents were unsure about the role the agency should play or how it could be helpful. When asked what issues the agency should address, 68 per cent of respondents said they either did not know or did not have any suggestions. Areas where respondents felt that an agency could be useful were consulate assistance in case of emergencies (7 per cent), taxation consultation (5 per cent), and passport/citizenship inquiries (5 per cent).

FIGURE 6-2: OPINIONS OF CANADIANS IN HONG KONG SAR



Source: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2011

Please indicate agreement or disagreement with the following statements

1. Children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada (Q1)
2. Canadian citizens should be entitled to dual citizenship (Q2)
3. Canadian citizens abroad should have the same voting rights as Canadian citizens living in Canada (Q3)
4. Canadian citizens abroad would benefit from having a Canadian central agency to coordinate issues affecting citizens living abroad (Q4)
5. Canadian citizens abroad should pay more for passports than Canadian citizens living in Canada (Q5)

In the 2007 Global Canadians survey, the majority of respondents agreed that Canadians living abroad should be entitled to the same level of consular support as Canadian tourists. They also agreed that the Canadian government should do more to keep in touch with Canadians living overseas. Nevertheless, the vast majority of our respondents did not feel that Canadians abroad should be subject to Canadian income tax or to a surcharge on passport renewal. These findings suggest a fiscal challenge that often confronts Canadian policymakers: constituents are generally in favour of the provision and improvement of services, but expect them to be paid for through existing revenue sources.


COMPARING THE RESPONSES OF CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD

The results of our polls provide an opportunity to compare how Canadians at home and a select group of Canadians abroad feel about a range of issues. The findings included:

- ❑ Overall, both groups feel that Canadians and their offspring should have the same rights regardless of whether they live in Canada or abroad
- ❑ A larger percentage of domestic Canadians support an agency for Canadians abroad than do Canadians living permanently in Hong Kong
- ❑ Both domestic Canadians and Canadians abroad are less adamant about the need for equal voting rights than they are about other issues

BOX 6-1: THE RIGHTS/RESPONSIBILITIES BALANCE

Khalid is a Canadian in his twenties who has been living in Pakistan for three years. He feels it is reasonable that Canadians who have been abroad for more than five years should not be allowed to vote in Canadian elections. "This might sound cliché, but voting, as with citizenship, comes with responsibilities as well as rights. If someone is not living in Canada, not serving on juries, things like that, then I think it's reasonable that they lose their privileges for a certain period."





CHAPTER SEVEN

Policy Responses: An Agenda for Action and Further Research

The Canadians Abroad Project set out to measure the size and scope of the country's overseas citizen population and to shed some light on what policy issues should be addressed to more fully capture the potential—and mitigate the risks—of a Canadian diaspora.

That the issue of Canadians abroad should be of interest to policy makers is no longer in doubt. While a policy of benign neglect might have been justified in the past because of limited knowledge or a presumption that only small numbers of Canadians lived overseas, this approach is no longer viable. The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's work in this area—as well as that of other organizations and researchers—has turned the spotlight on a number of issues that cannot be addressed in a piecemeal or reactive fashion. While the Lebanon evacuation of 2006 was an important event in drawing public attention to Canadians abroad, it also led to an overly narrow and generally unhelpful debate on the issue. There will be other situations like the one in Lebanon, and while the Canadian government should prepare for such cases, it should not allow evacuation planning to define its policy on Canadians abroad. It is an encouraging sign that the recent evacuation of Canadians from Egypt—on a cost-recovery basis—did not cause any controversy in Canada.

There are many policy implications to be drawn from this report. Some are highly practical and immediate and do not involve substantial investments of money or political capital. Other policy ideas will require more research, consultation, and political will because they could affect the machinery of government and basic notions of citizenship, attachment, and the rights and responsibilities of Canadians at home and abroad.

A fundamental starting point for all of our policy suggestions is the need to re-frame the idea of Canadians abroad as a) a significant part of the Canadian polity worthy of serious, long-term policy attention, and b) a global asset that can be harnessed in the Canadian interest given the right set of incentives

and actions. The idea of Canada as a source country for emigrants runs counter to the prevailing notion that Canada is an immigrant nation and challenges the belief that Canada is the country of choice for immigrants from around the world. Canada is far from becoming a net emigration country, but a greater appreciation of outmigration is useful for the nation's self-image, if for no other reason than to take the issue of Canadians abroad more seriously.

There is already a growing awareness of this in government. The support for this project from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Government of British Columbia is a sign that officials understand the importance of the issue even if they don't yet have the tools to deal with it. Similarly the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recently launched an initiative on Global Canadians that encompasses—but is not exclusively focused on—Canadians abroad. Other federal government departments also have an interest in this subject: Health Canada on the international transmission of contagious diseases; Industry Canada on research and innovation linkages of transnational Canadians; the Department of Finance on fiscal impacts; Human Resources and Social Development Canada on labour mobility and human capital development and so on. There is, however, very little communication between these departments on Canadians abroad, and virtually no policy coordination or vision as to the kind of approach that needs to be taken on the Canadian diaspora.


We believe there is a case for better policy coordination and some centralization of functions on issues related to Canadians abroad. This could amount to a standalone agency or department, or it could be a special secretariat within an existing ministry that is tasked with policy coordination and development on overseas Canadians, as well as support for cross-departmental and civil society initiatives. As Chapter Two has shown, many other countries have mechanisms dedicated to connecting with their overseas citizens, from full-fledged ministries to quasi-government agencies. A first step in the creation of a new agency or secretariat would be for all relevant federal departments to audit their activities that pertain to Canadians abroad, and to map the extent to which these activities connect with each other. A number of core Canadians abroad activities currently dispersed across various departments may well be best placed within the new central agency, for example consular services.

The creation of a dedicated agency to address issues of Canadians abroad would pave the way for a fundamental reassessment of the underlying issues that drive outmigration, return migration, attachment, and the beneficial linkages that citizens living overseas can bring to Canada. These include citizenship and the role of residency in defining a citizen, voting rights, incentives to encourage attachment to Canada without a tax penalty, and options for long-term overseas residents to ensure access to social and

healthcare services on return to Canada. This report has launched a discussion on these issues, but there is much more work to be done, including public consultations, before a consensus can be reached on fundamental questions of identity, rights and obligations. To this end, we believe a special Parliamentary Committee on Canadians Abroad should be formed so that these issues are discussed not only in bureaucratic circles, but also in the political arena.

The need for more study and deliberation on issues concerning Canadians abroad should not be an excuse to delay more immediate and practical actions that can lead to benefits for Canadians abroad and at home, and which do not require fundamental policy changes. The underlying goal of these actions is to foster attachments to Canada in practical ways—through political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national interests. Examples include:

- Support for overseas networks of Canadians to connect with their counterparts in Canada for commercial, research, and social improvement goals. An example of such a network is the C100 group in Silicon Valley.
- Staffing and funds for Canadian posts abroad to be more active in their outreach to Canadian citizens, by way of promotional and networking events, information dissemination, and public diplomacy.
- Partnerships with universities and colleges to establish a stronger link between Canadian alumni groups and networks of Canadians abroad. The “family” of overseas Canadians should include non-Canadians who have strong attachments to the country, for example through study in Canadian post-secondary institutions. It should also include the growing number of Canadian Overseas Schools that deliver high school curricula to foreign nationals (many of whom later attend Canadian universities).
- The creation of a global, cross-sector non-governmental organization (in addition to a coordinating government agency or policy secretariat) to link various national and regional Canadian networks overseas.
- Funding for more research on the incentives and obstacles for outmigration and return migration, and on ways to foster attachment to Canada that is in the national interest.
- The modernization of bilateral double taxation and/or social security agreements, especially with countries that have large populations of overseas Canadians. These mechanisms make it easier for Canadians to live and work abroad, as well as for foreigners to live and work in Canada. They can also address, to some extent, the problem of negative fiscal transfers in the case of Canadians who are abroad during their most productive (tax generating) years.



Short of a radical change in Canadian citizenship policy (for example, the elimination of dual citizenship or taxation of Canadians regardless of residency), the phenomenon of Canadians abroad is not likely to go away. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that the number of Canadians abroad will grow in the foreseeable future, and that foreign-born Canadians will increasingly dominate the outflow. There is undoubtedly a “balance sheet” to Canadians abroad, with liabilities (and contingent liabilities) as well as assets to consider. Recently, public attention in Canada has focused excessively on the liabilities and not sufficiently on the assets. Unlike the items on a balance sheet, however, Canadians abroad are real people, often highly skilled, and highly mobile, who make personal and professional choices based on changing circumstances, incentives, and motivations—much as all Canadians do. Whether or not Canadians abroad end up as an asset or a liability for Canada, therefore, is not a foregone conclusion, but is predicated on Canadian policy.

BOX 7-1: LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

A paper commissioned by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada surveyed models of diaspora engagement around the globe. The authors, Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin, identified eight policy interventions that Canada could consider when developing its citizens abroad strategy. These include:

1. Developing an inclusive definition of Canadians Abroad

Scotland's diaspora strategy aims to include not only individuals who were born in Scotland, but also *Ancestral Diaspora* (individuals abroad with Scottish heritage) as well as *Affinity Diaspora* (individuals with connections to Scotland, but no Scottish heritage).

2. Establishing an Emigrant Support Program to extend consular service beyond reactive humanitarian support during natural disasters

Since 2004, the Government of Ireland has administered a program that provides culturally sensitive, frontline welfare services to vulnerable Irish emigrants.

3. Encouraging philanthropic giving to Canada amongst Canadians Abroad

Over the past 30 years, the Ireland Fund has raised more than €300 million through diaspora networks for domestic projects.

4. Targeting tourism campaigns at diaspora markets

Scotland's Homecoming 2009 was a flagship tourist campaign which sought to secure tourist visits from diasporans and to use these visits to build longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora.

5. Mapping the full range of Canadian diaspora business networks to determine if additional networks are required

If a new business network is required, Canada could examine models such as Advance Australia, Global Scot, Kea New Zealand, Indus Entrepreneurs Network, and the networks run by Enterprise Ireland.

6. Establishing a high-level forum through which prominent Canadians Abroad can contribute their expertise to Canadian matters of interest and concern

An excellent model is the World Class NZ Network, which brings together very senior and influential New Zealanders and 'New Zealand-friendly' experts committed to accelerating the country's development, international competitiveness and economic growth.

7. Honouring prominent Canadians Abroad to foster “Canadian-mindedness”

On Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indians Day) each year, the Government of India awards overseas Indians who have contributed to enhancing the country's development and global status.

8. Considering the introduction of a new category of citizenship to balance the benefits and liabilities of the Canadians Abroad population

India has recently introduced a new category of citizenship, the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). This citizenship extends a number of formally designated citizenship rights to overseas Indians, but not the full set of political rights extended to citizens of India.

The full paper *A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Enriching Debate through Heightening Awareness of International Practice* is available at <http://www.asiapacific.ca/canadiansabroad>

APPENDIX I

Canadians in Hong Kong Survey: Methodology

The telephone survey was conducted from November 3 to November 27, 2010 in English, Cantonese and Mandarin. (A total of 125,558 telephone numbers were called.)

The survey contacted 35,825 households out of a total of 2,341,500 domestic households as of mid-2010 in Hong Kong SAR,⁹⁷ representing 1.5 per cent⁹⁸ of all households in the city. Of the 35,825 households contacted, 1,800 included one or more Canadian citizen over the age of 18. Ultimately, 507 respondents completed the survey.

A random sample of the target population (Canadian citizens in Hong Kong SAR who have stayed or have a definite plan to stay in Hong Kong for more than one year) of this size (507) has a range of error of +/- 5 percentage points at the 95 per cent confidence interval. The +/- 5 points indicates the range of error that the information and views reported are actually reflective of Canadians in Hong Kong.

This survey was produced with the support of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Western Economic Diversification Canada, the Government of British Columbia, and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation.

APPENDIX II

Global Canadians: A Survey of the Views of Canadians Abroad

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada designed the 18-question survey, which was posted on a website operated by InSite Survey System Ltd.

Reaching appropriate respondents was challenging. We followed the following strategy:

- ☐ Invited responses through Canadian diplomatic offices' contacts in each country;
- ☐ Invited responses through members of Canadian chambers of commerce or Canadian business associations in each country;
- ☐ Invited responses through members of Canadian social and cultural organizations in each country;
- ☐ Invited responses through subscribers to the websites run by overseas Canadian organizations or individuals; and
- ☐ Invited responses through word of mouth or an onward-referral process.

The survey was posted online on April 9, 2007 and ran from April 9 to June 14, 2007.

The survey was open to error including sampling error (because respondents needed to have Internet access to complete the survey). Respondents also needed to have some facility with the English language to understand and complete the survey, to have been informed of the existence of the survey by Canadian organizations in their host countries or through other sources, and to be adults at the time of the survey in order to be members of such organizations or subscribers to such e-contacts. Canadian organizations in host countries needed to be willing and legally

⁹⁷ Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistics_by_subject/index.jsp, [Page consulted on Feb. 10, 2011].

⁹⁸ Demographers routinely work with 1 and 2 per cent census samples of households and consider the results as acceptably accurate representations of the whole population.

able to forward survey information on to their members or subscribers. The survey was open to measurement error due to the wording of questions and/or question classification and order, deliberate or unintentional inaccurate responses, non-response or refusals, etc. With the exception of sampling error, the magnitude of the errors cannot be estimated. There is, therefore, no way to calculate a finite "margin of error" for this survey.

APPENDIX III

The ideal circumstance for analyzing the macro treasury impact of emigration would be to know the number of deemed non-residents and Canadian non-resident citizens living abroad who do not file tax returns. However, an inquiry to Canada Revenue Agency on the number of deemed non-residents produced this reply:

"As explained in the (email) below, we do not know how many deemed non-residents there are, because many of them do not have to file a return. If they do not have to file a return, and are not issued any type of slip (such as a T4, T4-ANR, or NR4) we do not have them on file."

Aggregate yearly data reported by the Department of Finance allows a calculation of the relative importance of non-resident income tax to total tax revenues in any year. For example, in the fiscal year 2008-2009, non-resident income tax amounted to \$6.2 billion or 3.2 per cent of Canada's total tax revenues. While it is a considerable sum, this is an overstatement of Canadian emigrant returns since non-Canadian citizen payments are included in the \$6.2 billion estimate of non-resident income tax payments.

The tax transfer values reported in Chapter Five, however, must be put in context. First, in the absence of an accurate count of deemed non-residents it is difficult to deduce how much of this treasury loss is due to awarding non-resident status alone, since a myriad of other factors affect the size of tax transfers.⁹⁹ Secondly, for every 10,000 deemed non-residents aged 36-61, the annual tax loss to Canada (\$3.2 billion¹⁰⁰) is small when compared to the annual income tax payments (\$167.3 billion) in Canada *circa* 2006.¹⁰¹

Finally, deemed non-residents often still pay income taxes, but just not to Canada, and existing tax treaties protect them from double taxation. Thus, recovered tax payments from instituting a world-wide Canadian tax system would, in many cases, but not all, be small.

However, there are still possible side effects if the deemed non-resident status accelerates Canada's brain drain by providing an incentive to emigrate. There is substantial literature on the brain drain that indicates that mid-career (aged 36-45) Canadian professionals did not leave Canada for the U.S. unless there was at least a \$250,000 lifetime income gain *circa* 1998. If any of the age groups lived in a moderate (U.S.) to high (European Union) tax environment, the tax incentive derived from deemed non-resident status for a potential Canadian émigré would not be enough alone to encourage Canadian citizens to emigrate. However, if a Canadian citizen moved to a low tax environment (e.g. Middle East, Hong Kong SAR) after obtaining a substantial subsidized Canadian education, then being a non-resident Canadian would produce a substantial tax incentive to move during his/her working lives.

⁹⁹ These include all the factors that would lead an individual abroad not to be in the labour force.

¹⁰⁰ The taxable population was calculated using the following assumptions: A permanent deemed non-resident population of 10,000 with an assumed labour force participation rate of 70 per cent and with tax payments were used in this calculation. For example, the federal transfer loss for 25-35 year olds equals \$186 million. This is calculated as $\$74,000 \times [(10,000) \times (.36) \times (.7)]$. The \$74,000 is the federal transfer loss reported in column 1, row 1 of Table 1. The weight $[(10,000) \times (.36) \times (.7)]$ is a product of the assumed 10,000 deemed non-residents abroad times (.36) which is the estimated percentage of 25-61 year olds in the Canadian overseas population *circa* (2006) times their assumed labour force participation rate of 70 per cent.

¹⁰¹ The total income tax payments in Canada in 2006 were \$167,276 million (see Statistics Canada). Consolidated Federal, Provincial and Local Revenue and Expenditures 2010-01-19.

¹⁰² See DeVoretz and Itturalde, 2001.

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
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This is Exhibit "D" referred to in
the affidavit of **Don De Voretz**.....

sworn before me, this 2 day of

May, 2012



.....
A Commissioner of Oaths, etc.



GLOBAL CANADIANS

A SURVEY OF THE VIEWS
OF CANADIANS ABROAD

Asia Pacific
Foundation
of Canada

Fondation
Asie Pacifique
du Canada

Global Canadians

A Survey of the Views of Canadians Abroad

Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada
September 2007

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Executive Summary

- A total of 549 respondents, all age 20 and above and residing in either Asian countries¹ or the United States, were successfully enumerated by online questionnaires between April 9 and June 14, 2007.

Profiles of Canadians Abroad

- Canadians abroad are widely scattered around Asia and the US.
- The average age of respondents is 41.7 years. The largest age group (52.4%) comprises respondents aged 30 to 44.
- The gender ratio of respondents is 58:42, men to women, or 1.39 males per female.
- Nearly 95% of respondents have some post-secondary education.
- Over 56% of respondents have lived outside of Canada for more than five years.
- Nearly 65% of respondents indicate that pursuing job and career opportunities in the global labour market is the main reason they chose to live abroad.
- Some 30% of respondents working abroad have careers related to Canada, either through government, business, NGOs or self-employment.

Citizenship and Identity

- The Canadian population abroad is a heterogeneous group: 44% are solo Canadian citizens, 36% are dual citizens, 16% are Canadian citizens with permanent residency in another country, and 4% are Canadian landed immigrants.
- Some 65% of respondents gained Canadian citizenship by birth, while 29% gained it through immigration and naturalization.
- Nearly 64% of respondents still call Canada home, though this percentage varies notably depending on the respondent's citizenship status, level of education, and the length of time he or she has spent living abroad.
- Canadians abroad may possess more than one identity and identify more with one or another of them in different circumstances. In terms of their professional lives, respondents are almost even on identifying most closely with either Canada (47%) or their country of residence (46%). In terms of their personal or family lives, respondents overwhelmingly identify more closely with Canada (66%) than with their country of residence (31%).

¹ A list of Asian countries included in the survey is provided in Figure 8 of this report.

Ties to Canada

- Nearly 54% of respondents make at least one trip to Canada per year.
- About 69% of respondents have plans to return to Canada and establish permanent residency.
- Among respondents' reasons for returning to Canada, "being closer to family members and friends" and "enjoying the quality of life and culture in Canada" are the most frequently cited.
- Among the news sources used by respondents to get updated information about Canada, "friends and family" and Canadian media are the most frequently cited.
- The majority of respondents reported Ontario, British Columbia, or Quebec as their home provinces in Canada.

Views of Canadians Abroad

- Respondents hold clear views on many issues related to their overseas civil rights and responsibilities. They are likely to agree with the following statements:
 - Canadians living overseas should be allowed to vote in Canadian elections regardless of how long they have been absent from Canada;
 - Canadians living overseas should be entitled to the same level of consular support as Canadian tourists; and
 - The Canadian government should do more to keep in touch with Canadians living overseas.
- Respondents are less likely to agree that:
 - Canada should cease to recognize dual citizenship;
 - Canadians living overseas should pay a surcharge on the renewal of their passports; and
 - Canadians living overseas should be subject to Canadian income tax.
- Respondents also have clear views on the potential benefits they can provide to Canada. The most important of these include the belief that their overseas presence creates goodwill toward Canada, and that their overseas knowledge and skills are transferable to Canada.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings of the survey *Views of Canadians Abroad*. The phenomenon of the growing Canadian diaspora² has recently received increased public attention, and many discussions and debates have focused on the presumed consequences and impacts of Canada's overseas population on Canada's well-being. Some fundamental questions still remain unanswered, however, including (but not limited to):

- How many Canadian citizens reside abroad, and where are they?
- What are their demographic and economic profiles?
- What are their connections to Canada, if any?
- What are the implications of these new patterns and how should policy react?

In this debate, the views of one group of Canadians are seldom heard: those of overseas Canadians. Such exclusion is undemocratic — the people who are most likely to be affected by changes in citizenship policy are given little to no input in the relevant discussions themselves. Thus, a primary aim of this report is to fill the 'knowledge gap' created by unanswered questions and to obtain data on the views of Canadians abroad, both of which will contribute to a balanced assessment of Canadian diaspora policies.

The survey cited in this report was designed and conducted by Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. The survey's target sample is the self-identified Canadian population currently residing in Asia and the United States who belong to business associations and social clubs or networks associated with Canada³.

The survey was designed in the form of an online questionnaire⁴ and was open for response from April 9 to June 14, 2007. During this period, we received a total of 597 individual responses, of which 48 were deemed incomplete and ultimately eliminated. The final 549 valid responses are used for analysis in this report.

The remainder of this report is organized in three parts. The next section discusses some working definitions and describes the method used in the survey. Section 3 reports the survey results, emphasizing profiles of Canadians abroad, their citizenships and identities, and their ties to Canada. The final section reports some conclusions.

² APF Canada published a report in 2006 which estimates that some 2.7 million Canadian citizens are scattered around the world. The report is available at APF Canada's website at www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/commentary/cac41.pdf.

³ It is obvious that the Asia Pacific region is of primary interest to the Foundation. We have chosen the US as a secondary region because over half of all Canadians abroad reside there. This choice does not mean to suggest that other regions are not important, however; given the limited time and resources at this stage, we have focused on areas that are immediately relevant to APF Canada's mandate.

⁴ The survey website is operated and managed by InSite Survey System, Ltd., whose website is www.insitesurveys.com.

2. Definitions and Methodology

Working Definition of a 'Canadian Abroad'

There are two nomenclatural challenges that must be addressed before a definition of 'Canadian abroad' can be established. The first entails considering precisely who is Canadian; the second is a definition of who can rightly be considered a Canadian "abroad"⁵. In this study, for reasons of simplicity, we classify Canadians abroad as being:

- ***Those who self-identify as a Canadian or a landed immigrant of Canada.*** This includes respondents who are Canadian citizens through birth, immigration and naturalization, or through Canadian parent(s). It also includes solo Canadian citizens, dual-citizens, Canadian citizens with permanent residency in another country, and Canadian landed immigrants who are citizens in another country.
- ***Those who have principal residence status outside Canada.*** This includes Canadians who are long-term residents (more than one year) or new residents (less than one year) in their host country. It also includes Canadian citizens or landed immigrants who have never lived or spent a significant time in Canada.

Different terms are also used to define Canada's population abroad: diaspora, overseas citizens, expatriates, citizens abroad, etc. Canada has long been considered a country of immigrants, and it has no universally accepted term for Canadians who live outside Canada. In this report, the terms Canadian diaspora, overseas Canadians, and Canadians abroad are used interchangeably to apply to the self-identified Canadian population that holds principal residence outside Canada.

Moreover, the survey's targeted areas are limited to countries in Asia and the United States, where probably over two-thirds of the Canadian overseas population currently resides. Thus, the findings and results of the survey represent only the views of the Canadian population living in these regions.

Method

The results presented in this report are derived from the previously mentioned online questionnaire. APF Canada designed the 18-question survey, which was posted on the website that is operated and managed by InSite Survey System Ltd. Detailed information on the questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.

Gathering as many targeted and representative respondents as possible while avoiding irrelevant respondents is a major challenge to conducting online surveys. Delivering the survey information to the expected potential respondents becomes a key to the success of the project. In facing these problems, we developed the following strategies to reach targeted groups and collect reasonably representative responses:

⁵ Hugo, et al (2003) and Sriskandarajah and Drew (2006) offer interesting discussions on the difficulties of defining nationals abroad, directly applicable to the "Canadian abroad" problem.

- Invite responses through Canadian diplomatic offices' contacts in each country;
- Invite responses through members of Canadian chambers of commerce or Canadian business associations in each country;
- Invite responses through members of Canadian social and cultural organizations in each country;
- Invite responses through subscribers of the websites run by overseas Canadian organizations or individuals; and
- Invite responses through a 'snowball' onward-referral process.

Following these strategies, we sent an initial survey assistance inquiry to many organizations and individuals falling under the above categories. With the exception of Canadian diplomatic offices, where government policy does not permit the solicitation of information for survey purposes, these groups were largely helpful. The invaluable assistance provided by the Canadian chambers of commerce in many Asian countries is highly appreciated and formally acknowledged in Appendix B of this report.

The survey was put online and opened for response on April 9, 2007. The original deadline was set for April 23, 2007, but later postponed to June 14, 2007 in response to some participating Canadian overseas organizations wishing to extend the survey deadline so that it better coincided with their routine operations. Thus, the survey period ran from April 9 to June 14, 2007.

We realized this method is subject to several sources of error. These include: sampling error (because respondents needed to have Internet access to complete the survey; to have some facility with English to understand and complete the survey; to have been informed of the existence of the survey by Canadian organizations in their host countries or through other sources; to be adults at the time of the survey in order to be members of such organizations or subscribers to such e-contacts; and Canadian organizations in host countries needed to be willing and legally able to forward survey information on to their members or subscribers); and measurement error due to question wording and/or question classification and order; deliberate or unintentional inaccurate responses, non-response or refusals, etc. With the exception of sampling error, the magnitude of the errors cannot be estimated. There is, therefore, no way to calculate a finite "margin of error" for this survey.

With pure probability samples, it is possible to calculate the probability that the sampling error is not greater than some number. However, that does not take other sources of error into account. Generally, online surveys are not based on a probability sample and therefore no theoretical sampling error can be calculated.

3. Survey Results

3.1 Profile of Canadians Abroad

Age


The age profile of the survey respondents varies widely, from 21 years at the youngest to 91 years at the oldest⁶. The median age of all respondents is 39 years, indicating that half of all Canadians abroad are above the age of 39. The average age of the pool is 41.7 years (Table 1). The largest age grouping among survey respondents is age 30 to 44 (Figure 1).

As shown in Figure 1, the overall age distribution of survey respondents is quite different from the age distribution in Canada. The survey data suggests that Canadians abroad are likely over-represented in the early period of working-age compared with the domestic Canadian population⁷. The group aged 30 to 44 accounts for 52.4% of all survey respondents while only representing 29.4% of domestic Canadians.

Post-secondary youth and retirement age demographics are likewise underrepresented in the survey pool. Youth aged 20 to 24 and those aged 65 and over make up only 1.2% and 6.0% of all survey respondents respectively, while in Canada these groups represent 9.1% and 12.4% of the overall population. The age structure of Canadians abroad is much younger than the domestic population, the latter being more akin to typical post-industrial demographic pyramids (Figures 2 and 3).

Table 1: Age Profile of Canadians Abroad

Variables	Value
Min	21
Max	91
Median	39
Mode	34
Mean	41.7
Std. Dev.	11.7
N	489



⁶ Because the survey only accepted responses from Canadians abroad aged 20 years and above, this age profile cannot represent the whole overseas strata.

⁷ For the purpose of comparison, the author recalculated age distribution of aged 20 years and up based on Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 051-0001, accessed on July 20, 2007, at <http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/demo10a.htm>

Figure 2: Age Pyramid of Canadians Abroad (20 and up)





Figure 3: Age Pyramid of Population in Canada (20 and up)



Gender

The gender ratio of all survey respondents is 58:42, men to women, or 1.39 males per female. This ratio is weighted toward the male gender significantly more than is the gender ratio of the domestic Canadian population (51:49, or 1.04 males per female).

The respondent gender ratio varies tremendously by area of economic activity and employment. Men are overwhelmingly dominant in areas associated with Canadian business, NGOs, self-employment, international organizations and multi-national companies (MNCs). Conversely, women are dominant in the areas of education (both as students and employees) and unemployed/not working. The gender ratio is relatively balanced in the categories of Canadian government, local government, business/NGO, and retired/semi-retired.

Figure 4: Canadians Abroad by Gender




Figure 5: Population in Canada by Gender (20 and over)






Figure 6: Gender Ratio by Economic Activity
(Males per Female)



Education

Canadians abroad are highly educated. Close to 95% of respondents have some post-secondary education or higher; over half have some level of postgraduate education and 43% have some level of undergraduate education.


Figure 7: Canadians Abroad by Education Level



Country of Current Residence⁸

Because of the survey limitations discussed earlier, our results may not represent an absolutely accurate description of the Canadian population distribution in Asia and the US. Our survey outcomes do provide some indication that Canadians are widely scattered through these regions with relative concentration in some countries/territories, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia and the US. (Figure 8).

Furthermore, the results illustrate great variation in citizenship status of overseas Canadians that is dependant on the country in which they reside (Table 2). In Thailand, Japan, Vietnam and the US, for example, the majority of Canadians are citizens of Canada only. Dual citizenship is only prominent in countries such as Taiwan, New Zealand and Australia, which have policies favourable to dual-citizenship. Table 3 highlights differences from country to country in how Canadians abroad gained their citizenship statuses. Canadian citizens abroad in Australia, Japan and New Zealand are overwhelmingly citizens by birth, whereas China and Taiwan have higher proportions of Canadians who gained citizenship through immigration and naturalization. Both of the latter also see a larger share of Canadians who gained landed immigrant status in Canada, but returned to China or Taiwan before obtaining full citizenship.



⁸ Country list as used here refers to independent economies.

Table 2: Respondents' Country of Current Residence by Citizenship Status (%)


Country of current principal residence	Citizen of Canada and other country	Citizen of Canada only	Citizen of Canada with "permanent residency" in other country	Landed Immigrant of Canada and citizen of other country	Total
Thailand	20.8	79.2	0.0	0.0	100.0
Japan	13.9	75.0	11.1	0.0	100.0
Vietnam	27.8	69.4	2.8	0.0	100.0
USA	28.9	59.6	11.5	0.0	100.0
Philippines	33.3	50.0	11.1	5.6	100.0
Hong Kong	21.7	48.1	28.3	1.9	100.0
China	31.6	31.6	5.3	31.6	100.0
Taiwan	56.4	30.8	1.3	11.5	100.0
New Zealand	46.3	28.4	25.4	0.0	100.0
Australia	53.2	16.1	30.7	0.0	100.0
Other	43.9	43.9	9.8	2.4	100.0
Total	36.4	44.3	15.8	3.5	100.0
N = 539	Pr < 0.001				

Table 3: Country of Current Residence by Means of Acquiring Citizenship (%)

Country of current principal residence	Canadian citizen by birth	Canadian citizen through immigration and naturalization	Canadian citizen through parents' Canadian citizenship	Canadian landed immigrant	Total
Australia	95.2	3.2	1.6	0.0	100.0
Japan	86.1	13.9	0.0	0.0	100.0
New Zealand	83.6	14.9	1.5	0.0	100.0
USA	76.9	23.1	0.0	0.0	100.0
Thailand	76.0	24.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Vietnam	67.6	27.0	5.4	0.0	100.0
Hong Kong	61.1	31.5	5.6	1.9	100.0
Philippines	55.6	38.9	0.0	5.6	100.0
Taiwan	34.9	53.0	1.2	10.8	100.0
China	15.0	45.0	10.0	30.0	100.0
Other	46.3	46.3	4.9	2.4	100.0
Total	65.0	28.8	2.7	3.5	100.0
N=549	Pr<0.001				

Length of Time Living Abroad


Canadians living abroad tend to do so on a long-term basis. Over 56% of survey respondents have lived outside Canada for more than five years. Some 34% have lived overseas between 1-5 years, and another 8% joined the Canadian diaspora within the past year. Interestingly, approximately 1% of respondents have never lived in Canada.



Motivations for Living Abroad

Following career opportunities is the dominant factor motivating Canadians to reside abroad. Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicate that “job and career opportunities” was the key reason for their decision to move abroad. This is followed by family and personal reasons — marrying a local or following a spouse overseas, for example — accounting for 19% of all responses. The third most frequently cited reason is related to lifestyle and climate, amounting to 8%.

Motivations for living abroad do not differ dramatically between Canadian-born and foreign-born. One notable difference, however, appears in the response to a question about Canadian taxes. Over 6% of foreign-born Canadians abroad indicate that tax was the key motivation for living outside Canada, while only 0.3% of Canadian-born indicates it was the reason for moving abroad, as shown in Figure 10.




Note: N=549; Pr<0.01

Economic Activity

Although approximately two out of every three Canadians abroad have left Canada for work-related reasons⁹, the types of economic activities they engage in vary significantly and have different implications for Canada (Figure 11). Some 30% of respondents working abroad do so for Canadian entities, such as governments, businesses, NGOs, or some form of self-employment. Over 31% of respondents are integrated into the local economy through local governments, businesses, schools, or NGOs. Another 27% of respondents work for international organizations or multinational entities, and some 12% are economically inactive because they are either retired/semi-retired, a student, or unemployed/not working.


Canadian-born- and foreign-born Canadians abroad seem to have different economic opportunities overseas. Canadian-born Canadians are more likely to be engaged in categories of “working for the Canadian government,” and “working for local government”. Foreign-born Canadians, however, are more frequently engaged in other categories, such as “working for an international organization or multinational business,” “self-employed,” or “unemployed/not working”.



Note: N=539, Pr<=0.001

⁹ This is similar to the findings of Sriskandarajah and Drew (2006:22) regarding overseas Britons.

In addition to the gender-related differences discussed earlier, economic activity also varies by citizenship status (Figure 12). Solo Canadian citizens living abroad are dominant in the Canada-related entities field, accounting for 38% of the group. Dual citizens and Canadian citizens with “permanent residency” in other countries are more likely to be engaged in local-related entities, representing some 40% of each group. However, Canadians abroad who are landed immigrants in Canada and citizens of another country are most likely to work for an international entity (37%).



Note: N=539, Pr<0.001

3.2 Citizenship and Identity

Solo Citizenship and Dual Citizenship

As should now be clear, the Canadian population abroad is by no means a homogeneous group. It includes Canadians who are citizens of Canada only, dual citizens, multiple citizens, and other persons who hold various combinations of immigration, citizenship and residency statuses between Canada and their host countries. According to the results of this survey, 44% of all respondents are solo Canadian citizens, 36% are dual citizens of Canada and another country, 16% are Canadian citizens with permanent residency in another country, and 4% are landed immigrants in Canada (Figure 13a).

The survey results also reveal the means through which Canadians abroad attained their Canadian citizenship statuses. Some 65% of respondents report that they are Canadian citizens by birth. Approximately 29% of respondents indicate that their Canadian citizenship was gained through Canada's immigration and naturalization process. Only 3% are Canadian citizens through their parents' Canadian citizenship, and another 3% are landed immigrants who are not yet Canadian citizens (Figure 13b).

Based on these figures, we can estimate that roughly 65% of all respondents are Canada-born Canadians and 35% are foreign-born Canadians, using the category of "citizenship by birth" as meaning "born in Canada."

The survey data also show the most common countries that Canadians abroad have their citizenship of permanent residency are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, UK, and USA. Nearly 4.5% of respondents have more than one citizenship or permanent residency other than Canada (Figure 14).

Figure 13a: Citizenship of Canadians Abroad






Figure 13b: How Canadians Abroad Gained Citizenship**Figure 14: Overseas Canadians' Dual/Multiple Citizenship or Permanent Residency (%)**

Sense of Belonging: Is Canada Home?


On the whole, members of the Canadian diaspora display significant personal linkages to Canada. One such linkage is respondents' personal sense of belonging to Canada. Nearly 64% of respondents indicate that they consider Canada their home. While another 19% say they are not sure whether Canada is their home or not, only 17% say, definitively, that Canada is not their home (Figure 15).


This sense of belonging varies notably by citizenship status. Canadians abroad who gained citizenship through immigration and naturalization recognize Canada as their home more frequently than any other group. Although this level of recognition is not significantly different from that of Canadians abroad who gained citizenship by birth, it is still notably higher — even taking into account survey variation. It may not be surprising, then, that Canadians abroad who gained citizenship through their parents have the lowest level of recognition that Canada is their home (Figure 16).

Educational background also appears to affect a group's personal linkages to Canada. In general, the higher the education level a respondent has, the more likely he or she or will associate Canada with home (Figures 17-19). Likewise, the longer a Canadian lives abroad, the less likely he or she will consider Canada home. Respondents who have never lived in Canada have the lowest frequency of association. There is no statistical difference between the proportion of males and females who call Canada home.


Another linkage to Canada is respondents' close professional and personal associations with Canada. Respondents are almost evenly split over which country they most closely associate professionally with: Canada (47%) or their country of residence (46%). In terms of personal or family-life associations, 66% of respondents indicate that they feel closer to Canada than their host country (31%). This suggests that Canadians abroad may possess multiple national identities that gain prominence or diminish depending on the circumstance (Figure 20).

Figure 15: Is Canada Home?







Note: N=527, Pr<0.1




Note: N=501, Pr<0.1



Note: N=504, Pr=0.486



Note: N=527, Pr <= 0.001



3.3 Ties to Canada

Trips to Canada

The Canadian diaspora also keeps close physical ties with Canada. One such tie is visits to Canada; over 94% of respondents have visited Canada since they established principal residency abroad. Nearly 54% of respondents make at least one trip to Canada per year, among which 9% make three or more trips a year. Some 40% have made at least one trip to Canada every two years or more. Only 6% of respondents have never made a trip to Canada (Figure 21).

Visiting Canada as a means of connecting with Canada varies notably in accordance with their characteristics. Those who consider Canada as home make more trips to Canada than those who do not or not sure they regard Canada as home (Table 4). Canadian students, those working for a Canadian business or NGO and self-employed are likely the most frequent travelers who make three or more trips a year back to Canada. Canadian academics, those working for a Canadian business and government are likely the moderate travelers who make 1-2 trips a year to Canada (Figure 22).





Table 4: Trips to Canada by Whether Considering Canada Home

	Consider Canada Home (%)		
	Yes	Not Sure	No
Never	4.7	4.06	11.4
1 trip every two or more years	34.0	54.5	48.9
1-2 trip(s) a year	48.5	37.6	37.5
3 or more trips a year	12.7	4.0	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=527	338	101	88
Pr<0.001			


Figure 22: Trips to Canada by Economic Activity

Note: N=527, Pr<0.001

Return to Canada

Re-establishing or planning to re-establish principal residence in Canada is another link between Canadians abroad and Canada. In total, as many as 69% of respondents indicate they have plans to return to Canada in the future; 11% report that will return within the next year, and 17% suggest their return will happen in 10 or more years. Over 40% of respondents indicate they plan to return to Canada within 10 years while 31% have no plans to return.

Canadian-born Canadians abroad are less likely to have plans to return to Canada compared with their foreign-born counterparts. However, foreign-born Canadians indicate their return will most likely be in 10 or more years.



Note: N=525, Pr<0.01


Reasons for Return

The top reason cited by respondents for wanting to return to Canada is that they miss their family and friends after some years away from home. Nearly 41% respondents say they plan to return for this or other family-related reasons.

A second reason often cited by respondents is their longing for home: 40% of Canadians abroad report that they miss their home and the culture and quality of life in Canada. This indicates that psychological and cultural ties are important fibres of the connection to Canada that may ultimately bring many overseas Canadians back home.


Returning to Canada for retirement, which 28% of respondents indicate as one of the reasons they wish to return, is a natural end for those Canadians living abroad for job-related purposes. Similarly, job availabilities or other economic opportunities in Canada are likely important factors that will bring some members of the Canadian diaspora home. Access to health services, social services or educational opportunities in Canada also attract many overseas Canadians. In sum, a respondent's decision to return to Canada is the outcome of many factors, social and otherwise.

Figure 24: Main Reasons for Return



Province of Origin


Many Canadians abroad associate “home” not only with Canada, but also with a particular province. The survey data shows that Ontario (40%) and British Columbia (30%) are the home provinces of most Canadians abroad. Quebec and Alberta are also the home province to a significant number, tallying 12% and 9% of responses respectively.



Keeping Ties

It is important not only to have close ties connecting Canadians abroad with Canada, but to also keep such ties strong. One way Canadians abroad achieve this is by keeping themselves updated on Canadian news, events and issues. The survey finds that friends and family are the most important source of Canadian news for overseas Canadians; 64% of respondents indicate that they get Canadian information “frequently” or “very frequently” from this source. The second leading information source for Canadians abroad is the domestic Canadian media (including print, web and broadcast sources), through which 57% of respondents get information about Canada “frequently” or “very frequently.” International media plays a moderate role in providing Canada-related news to Canadians living abroad; 28% of respondents indicate that local media is their key source for information on Canada.


Surprisingly, overseas Canadian networks are rarely used as a primary source of information on Canada. Only 27% of respondents report that they “frequently” or “very frequently” get Canada-related information from overseas networks, while 43% of respondents indicate that they get Canada-related information from overseas networks “rarely” or “not at all.” As few as 13% of respondents indicate that they “frequently” or “very frequently” get information on Canada from Canadian diplomatic posts, while 70% say they do this “rarely” or “not at all.”



3.4 Views of Canadians Abroad


Dual Citizenship

One of the questions often raised in the public debate about Canada's overseas citizens is whether or not Canada should continue to recognize dual citizenship. To ascertain what Canadians abroad think about the issue, our survey contained the statement "Canada should cease to recognize dual citizenship," asking respondents to agree or disagree. The survey data suggests that most respondents strongly disagree: nearly 15% "disagree" and 61% "strongly disagree," while only 14% of respondents indicate they agree with the statement.




Passport Renewal Fee Surcharges

A majority of Canadians abroad would also oppose having to pay a surcharge on the renewal of their Canadian passports. Nearly 70% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that "Canadians living overseas should pay a surcharge for the renewal of their passport." Only 18% indicated agreement.




Voting

Canadians living abroad do not appear to have a strong desire to vote in Canada's elections. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "Canadians living overseas should be entitled to vote in Canadian elections regardless of how long they have been absent from Canada," just over 50% of respondents agreed. Some 29% of respondents do not agree with the statement, while the remaining 19% hold a neutral position.



Taxes



Being subject to Canadian income tax is also highly unpopular with Canadians abroad. Over 77% of respondents "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the statement that "Canadians living overseas should be subject to Canadian income tax," while as few as 13% of respondents agree.



Government Services

Canadians abroad on the whole feel that they should not be treated differently from Canadian tourists in terms of receiving Canadian consular support. When asked to respond to the statement, "Canadians living overseas should be entitled to the same level of consular support as Canadian tourists," 76% of respondents agreed and 11% disagreed.

More than half of the survey respondents expect that "the Canadian government should do more to keep in touch with Canadians living overseas." Only 14% disagree with this statement.



Benefits to Canada

Respondents' opinions on the potential benefits Canadians abroad may provide to Canada are detailed in Table 5. Respondents were asked to rate eight categories of benefits each on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being "of no benefit" and 5 being "of very great benefit."

Respondents most frequently espoused two benefits: that their overseas presence creates goodwill toward Canada, and that their overseas knowledge and skills are transferable to Canada. A second tier of benefits ranked high by respondents include the belief that:

- the network of overseas contacts created by Canadians abroad could be useful for other Canadians;
- Canadians abroad could be useful in creating or enhancing institutional and cultural links between Canada and their host countries;
- Canadians abroad could be useful in creating awareness of Canadian values and culture; and
- Canadians abroad could be useful in creating business, trade and investment links with Canada.

Respondents indicated that third-tier benefits, such as being able to influence host country policies toward Canada or sending remittances to family members in Canada, were not as important as the benefits cited above. Still, it is clear that most Canadians abroad view their benefits to Canada in a 'soft power' sense — they can influence a host country and its denizens in ways that Canadians at home cannot.

Table 5: Respondents' perception on the benefits to Canada derived from Canadians living abroad

Benefits	Rate the Benefits (where 1 = no benefit and 5 = the greatest benefit)							Mean of rating	Std. Dev.
	1	2	3	4	5	Don't Know	Total		
Creating goodwill toward Canada	27 <i>5.3%</i>	12 <i>2.4%</i>	55 <i>10.8%</i>	174 <i>34.3%</i>	226 <i>44.6%</i>	13 <i>2.6%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	4.13	1.07
Knowledge and skills that are transferable to Canada	20 <i>3.9%</i>	28 <i>5.5%</i>	75 <i>14.8%</i>	137 <i>27.0%</i>	227 <i>44.7%</i>	21 <i>4.1%</i>	508 <i>100%</i>	4.07	1.10
Network of overseas contacts for other Canadians	28 <i>5.5%</i>	19 <i>3.7%</i>	66 <i>13.0%</i>	164 <i>32.3%</i>	216 <i>42.5%</i>	15 <i>3.0%</i>	508 <i>100%</i>	4.06	1.11
Creating/enhancing institutional, cultural, and other links between host country and Canada	26 <i>5.1%</i>	18 <i>3.6%</i>	72 <i>14.2%</i>	180 <i>35.5%</i>	194 <i>38.3%</i>	17 <i>3.4%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	4.02	1.08
Creating awareness of Canadian values and culture	26 <i>5.1%</i>	26 <i>5.1%</i>	77 <i>15.2%</i>	160 <i>31.6%</i>	209 <i>41.2%</i>	9 <i>1.8%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	4.00	1.12
Creating business/trading/investment links with Canada	29 <i>5.7%</i>	28 <i>5.5%</i>	75 <i>14.8%</i>	148 <i>29.2%</i>	210 <i>41.4%</i>	17 <i>3.4%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	3.98	1.16
Influencing host country policy toward Canada	40 <i>7.9%</i>	64 <i>12.6%</i>	133 <i>26.2%</i>	121 <i>23.9%</i>	100 <i>19.7%</i>	49 <i>9.7%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	3.39	1.22
Sending remittances to family members in Canada	88 <i>17.4%</i>	82 <i>16.2%</i>	125 <i>24.7%</i>	85 <i>16.8%</i>	56 <i>11.0%</i>	71 <i>14.0%</i>	507 <i>100%</i>	2.86	1.30

Note: Percentages in italics are measured against the total number of respondents successfully enumerated.

4. Conclusion

This survey is part of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's innovative study series on global Canadians. Using APF Canada's earlier estimation of the number of Canadians abroad as a starting point, this survey has attempted to provide a three-dimensional profile of Canadians living abroad. It has also aimed to obtain the views of Canadians abroad on specific policy issues that may have an impact on Canadian citizens living and working in the global economy, both at present and in the future.

This report has shed light on a number of unknowns surrounding the Canadian diaspora phenomenon, especially those regarding their demography, economic profiles, citizenship and identity, ties to Canada, and their views on aspects of Canadian domestic and foreign policies. It is hoped that this study will facilitate further public discussion in this area and contribute to a more balanced assessment of any policy that has an impact on Canadians, regardless of where they live.

The survey results have also suggested that Canadians are becoming more and more global, and that a large portion of this overseas population has retained a strong Canadian identity, kept close ties with Canada, and played an influential role abroad, where its influence on Canada's foreign relations is unique. By these accounts, a global Canadian population is a significant asset for a global Canada. How Canada utilizes this asset is one of the many challenges Canada must soon face. We at APF Canada hope this study serves as a reference point for future research, debate and discussion of the diaspora phenomenon — a small step in the right direction.

References

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Appendix A: About the Author

Kenny Zhang is Senior Research Analyst at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Mr. Zhang received his B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from Fudan University, China and the Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands, respectively. Prior to joining the Foundation, Mr. Zhang worked as an associate research professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and as a senior researcher at the Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies (RIIM) at Simon Fraser University. His main research interests focus on Canada-China trade and investment relations, China's domestic labour migration, Canada's immigration and emigration, and, most recently, the Canadian population abroad and its policy implications for Canada. Since May 2005, Mr. Zhang has been a member of the Vancouver Mayor's Task Force on Immigration.

Kenny Zhang can be contacted at kenny.zhang@asiapacific.ca.

Appendix B: Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the anonymous individuals who took part in the online survey. Without their participation, this study would have not been possible. We are especially grateful to the many Canadian organizations, associations and individuals who helped us in disseminating this survey information in Asia and the US. These organizations are listed in the following table of this Appendix.

Our thanks also go to Meyer Burstein, Shibao Guo, Jean Kunz, Chris Robinson and Wenhong Chen, all of whom provided invaluable research ideas and suggestions prior to the survey design. Special thanks must also be given to Don DeVoretz, who helped design the questionnaire and advised us on many research questions.

Several of our colleagues at APF Canada have contributed to this project. Yuen Pau Woo provided strong leadership in directing this study, and Ron Richardson and Christopher LaRoche helped extensively in editing this report.

List of Overseas Canadian Organizations Contacted in Asia and the US

Australia

Canadian Australian Chamber of Commerce	www.canauscham.org.au
Canadian Australian Club, Sydney	www.canadianaustralianclub.com/aboutus.htm
Canadian Australian Club Gold Coast /Tweed Inc.	
Canada Club of Newcastle	
Tasmanian-Canadian Association	
Canada Club of Victoria Inc.	www.canadaclub-vic.org.au
Canadian Association of South Australia	www.canadainsa.org.au
The Canadian Club of WA Inc.	www.geocities.com/canadawa01/
Canada Australia New Zealand Business Association (CANZBA) – Vancouver	www.canzba.org
Canadian Club Québécois - Brisbane	
Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand	www.acsanz.org.au/

China

Canada China Business Council - Beijing Office	www.ccbc.com/Beijing/
Canadians in China	www.canadiansinchina.com/
Club Canada	www.clubcanada.net/

Hong Kong

Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong	www.cancham.org
Canadian Club in Hong Kong	canadianclub.org.hk/
Chinese Canadian Association Hong Kong	www.ccakhk.org/
The Hong Kong-Canada Business Association	www.hkcba.com/

Indonesia

Canada Indonesia Business Development Office

www.cme-mec.ca/cibdo/

Indonesia Canada Chamber of Commerce

www.iccc.or.id

Japan

Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Japan - Tokyo Office

www.cccj.or.jp

McGill MBA Japan

www.mcgillmbajapan.com

Association of Canadian Teachers in Japan

www.actj.org/joomla

Tokyo Canadian Club

www.tokyocanadianclub.com

Quebecwa

www.quebecwa.net

Canadian Alumni Association

www.caaj.jp

Tokyo Canadians Hockey Club

www.tokyocanadians.com

South Korea

Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Korea

www.ccck.org

Malaysia

Malaysia-Canada Business Council

www.malaysia-canada.com

Canadian Association of Malaysia

www.canadians-in-kl.com/index.htm

Canadian Graduates' Association in Malaysia

www.cgamalaysia.org

Malaysia-Canada Business Council (Sabah)

New Zealand

The Canada New Zealand Business Association

www.canada-nz.org.nz

The Canadian Club of New Zealand

www.canada-nz.org.nz/canadian_club.htm

Wellington Canada Club

Christchurch Canada Club

Philippines

Canadian Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines

www.cancham.com.ph

Canadian Club of the Philippines

www.geocities.com/thecanadianonline/index.htm

Philippines - Canada Trade Council - Vancouver

www.philcantrade.org

Singapore

Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Singapore

www.cancham.org.sg

Canadian Association of Singapore

www.canadians.org.sg

Taiwan

The Canadian Society in Taiwan

www.canadiansociety.org

Thailand

The Thai-Canadian Chamber of Commerce

www.tccc.or.th

Vietnam

The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam (HoChi Minh City)

www.canchamvietnam.org

USA

Canada Arizona Business Council

www.canaz.net

O Canada Tucson

www.ocanadatucson.com

The Phoenix Expat Canadian Meetup Group

canadian.meetup.com/3/?gj=sj21

Digital Moose Lounge (Silicon Valley)

www.digitalmooselounge.com

Canadians Abroad (Los Angeles)	www.canadiansabroad.com
Québécois a Los Angeles	www.quebecoisalosangeles.org
Canadians in San Diego – CanDiego.org	www.candiego.org/index.htm
Canada25 of San Francisco	www.canada25.com/index.html
Newfoundland Club of California	www.newfoundlandclubofcalifornia.net/index.asp
CanAm - The Canadian American Society of the Southeast	www.canamsociety.org
Canadian Women's Club of Atlanta	www.cwcatlanta.org
Canadian Club of Chicago	www.canadianclubofchicago.org
Canadian Women's Club of Chicago	www.cwcchicago.com
Canadian Club of Boston	www.canadianclubofboston.com
Canadian Women's Club of Boston, Inc.	www.canadaclub.org
The New England-Canada Business Council	www.necbc.org
Upper North Side	www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/uppernorthside
Canadian Association of New York	www.canadianassociationny.org
Canadian Women's Club of New York City	www.cwcnyc.org
CanSouth Club	www.cansouth.org
Canada-America Society of Seattle	www.canada-americasociety.org
Canadian Business Network	www.canadianbusinessnetwork.com
Canadian American Business Council	www.canambusco.org
Canadian-American Chamber of Commerce	www.canamcc.org/index.html
Other	
CRA Magazine	www.cramagazine.com
Canadian Expatriates Blog	canadianexpatriatesblog.blogspot.com
Canadian Abroad Resource Guide	www.geocities.com/canadians_abroad
Association of Canadian Clubs	www.canadianclub.ca
Connect2Canada	www.connect2canada.com

Note: Highlighted organizations are those that helped the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada disseminate survey information to Canadians abroad.

Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire

Responses to this survey are strictly confidential and will only be used in the aggregate.

This survey is directed at Canadian citizens or landed immigrants currently living outside of Canada. Please indicate if you are a

- ☐ Canadian citizen by birth (continue)
- ☐ Canadian citizen through parental rights (continue)
- ☐ Canadian citizen through immigration (continue)
- ☐ Canadian landed immigrant (continue)
- ☐ Neither Canadian citizen nor landed immigrant (stop)

1. Where is your current principal residence?

- ☐ Australia
- ☐ China (PRC)
- ☐ Hong Kong SAR
- ☐ India
- ☐ Indonesia
- ☐ Japan
- ☐ Korea (Republic of)
- ☐ Malaysia
- ☐ New Zealand
- ☐ Philippine
- ☐ Singapore
- ☐ Taiwan
- ☐ Thailand
- ☐ USA
- ☐ Vietnam
- ☐ Other _____

2. How many years have you lived outside of Canada?

- ☐ Less than 1 year
- ☐ 1-3 years
- ☐ 4-5 years
- ☐ 6-9 years
- ☐ 10 years or more
- ☐ Never lived in Canada

3. What is your main reason for living abroad?

- ☐ Job/career opportunities
- ☐ Cost of living
- ☐ Tax reasons
- ☐ Educational reasons
- ☐ Family/personal reasons
- ☐ Lifestyle/climate reasons
- ☐ Health reasons
- ☐ Other _____

4. Which one of the following categories best describes your current employment situation?

- ☐ Working for the Canadian government
- ☐ Working for a Canadian business or NGO
- ☐ Working for an international organization or multinational business
- ☐ Working for a local business or NGO
- ☐ Self-employed
- ☐ Unemployed
- ☐ Student
- ☐ Retired
- ☐ Other (please specify) _____

5. What is your citizenship?

- ☐ Citizen of Canada only
- ☐ Citizen of Canada and other country
- ☐ Citizen of Canada with "permanent residency" status in other country
- ☐ Landed immigrant of Canada and citizen of other country

5b. Please indicate the name of "other" country that you have citizenship or permanent residency

6. In your professional life, which country do you identify most closely with?

- ☐ Canada
- ☐ Country that you currently reside in
- ☐ Other country (please indicate) _____

7. In terms of your personal/family life, which country do you identify most closely with?

- ☐ Canada
- ☐ Country that you currently reside in
- ☐ Other country (please indicate) _____

8. Do you consider Canada as your home?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Not sure

9. Since living abroad, how often do you on average return to Canada for visits?

- ☐ Never
- ☐ 1 trip every two years or more
- ☐ 1-2 trip(s) a year
- ☐ 3 or more trips a year

10. Which of the following statements best describes your situation?

- ☐ I plan to return to Canada to establish my principal residence within the next year
- ☐ I plan to return to Canada to establish my principal residence within the next 2-3 years
- ☐ I plan to return to Canada to establish my principal residence within the next 4-5 years
- ☐ I plan to return to Canada to establish my principal residence within the next 6-9 years
- ☐ I plan to return to Canada to establish my principal residence in 10 or more years
- ☐ I have no plans to return to Canada to establish my principal residence (skip to 15)

11. What would be your main reason for returning to Canada? (Select all that apply)

- ☐ To spend retirement years in Canada
- ☐ Job opportunities in Canada or other economic reasons
- ☐ To enrol yourself or family members in Canadian schools or other educational reasons
- ☐ To be closer to family members in Canada or other family reasons
- ☐ To enjoy quality of life in Canada
- ☐ To access Canadian health services or other social services
- ☐ Negative experiences abroad
- ☐ Other (please specify) _____

12. On a scale of 1-5, please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree)

- ☐ 12a) Canada should cease to recognize dual citizenship
- ☐ 12b) Canadians living overseas should be entitled to the same level of consular support as Canadian tourists
- ☐ 12c) Canadians living overseas should pay a surcharge for the renewal of their passports
- ☐ 12d) Canadians living overseas should be entitled to vote in Canadian elections regardless of how long they have been absent from Canada
- ☐ 12e) Canadians living overseas should be subject to a tax on their global income
- ☐ 12f) The Canadian government should do more to keep in touch with Canadians living overseas

13. On a scale of 1-5, please rate the benefits of Canadians living abroad for Canada as a whole (1 = no benefit, 2 = little benefit; 3 = moderate benefit; 4 = great benefit; 5 = very great benefit, DK = don't know)

- ☐ Knowledge and skills that are transferable to Canada
- ☐ Remittances to family members in Canada
- ☐ Creating business/trading/investment links with Canada
- ☐ Creating awareness of Canadian values and culture
- ☐ Creating goodwill towards Canada
- ☐ Creating/enhancing institutional, cultural and other links between host country and Canada
- ☐ Influencing host country policy towards Canada
- ☐ Network of overseas contacts for Canadians
- ☐ Other (please specify) _____

14. On a scale of 1-5, please rate the extent to which you get information about news and issues in Canada from the following sources (1 = not at all; 2 = rarely; 3 = occasionally; 4 = frequently; 5 = very frequently)

- ☐ Canadian media (print, web, or broadcast)
- ☐ Overseas Canadian networks
- ☐ Local media
- ☐ International media
- ☐ Canadian diplomatic posts
- ☐ Friends and family
- ☐ Other (please specify) _____

15. What is your gender?

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

16. Year of birth _____

17. Which one of the following best describes your highest education level?

- ☐ Postgraduate level
- ☐ Undergraduate level
- ☐ High school level
- ☐ Other _____

18. Province of residence before leaving Canada:

- ☐ Alberta
- ☐ British Columbia
- ☐ Manitoba
- ☐ New Brunswick
- ☐ Newfoundland and Labrador
- ☐ Nova Scotia
- ☐ Ontario
- ☐ Prince Edward Island
- ☐ Quebec
- ☐ Saskatchewan
- ☐ Northwest Territories
- ☐ Yukon
- ☐ Nunavut
- ☐ Never lived in Canada

Thank you!



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